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ABSTRACT 
 
The Perceived Power:  Government and Taxation during the American Civil War.  
(December 2005) 
Jane Flaherty, B.A., Boston University; M.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Harold C. Livesay 
 
 
This dissertation examines how the internal revenue legislation enacted during 
the American Civil War fostered a new role for government in society. The delegates to 
the 1787 Constitutional Convention constructed a system of fiscal federalism for the 
United States. The national government relied on indirect taxes, particularly customs 
duties, as its primary source of revenue.  Concurrently, the states developed an array of 
unique financing strategies, including taxing citizens directly. The dire need for war 
funds compelled this “unperceived” government to expand beyond the constraints 
imposed by this antebellum fiscal structure. Through my research, I found that the taxes 
imposed during the war represent an attempt to cope with a financial crisis, rather than 
impart a particular preconceived agenda. Because Congress had depended on customs 
receipts as its primary source of revenue for four decades, lawmakers had few ready 
options for meeting the overwhelming war costs.   In developing the war revenue 
measures, lawmakers borrowed policies and statutes from the past, rather than relying 
upon the “free labor ideology” that united the party. The need to meet the escalating 
costs of war forced lawmakers to react with more speed than deliberation.  They often 
sacrificed their principles to provide the means to prosecute the war and reunite the 
nation. Once peace returned, the question of whether to “sink” the debt or shrink 
revenues, vexed lawmakers, and kept the government from returning to its limited role in 
the economy.  As a result, the United States government emerged from the Civil War as 
a perceived power, one that touched citizens “individually” through the new internal 
revenue system.  I concluded that the fiscal powers of the national government expanded 
beyond the restraints imposed throughout the antebellum era.  The internal revenue 
measures enacted during the war played a significant role in this transformation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
“Nothing is more striking to the European traveler in the United States,” 
commented Alexis de Tocqueville in 1834, “than the absence of what we term the 
government.”  Coming from a country with a “completely centralized” authority, the 
American government impressed de Tocqueville by  retaining its “vigor” while 
distributing its influence so broadly.  “This accounts for [the government] passing 
unperceived,” he continued.  “The power exists but its representative is nowhere to be 
seen.”1 
This dissertation examines one aspect of the maturation of the American 
government from Tocqueville’s “unperceived” force into a perceived power. Through 
the internal revenue legislation drafted during the American Civil War, the national 
government became a tangible force in the American economy and society.  This 
legislation, I suggest, played a significant role in expanding the national government 
beyond the state centered federalist structure of the antebellum era.  Before the Civil 
War, the national government sustained itself primarily through import duties.  
Collecting tariffs emerged as the most efficient and cost effective means of providing 
revenue for the central authority.   
Taxing citizens through imports also complemented the federalist structure of 
government.  States assumed responsibility for “lives, liberties, and property” of citizens, 
maintaining control of the laws and activities within their boundaries. Concurrently, the 
national government remained dependent on indirect taxes to which Americans 
remained insensible.  This system reflected the vision of government James Madison 
articulated at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention. Madison reassured the fellow 
delegates that the national government would not exercise its authority over citizens of 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the format of the journal Civil War History. 
 
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1954): I: 72-74, 90-94. 
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the country “individually.”2  Instead, states would remain the primary governing 
influence in the lives of Americans.  “The Federal Union established by the Constitution 
was a novel political experiment,” observed Herman Belz “that combined features of 
both confederation of sovereign state and a sovereign national government.”3 
Maintaining this balance in sovereignty became the challenge of political and judicial 
leaders throughout the antebellum era. 
However, the early revenue system of the United States supported this federalist 
system. The national government relied overwhelmingly on indirect taxes on 
consumption.  In collecting these taxes through an intermediary, such as a customs 
officer at a distant port or a merchant, indirect taxes provided steady revenue, but 
remained intangible. Since the tax became incorporated into the price of the good, the 
consumer paid the tax in small increments (through each purchase) and remained 
unaware of the actual amount contributed to the Treasury. The tax gatherer did not touch 
citizens individually.   
Direct taxes, on the other hand, secured the states’ finances, through assessments 
of real and personal property.  This provided the most tangible form of revenue 
collection a government can undertake.  Citizens knew exactly how much they 
contributed paid these taxes “directly” to their local government officials, in lump sums, 
rather than piecemeal.  These taxes supported local projects, where citizens saw the 
results of their investments.  Further, states did not rely solely on direct taxes, as the 
national government relied on indirect taxes.  Instead, states used a variety of funding 
schemes to meet their expenses. “There were few limits on what states could do to raise 
revenues,” noted John Joseph Wallis.  This becomes an important aspect of fiscal policy 
at the outbreak of the Civil War; while states have a variety of options for meeting war 
expenses, the national government’s options remained far more limited.  The influence 
                                                 
2 These terms come from the Constitution, the Preamble and Article I, Section 8; James 
Madison, Notes of the Debates on the Federal Convention of 1787, Adrienne Koch, ed. 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1960), 140.  
3 Herman Belz, ed. The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Union 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2000), viii. 
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exerted through this taxation made state and local governments responsive to 
constituents, and while leaving the national government confined within its “sphere.”4  
In an attempt to curb the “power of the purse,” the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention created a fiscal system that gave state governments great flexibility in 
meeting their expenses. Restricted only in collecting export duties and coining money, 
states retained a great deal of flexibility in generating adequate revenues.  Conversely, 
the national government worked within more constrained powers, both from 
Constitutional provisions and public expectations, of taxation that contributed to its 
limited role in antebellum national development. The dearth of national revenue officers, 
and other administrators of power, kept the national government as an “unperceived” 
force in the lives of most Americans.  This antebellum fiscal structure great inhibited the 
choices available to the Union government when faced with the challenge of raising 
enough funds to meet the expenses of the Civil War.   
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention constructed a federalist form of 
government for the United States in which “national unification” was achieved through 
the “maintenance of subnational systems.”  The success of this structure required 
cooperative relationships throughout the political system.”5  Though elements of 
federalism rebounded in the late nineteenth century, the government fiscal policy never 
retrenched.  Internal taxes became a fixed component of federal revenue, and forever 
altered the role of the central government in society. “The old federal republic in which 
the national government had rarely touched the average citizen except through the post-
office,” James M. McPherson explained, “gave way to a more centralized polity that 
taxed people directly.”6  This study focuses particularly on the way in which internal 
taxation evolved from this federalist base into a national force.  Other policy 
                                                 
4 John Joseph Wallis, “Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and 
Constitutional Change, 1842-1852,” Journal of Economic History, 65 (March, 2005), 
215. 
5 Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell, 1966), 2. 
6 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Ballatine 
Books, 1998), 859. 
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implications of federalism have received great attention, most notably how this system 
fostered and perpetuated the national blight of slavery. Although scholars have 
recognized this evolution rarely do they tie the fiscal system of the antebellum era to the 
early stages of Civil War fiscal policy. 
This in part explains the uniformity of criticism directed at the Civil War tax 
legislation. Studies of the Republican fiscal policies begin during the War, with opening 
of the emergency session of Congress on July 4, 1861, failing to take into account the 
obstacles that the Republican leaders faced.  The “stunted government”7 that emerged 
after the antebellum era created many impediments to meeting the fiscal demands of the 
war.  Chapter I examines the development of fiscal federalism, a structure that left little 
financial power with the national government, while vesting state governments with a 
great deal of flexibility in their revenue policies.8 
Chapter II addresses the ramifications of this fiscal federalism. The Treasury 
department began the Civil War with few funds and poor credit.   Bankrupt and 
disorganized, the Treasury had to find resources quickly. Because the central 
government had depended on customs receipts as its primary source of revenue for four 
decades, lawmakers had few options for meeting the tremendous war costs. The 
government faced an uncertain future.  The subsequent decisions made by Union 
leaders, most notably Treasury secretary Salmon P. Chase, reveal why the Republicans 
adopted many of their controversial policies.   
In Chapter III, I argue that the tax measures inaugurated during the War drew 
from tradition. The United States had not collected internal taxes since the War of 1812.  
Rather than drafting policy anew, Civil War legislators looked to precedent, particularly 
English tax policy. Because the war revenue legislation resulted from urgent necessity 
rather than design, lawmakers relied on accepted practices and policies that had worked 
                                                 
7 Term used by Bray Hammond, Sovereignty and the Empty Purse: Banks and Politics in 
the Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 1-26. 
8 The term “fiscal federalism” found in Christopher Hamilton and Donald T. Wells, 
Federalism, Power, and Political Economy: A New Theory of Federalism’s Impact on 
American Life (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 81. 
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in the past. Republican fiscal policy did not spring from the free labor ideology that 
arose in the late antebellum era.  Nor did the designs of party members, hoping to cash in 
on their new power, solely direct the course of legislation.  English fiscal policy of the 
seventeenth century greatly influenced the development of Civil War tax initiatives. This 
chapter examines the origins of the theories that laid the basis for Civil War financial 
legislation. In particular, I question the “regressive” nature of the taxes, and instead 
suggest that “sparing the necessaries of the poor,” an ideal that arose in England in the 
late seventeenth century, greatly influenced the wartime fiscal legislation.  
How did these influences manifest into policy?  Scholarship on the Civil War 
fiscal legislation posits that the Republican Party directed the course of their legislation 
either to serve the interests of favored constituents, or to implement a pre-war ideology.  
I suggest, in Chapter IV, that the wartime fiscal policies represent an attempt to cope 
with a crisis, rather than impart a particular preconceived agenda.  The lawmakers 
reacted with more speed than deliberation, and often sacrificed their principles to 
provide the means to prosecute the war and reunite the nation. The economic or 
ideological determinism that many scholars associate with Republican initiatives during 
the war does not surface in the formulation of tax policy.  Instead, one finds a fledgling 
party that united on social rather than economic issues, struggling to cope with a fiscal 
crisis.  Though conceived in haste, the internal revenue system, more than any other 
measures adopted by the wartime government, fostered the expansion and 
nationalization of government, one goal of the Whig element of the party.  These 
policies also initiated the broad corruption of the government that pervades in the late 
nineteenth century. This consequence resulted more from the exigencies of war that the 
manifestation of political or economic objectives. 
Chapter IV also examines the Herculean task of attempting to create a revenue 
system.  As expenses continued to outpace receipts, lawmakers frantically expanded the 
tax legislation and incorporated segments of the economy that Republicans had hoped to 
avoid. Legislators designed a diffuse system of taxation, spreading the burden across the 
economy, rather than focusing on a few objects. The overwhelming expenses forced the 
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expansion of the revenue system into a program that reached into every pocket through a 
variety of consumer and industrial goods. 
Chapter V looks at the post-war decisions regarding the future tax policy.  
Notable studies of the fiscal effectives of the war, particularly the introduction of the 
“Greenbacks” have shown how lawmakers dealt with the emergencies implemented 
during the crisis.9  However, little attention has been directed at the tax program.10  This 
chapter addresses the dilemma over what to do with the “war” revenue measures, and 
how this shaped American fiscal policy for the remainder of the nineteenth century. 
Historically, taxes on alcohol and tobacco, considered unhealthful and amoral luxuries 
rather than nourishing necessities, produced reliable sources of revenue, and thus 
became the basis of the post-war revenue system. In particular, this chapter examines the 
work of David A. Wells, a “scientist” whose well-respected study of the Civil War debt 
helped him secure the office of Special Commissioner of Internal Revenue.  Wells 
helped convert the internal revenue system from “a confused mass of omnipresent, 
duplicating and oppressive taxes” into a “unified edifice founded on rational 
principles.”11 His struggles to formulate new policy demonstrated how the fiscal system 
expanded during the war.  
In matters of political economy, American leaders of different political leanings 
repeatedly displayed an extraordinary pragmatism. Americans, historians Carolyn 
Webber and Aaron Wildvaskyin observed, “are the most unideological people” who 
                                                 
9 Three classics include: Wesley C. Mitchell, A History of the Greenbacks, with Special 
Reference to the Economic Consequences of Their Issue (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1903); Robert P. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study 
of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1959); Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American 
Finance, 1865-1879 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964). 
10 The income tax remains one of the few tax measures introduced during the war that 
has been studied in detail during the postwar period. 
11 Herbert R. Ferleger, David A. Wells and the American Revenue System, 1865-1870 
(Philadelphia, PA: Porcupine Press, 1977), 116. 
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“practice more than they preach.”12 The development of American fiscal policy 
remained a fine balance between high ideals and grounded practicality. This began in the 
colonial era, when everything from scraps of paper to wampum passed as currency. The 
fiscal system created in the early Republic demonstrates this pragmatism.  There always 
existed a “sharp dichotomy between theory and practice in American policy,” Daniel 
Elazar noted.13  When faced with difficult choices, lawmakers resorted to practical 
solutions. I do not dispute the commanding literature that shows ideology played a 
significant role in the development the American government,14 however this study does 
suggest that in the realm of fiscal policy, the “dominance of pragmatism,” often 
overwhelmed the ideological goals of political leaders.15   
 
The “Forgotten Force” 
 The Civil War compelled an expansion of the federalist structure that endured 
from the ratification of the Constitution until the firing on Fort Sumter. The delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention erected a federalist system of government in which 
“authority is exercised concurrently by a national government and state or provincial 
governments.”16  Political scientists have examined this federalist structure, but most 
research has focused on the dramatic changes in the relationship between the state and 
national governments during the twentieth century.17 In historical literature of the early 
                                                 
12 Carolyn Webber and Aaron Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the 
Western World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 151. 
13 Elazar, American Federalism, 24. 
14 Two classics include: Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Eric Foner, Free Soil, 
Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
15 Robert W. Fogel, The Union Pacific Railroad: A Case in Premature Enterprise 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), 39. 
16 Vincent Ostrum, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self –
Governing Society (San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1991), 7. 
17 Excellent review of the literature in Harry N. Scheiber, “Federalism and Legal 
Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System,” Law and 
Society Review, 4 (Spring, 1980), 663-722. 
 8
nineteenth century however, this federalist structure remains a “forgotten force.”18  
Daniel Elazar, Harry Scheiber, and J. Willard Hurst remain the guiding forces in 
directing attention to the centrality federalism to American development during the 
antebellum era.19   
Yet the federalist system greatly influenced the development of American fiscal 
policy. The opening of the House of Burgess in 1619 introduced an early version of 
federalism to the American polity. This assembly gave the British colonists the 
opportunity to exercise local control over questions that a distant Parliament could not 
resolve quickly. During the subsequent century and a half of “salutary neglect” 
Americans developed an enduring devotion to local governance.  Autonomous colonial 
towns and counties “were largely autonomous, and they stood to lose more than they 
were likely to gain from a loose acquiescence in the action” of the remote Parliament 
and Crown.20  Distrust of a distant, and corrupt power flourished in the years before the 
American Revolution.  The “older tradition” of this governance “had been so 
institutionalized in colonial politics,” suggested Jack P. Greene, “that it could never 
really be displaced.”21   
Americans have embraced this dual governance as a central component of 
political intercourse. “Our polity has been based on a conception of local political 
organizations which historically and economically have each a certain unity, which 
internally have a large degree of peculiar interest and geographically have conditions of 
their own, of quite diverse even from those of their neighbors.  It has been based on a 
                                                 
18 Christopher Hamilton and Donald T. Wells, Federalism, Power, and Political 
Economy: A New Theory on Federalism’s Impact on American Life (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), Chapter I. 
19 Daniel Elazar, op. cit., 1966; Harry Scheiber, American Law and the Constitutional 
Order: Historical Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978); J. 
Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in 
Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
20 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Second ed. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 164. 
21 Jack P. Greene, “Political Mimesis: A Consideration of the Historical and Cultural 
Roots of Legislative Behavior in the British Colonies in the Eighteenth Century,” 
American Historical Review, 75 (December, 1969), 359. 
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conception of the individual human being as the moral and social and so the political and 
legal unit.”22  The fear of losing local control became the rallying point for the Anti-
Federalists who opposed the implementation of the Constitution.  James Madison 
reassured his reticent “fellow-citizens” that the new national authority created by the 
Constitution would not “be charged with the whole power of making and administering 
laws.” Instead, the “subordinate governments … will retain their due authority and 
activity” in order to secure “private rights and public happiness.”23 Almost half a century 
later, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story affirmed Madison’s vision.  “The division and 
distribution of legislative powers between the state and national governments,” he 
explained, “ is adapted to preserve the liberty and promote the happiness of the people of 
the United States.”24  
Defining the limits of power of the separate government spheres became more 
difficult as lawmakers struggled to convert constitutional aspirations into working 
statutes.  The national government remained one of “specified and limited powers,” 
although those powers remained “ample” and “vast,” including, “the regulation of all 
external concerns,” protecting citizens from “foreign national and internal dissentions,” 
and the “regulation of commerce.”  To attain “these great and desirable objects, the 
purse and sword are placed in its hands.”25  But throughout the antebellum era, state and 
local governments remained the principal authority in the lives of most Americans.  
                                                 
22 Roscoe Pound, “Law and the Federal Government,” in Federalism as a Democratic 
Process (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1942), 10. 
23 James Madison, “Federalist 14,” in The Federalist, Paul L. Ford, ed. (New York: 
Henry Holt, Co., 1898), 84-87.  
24 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution. 1833. reprint. (Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press, 1987),514. 
25 Both Brockenbrough and Alexander Hamilton came up with a similar list of what the 
responsibilities of the government, although their views on the use of government power 
differed.  See, Brockenbrough, John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland, 
Gerald Gunther, ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969); Alexander 
Hamilton, “Federalist 23,” in The Federalist, 144. 
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“Nineteenth century American governance,” William J. Novak noted, “remained 
decidedly local.”26   
The first political parties coalesced around the different ideals over the role of the 
central government in American politics and society.  The Federalists believed that the 
Constitution created “a vigorous and energetic government where a feeble and 
ineffectual confederation once stood,” explained Andrew Lenner.  “The authority of the 
federal government was thus sovereign – ‘supreme, irresistible, absolute’ – in respect to 
national concerns.”27  Alexander Hamilton, while serving as the first Treasury secretary, 
proposed actions that relied on the “complete powers” of the central government.  
Hamilton argued that, “every power vested in a government is in its nature sovereign, 
and includes . . . a right to employ all the means requisite and fairly applicable to the 
attainment of the ends of such power.”  Hamilton reasoned that these powers “implied” 
powers “may be employed as an instrument or mean of carrying into execution any of 
the specified powers” outlined in the Constitution.28  Although Hamilton’s program 
concentrated on financial policy, “economic development was far from foremost among 
his objectives,” Stuart Bruchey suggested.  “He sought above all the stability and staying 
power of the national government.”29 
In opposition to this expansive use of national authority, the Democratic-
Republicans argued that consolidating power within a central authority would lead to the 
emergence of a corrupt government.  “Debt, taxes, wars, armies, and navies were all 
pillars of corruption,” Henry C. Adams explained.30  Keeping the central authority from 
strengthening the military, assuming great financial burdens, and overtaxing the citizens, 
                                                 
26 William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 10. 
27 Andrew Lenner, “A Tale of Two Constitutions: Nationalism in the Federalist Era,” 
American Journal of Legal History, 40 (January, 1996), 73. 
28 Alexander Hamilton, “Hamilton’s Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of 
the United States,” in The Federalist, 655. 
29 Stuart Bruchey, The Wealth of the Nation: An Economic History of the United States 
(New York: Harper Row, 1988), 21. 
30 Henry C. Adams, History of the United States during the Administration of Thomas 
Jefferson. 2 vols. Reprint. (New York: Albert and Charles Bohni, 1930): I, 239. 
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helped insure the continuance of a more virtuous government. Thus states must retain 
powers not delegated to the national government.  “High taxation, extensive 
bureaucracy, financial and currency manipulations, special privileges and monopolies 
represented,” to the early Republicans, according to James L. Huston, “the concrete 
actions aristocratic government took to warp the distribution of wealth in favor of the 
few and to the detriment of the many.”31  In relying upon these ideals, Thomas Jefferson, 
as Secretary of State, resisted much of the economic program proposed by Hamilton.  In 
his response to Hamilton’s proposal to establish a national bank, Jefferson countered that 
the general government might employ only the “expressed” powers clearly designated in 
the Constitution.  To give the government the use of implied powers, “to do any act they 
please which might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and 
subsequent enumerations of power completely useless.”32  Jeffersonian Republicans 
“believed that the union would only be strong and vigorous if federal principles were 
respected; encroaching on local affairs would weaken and dissolve” the government.33   
By granting the Jeffersonian Republicans power through the “Revolution of 
1800” the electorate embraced the ideal of a “limited government, consisting of clearly 
defined and enumerated powers,” argued Lenner.34   Throughout the antebellum era, 
leaders invoked numerous checks to keep the national government distant, and confined, 
within its “sphere of action.” These included President James Madison 1817 veto of the 
Bonus Bill, President Andrew Jackson’s veto of the Maysville Road Bill, the attacks on 
the First and Second Bank of the United States, and the legislative tussles between free 
trade advocates and those who advocated protective tariffs to aid industrial development. 
Debates on the role of the national government continued, however one dominant 
                                                 
31 James L. Huston, “The American Revolutionaries, the Political Economy of 
Aristocracy, and the American Concept of the Distribution of Wealth, 1765-1900,” 
American Historical Review, 98 (October, 1993), 1089. 
32 Thomas Jefferson, “Jefferson’s Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank,” 
The Federalist, 651-652. 
33 Andrew Lenner, Separate Spheres: Republican Constitutionalism in the Federalist 
Era,” American Journal of Legal History, 41 (April, 1997, 281. 
34 Andrew Lenner, “A Tale of Two Constitutions: Nationalism in the Federalist Era,” 
American Journal of Legal History, 40 (January, 1996), 105. 
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political party, the Democrats, emerged during the antebellum era.  One tenet of the 
party’s platform stated that, “the federal government is one of limited powers.”35   
Although expressed by a political party, the American voters embraced this 
sentiment.  Jean Baker observed that, “Party leaders shaped and articulated mass 
inchoate sentiments, but did not create them”36 Though different opposition parties 
offered a vision of a more vigorous national government, Democrats who supported a 
“limited” national government controlled the House of Representatives for 24 years and 
the Senate for 28 years, between 1828-1860.37  Through this electoral supremacy, 
Americans showed they favored a limited role for the national government.  Maintaining 
a stronger position for the government fell to the unelected justices of the Supreme Court 
under the leadership of John Marshall. 
These differences in constitutional interpretation of government power emerged 
as the continuing force that divided political parties throughout the antebellum era.  
Economic policy emerged as the most tangible manifestation of these differences. The 
subsequent debates over support for internal improvements, protection of “infant 
industries”, and government authority over banks symbolized the basic concern over 
what role the national government should play in civic society.  The continuing belief 
that the development of “great executive prerogative” could foster “patronage, 
corruption, and tyranny” convinced many voters to support platforms that called for a 
limited national government. President James Madison vetoed the popular “Bonus Bill” 
of 1817 that would have applied the surplus funds from the Bank of the United States to 
the development of the nation’s roads and canals, because he feared the effects of the 
bill.  “Madison saw in it the worst of all possible corruptions . . . because it placed in 
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jeopardy once more the balanced federal system of government,” John L. Larson 
explained.38   
The fear of “corruption and consolidation” helped to limit the power of the 
national government, a limitation that Americans embraced.  This structure had 
continuity throughout the antebellum era.  Professor Charles B. Goodrich confirmed the 
role of the national government in society during an 1853 Lyceum lecture to an audience 
in Lowell, Massachusetts.  He explained in words similar to those articulated by 
Madison, that the national government protects the citizens from outside “molestation,” 
from either foreign countries or other states, “thus securing the life, liberty, and estate.”  
State governments “reached nearer home” and “controls our rights, duties and 
obligations as members of society.”39 
Although the political parties that debated the boundaries between the national 
and state governments, both agreed that these separate authorities retained power within 
their respective spheres.  This “division and distribution of legislative powers,” 
commented Joseph Story, “is adapted to preserve the liberty and promote the happiness 
of the American people.”40   This consensus helped preserve the nation despite the 
growing sectional tensions.  “The range of ideas which practical politicians can 
conveniently believe in is normally limited by the climate of opinion that sustains their 
culture,” Carter Goodrich reckoned.  “They differ sometimes bitterly, over current issues 
but they also share a general framework of ideas which makes it possible for them to 
cooperate when the campaigns are over.”41  J. Willard Hurst identified this common 
conception of government thus:  “[Americans] in the nineteenth century were prepared 
to make strong positive use of law to maintain such conditions as it thought essential to 
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the main flow of private activity.”42 This meant that governance occurred at the state 
level, where citizens could keep a close eye on the use of resources, while the national 
government concentrated on broader policies. In embracing a federalist system, 
Americans did not reject “government,” but instead trusted and supported, through their 
tax dollars, local governance over national authority.  
 
The Paradox of Federal Power 
The entrenchment of slavery in American society during the antebellum era helps 
demonstrate the paradox of federal power throughout this era.  The calls to curtail the 
expansion of government power grew shriller as slavery became obsolete in the North 
and more fundamental to the economy of the southern states.  As more Americans 
rejected slavery, the continuance of the “peculiar institution” relied on the ability of the 
states to maintain control over their “domestic institutions.”  Inaugurated at the 
Constitutional Convention, the relentless effort to maintain human beings as property 
contributed to the effort to keep the national government constrained. “Slavery was so 
clearly within the states’ reserved rights, and the Constitution so explicitly restricted 
congressional authority” over the institution, explained William H. Freehling, “that if the 
Constitution was preserved inviolate, Congress could never touch slavery.”43   While the 
early “republican” ideal of limiting government derived from a fear of corruption and 
consolidation, the desire to preserve slavery soon overwhelmed these ideological 
concerns. Limiting the power of the national government became deeply enmeshed with 
the preservation of slavery. The doctrine of states’ rights has become so intimately 
associated with the antebellum South that Americans forget the first volatile states rights 
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movement that threatened to sever the nation occurred in New England during the War 
of 1812, not South Carolina in 1831.44 
John Randolph of Roanoke incited the fear that granting the government 
“colossal” power created the potential for the abolition of slavery.  During the 1824 
debates over an ambitious program of internal improvements, Randolph declared that, 
“If Congress possesses the power to do what is proposed by this bill . . . they may 
emancipate every slave in the United States.”45  John C. Calhoun made the same 
argument in a more nuanced manner in 1831 during the Nullification Crisis:  “Our 
peculiar domestic institution mark us as its certain victim [of “mighty” government 
power] unless we can be protected by the interposed sovereignty of the states.”46   
Until the 1820’s, the period when slavery emerged as a dominant factor in the 
American economy, the liberalism of the early Republic thwarted the expansion of the 
national government’s power.  However, the growing threat of abolition made it 
necessary to utilize national power in repatriating runaway slaves, keeping abolitionist 
literature from circulating, and asserting the right to move slaves into the territories, and 
potentially, free states.  As Debow’s Review warned in 1853, “To accomplish the 
abolition of slavery is only one of the visionary dogmas of the day,” soon rights and 
property would be abrogated.47  To keep citizens free, and their property inviolable, the 
power of the national government needed to remain confined to the “several powers 
conferred” by the Constitution. State governments must retain the power “to govern men 
and things within the limits of their dominion.”48 The “fugitive-slave complex” created a 
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“basic formula for claiming federal protection of slavery while denying federal power to 
interfere with slavery” in the states where it existed.49   
To understand the vitriolic reaction of slaveholders to the expansion of 
government power, one must view the owners as “speculators” rather than “investors.”  
“Every political discussion of slavery was an event that could affect the value of every 
slaveholders’ property,” observed Gavin Wright. Protecting state sovereignty to preserve 
slavery fit neatly with the revolutionary vision of keeping the central government small.  
Other economic issues, such as “tariff, banking, and internal improvements” became 
“greatly defused and compromised by the 1850’s,” Wright continued. The preservation 
of slavery emerged as the dominant economic interest of the antebellum era.50   
A delicate balance ensued. Checking government power protected slavery within 
the states that permitted the peculiar institution to flourish.  However, as the anti-slavery 
“clamor” grew nationally, slave-owners needed the government’s protection against the 
threat of the abolitionist movement. The postal service limited the distribution of 
inflammatory material in the slave states.  The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice 
Roger B. Taney, struck down state Personal Liberty laws in the northern states that arose 
starting in the 1840’s.51  Slave-owners repeatedly huddled under the shield of the Fifth 
Amendment to guarantee their right to maintain their “property.”  The Supreme Court 
decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) decision affirmed that slave-owners could carry 
this property, like any other, into territories, even if Congress or the residents of that 
territory disapproved. All these actions limited the national authority not only in 
principle, but also in reality. 
Although most directly associated with the states’ rights agitation and the effort 
to limit the national authority, the “slaveocracy’s” efforts to preserve their hegemony 
also helped to augment the power of the central government. The federal government 
                                                 
49 Donald E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, Law, Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical 
Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 24. 
50 Gavin Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South: Households, Markets, and 
Wealth in the Nineteenth Century (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 144-150, 131. 
51 Thomas D. Moriss, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North, 1780-1861 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). 
 17
protected slavery most zealously with the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.  
Through this law, the national government exerted its authority over free states that did 
not cooperate with the repatriation of runaway slaves.  Federal marshals intervened 
directly in returning runaway slaves to their masters.  Many free blacks, who could not 
prove their nativity in a northern state, also fell victim to the government under this law. 
Assisting in the capture of fugitive slaves became a duty for citizens of free states under 
penalty of incarceration and a stiff fine for non-compliance, thus forcing people to 
participate in an activity they did not sanction.  This measure expanded the role of 
government, in particular its relationship with individual citizens. 
Beaten then arrested for publishing an account of a fugitive slave’s capture, a 
Wisconsin newspaperman faced federal charges for impeding the Fugitive Slave Act. In 
the Supreme Court case that resulted, Ableman v. Booth (1859) Chief Justice Taney 
reaffirmed the “supremacy” of the national authority over State laws blocking the 
removal of runaway slaves from their boundaries..52  Donald Fehrenbacher also 
concluded that, “The fugitive slave complex as a whole provided the South with the 
basic formula for claiming federal protection of slavery while denying federal power to 
interfere with [the institution] directly.”53 
The Democratic party evolved from a party that professed, “Congress had no 
right to legislate slavery out of the territories,” to a new stance that, it must “protect 
slavery in them.”54  The growth of national power did not occur suddenly during the 
Civil War, but incrementally during the antebellum period.  President James Buchanan 
“searched the Constitution” and found that he had “no power” to keep southern states 
from seceding during the winter of 1860-1861.55  Yet, he authorized an army of 5900 
men to march into a territory to quell a domestic institution that both Republicans and 
Democrats found repugnant.  Buchanan spent almost $40 million on the “Mormon War” 
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to stop polygamy from flourishing in the Utah territory, and potentially spreading to 
other states.56   Yet, he could not muster the same resources to stop the secession 
movement.  I use this example to show that slavery did not completely curtail 
government power, as often suggested, just redirected its focus.   
 
The Myth of Laissez-Faire 
 A proper interpretation of government’s role in society throughout the nineteenth 
century has eluded many who still cling to the “myth of laissez-faire.”57  During the 
antebellum era, a vigorous “hostility to government and government action,” emerged, 
according to Sidney Fine.  “The Jacksonian drive against monopoly,” Fine continued, 
“created a negative rather than positive approach to government intervention in civic 
life.”  By limiting “monopoly and special privileges,” competition would flourish and 
ensure a “free field for individuals.”58  Social scientists intrigued with “new 
institutionalism” and “state-building” have concentrated their efforts on government 
development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, suggesting that little state 
formation occurred earlier.59  In an extreme statement of this sentiment, Richard F. 
Bensel theorized that the “American state” was a “mere shell” until 1859.  The “modern” 
(post-Civil War) government iinherited “nil” from the antebellum era.”60  
 The charged and increasingly partisan debates over slavery, tariff policy, the 
Bank of the United States, and the internal improvements seemed to signal a dispute 
between “laissez-faire” philosophy and a more interventionist doctrine. Leonard White, 
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the expert on nineteenth century federal administration, found a “laissez-faire attitude 
reigned in the government” throughout the antebellum era.61  Harry Watson found no 
“national planning policy” to direct the “Market Revolution” that swept the United 
States after the 1820’s.62  In agreement, Douglass North related that “institutional and 
political policies . . . modified rather than replaced” the “forces” unleashed by the market 
economy.63  Lawrence F. Kohl offered that the antebellum period relied on the “politics 
of individualism” and suggested that Americans refused to “surrender any portion of 
independence to achieve a larger public end.”64  
The idea that American government during this period represented a non-
interventionist structure denuded of power or authority misses the mark. Though the 
national government did not resemble the more activist force of today, local and state 
authorities contributed directly to economic expansion throughout the antebellum era. 
Carter Goodrich noted that, “there was little sustained and inflexible opposition to the 
use of public agencies in the promotion of economic development.”65  Through the 
1820’s the national government promoted economic development both directly and 
indirectly.  Tariffs and bounties provided the most direct sources of government aid.  
Distributing public lands, initially for education, then increasingly for the promotion of 
internal development, such as providing land grants to states for railroad development 
also demonstrated the government’s use of its authority to promote economic 
development.66  When the movement to limit federal involvement in these enterprises 
crested, state governments continued the tradition.  States launched a vigorous role in 
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funding development.  Governance in the nineteenth century, according to David Potter, 
became “a constant endeavor to make the economic abundance of the nation 
accessible.”67 
 A group of “commonwealth studies” showed the state governments engaged in 
vigorous social and economic policy throughout the antebellum era 68.  Robert A. Lively 
summarized this sentiment: “The movement was virtually unlimited as to time and place 
… from the beginning to the end of the nineteenth century, governments were deeply 
involved in lending, borrowing, building, and regulating.”  However, this investment 
occurred primarily at the state, not national, level.69  
States actively engaged in promoting internal improvements.  They borrowed 
approximately $109 million between 1830-1850, to develop transportation infrastructure 
(canals, railroads, and turnpikes).70  “In Great Britain,” Carter Goodrich noted, “most 
canals and all railroads were built by private capital; in the United States, government 
was responsible for 70 percent of investment in canals and 30 percent of the investment 
in railroads”71 State and local governments pursued development when the national 
government withdrew.  This became the hallmark of “fiscal federalism” discussed in 
Chapter I.  “State, economy, and society were mutually interwoven in an overarching 
practice of well regulated governance,” posited William J. Novak.72  States assumed the 
role of promoting development, as the national government retreated from these 
enterprises. 
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United in their eagerness to “build-up their country and make their fortunes, 
Americans relied on state government support.”73  Government support provided access 
to the public domain, protected settlers from the Native Americans, provided a usable 
currency to facilitate trade, and built arteries to move goods back and forth to the market.  
“The great demand for capital in the United States, and the extent of territory compared 
to population,” Albert Gallatin reasoned, necessitated government sponsorship of 
internal improvements.74  When the federal government withdrew from direct support of 
these projects after the presidency of John Quincy Adams, state government filled the 
void.  State-based projects also relieved Americans of the fear of concentrating too much 
power in the central government.  Andrew Jackson noted in his Maysville Road veto that 
the national government must “avoid an evil influence upon the local concerns of the 
country.”  He did not “oppose federal projects in principle,” instead believed the 
Constitution mandated that state governments, not the national government, guide this 
development.  
Facilitating the “release of individual creative energy,” noted J. Willard Hurst, 
“remained the dominant paradigm in American law during the nineteenth century.”75 
Rather than a “laissez-faire” attitude toward government, state and local governments 
assumed energetic responsibility for ensuring public safety, providing education and 
maintaining a “well-regulated market,” and  “facilitated local trade.”76 Indeed, while 
serving as president, Martin Van Buren complained that communities look to 
government “for too much.”77  Lawrence Kohl described the American attitude toward 
government during the Jacksonian era as “protect me, then let me alone.”78  Rather than 
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an era of rugged individualism, Americans actively used government to further their 
ambitions.  But this relationship occurred at the local and state level, not with the 
national government.  
“Americans in the nineteenth century asked the impossible of their government,” 
quipped Wallace Farnham.  They required it “to subsidize without governing, … transfer 
the nation’s resources into their hands, … underwrite enterprise without stomping on 
liberty,” and provide “domestic tranquility” without “consistent force or steady 
revenue.”79  Economic development occurred with state aid and guidance. 
 
The Revolution in Government  
The American Civil War breached, but did not destroy, the lines of the federalist 
system established during the antebellum era. The national government assumed 
responsibilities that had, historically, been claimed by the states.  The Homestead Act 
and the aid to the Pacific Railroad provided direct aid in economic development, two 
areas dominated by states since the 1820’s. Citizenship, the right to vote, and 
guaranteeing the civil rights of four million freedmen in southern states fell under 
national, not state, control. In the late nineteenth century however, the national 
government reverted back to the antebellum federalist structure of leaving these matters 
to state and local control. Both the Union and Confederate governments mandated 
conscription for the first time in both the Union and the Confederacy, ensnaring the poor 
and patriotic, but missing those with property or the means to buy a replacement.  
States soon resumed their responsibility for the “life and liberty” of their citizens.  
They took control over voting rights through devises such as literacy tests and poll taxes. 
The army shrank again; only 9,000 troops served in the “occupied” South in 1870.80  A 
narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth amendment reduced the governments’ (both 
national and state) regulatory authority over corporations.  States soon re-established 
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their control over the “personal” interactions of their citizens, including the freedmen’s 
newly established right to vote. 
Justly lamented as the failure of Reconstruction and abandonment of the 
freedmen, who sought government assistance in establishing an independent livelihood, 
the endurance of the federalist system into the late nineteenth century created much of 
the despair of the twentieth century.  However, this desertion resulted less from a lack of 
will, then because of the overwhelming burden and resilience of the federal structure. 
The endurance of state based federalism made the gains in national power during the 
Civil War temporary. “Congress subsidized, but did not supervise.  The impact of events 
since Sumter was to sound loudly the message that the national government could 
achieve goals, old or new, through essentially traditional ways and means,” argued 
Harold M. Hyman.81  The Union fought the war to preserve the nation, not change it 
irrevocably. Soon after the war ended, Senator William Pitt Fessenden (R. ME), an 
influential member of the Senate, who served briefly as Treasury secretary, urged a 
return, “as fast as possible” to the “imperatives” of the written Constitution.82 Although 
the national government took on more power and authority during the course of the war, 
many Americans agreed with Fessenden that a return to dual federalism of the 
antebellum era would best suit the reunited nation.    
However, the fiscal policy of the nation did change and never reverted to the 
federalism of the earlier era. The national government assumed a greater power through 
“the purse.”  Federal revenues never exceeded $74 million before 1861; after 1865, they 
never fell below $257 million.83  Instead of relying primarily on duties gathered at 
distant ports, the national government after the Civil War collected internal revenue 
directly from citizens as well as indirectly through tariffs.  States also increased their 
budgets, and correspondingly, their revenue.  Franklin Pierce reflected in 1853 that the 
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executive “must maintain an unsleeping watchfulness against the tendency of all national 
expenditure to extravagance.”84  The watchfulness disappeared.  Government corruption 
emerged and became rampant during the post-war Reconstruction Era, when the “old 
moral standards” collapsed.85   
The “growth of special [primarily internal improvement and corporate] 
legislation in the 1840’s and 1850’s” resulted in “corruption [becoming] a serious 
problem for the first time,” Douglas Bowers related. During the antebellum era, this 
exploitation of government power occurred more frequently at the state rather than the  
national level.86  States allocated more money for development than the national 
government.  State legislatures provided more opportunities for directing public funds to 
special projects;  those assemblies, more than Congress, became the target for influence 
peddling.  But the Civil War taught Americans that “government could legitimately 
spend on a grand scale,”87 and this lesson paved the road for the expansion in national 
government authority, and the benefits and evils that accompany power.  The new 
revenue that came into the federal coffers opened areas for expansion of federal reach, 
and the “unceasing watchfulness” of the antebellum period gave way to a period of 
“riotous living.”88 
This dissertation examines this transformation.  The national government 
emerged from the Civil War as a perceived power, one that expanded its scope and 
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power under the duress of war, and now became a presence in the lives of most 
Americans.  However, the embedded strength of federalism continued to act as a 
restraint on the full exercise of this new authority.  While veterans, their widows and 
children received direct benevolence from Washington, the liberated freedman reverted 
to a condition of limited rights and penury.  They received no support or protection from 
this new power.  The ill that accompanies new largesse swooped faster and with more 
precision than the good.  The greatest force for limiting national expenditure, the 
restraint on taxation, disappeared.  Yet the newly enriched authority, with few restraints 
and little oversight upon its expenditures, used these revenues to assist Americans 
‘individually,” only touched a few.  
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CHAPTER II 
FISCAL FEDERALISM 
The delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention constructed a federalist 
system of government for the United States.  The state and national authority would co-
exist as “sovereign jurisdictions, each limited within a certain prescribed boundary.” 
Delineating the bounds of national and state power proved more difficult.  Jurists and 
politicians, to this day, have struggled to interpret this ideal of federalism.  The conflicts 
over how best to “agglomerate” the “small and sovereign nations” that united into a 
republic and declared independence from Great Britain shaped the course of events 
throughout the nineteenth century.1   
Establishing a fiscal policy within this structure surfaced as an early challenge. 
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention understood that “the power to tax is an 
essential part of the power to govern.”2  Therefore, a particular intensity accompanied 
the debates over how to generate adequate revenue for the co-existing national and state 
governments. These separate governments had to tap the same taxpayers, and this 
constituency had demonstrated its prickliness during both the Colonial and 
Confederation eras.  Despite the volatility of this topic, a consensus emerged before the 
Convention that the system of requisitions used to finance the government under the 
Articles of Confederation did not work and needed revision.  Early in the deliberations 
over fiscal policy, the delegates agreed that the national government would receive most 
of its revenue from customs duties.  State governments would retain sovereign powers 
over their finances, limiting only their ability to collect import and export duties.  Both 
governments kept their ability for independent financing. 
In this chapter, I argue that the federalist system adopted by the United States 
shaped the revenue structure that emerged in the United States until the onset of the Civil 
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War.  Whereas other areas of national and state influence remained influx throughout the 
antebellum era, the fiscal system originally envisioned in the late eighteenth century 
endured. Since Charles and Mary Beard published their seminal work, An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, scholars have viewed the 
Constitution as an extension of the economic tumult that convulsed the movement 
toward independence.3  A narrow interpretation of the Beard’s thesis suggests that the 
Framers designed the Constitution to protect their private assets, and securing this wealth 
played a decisive role in the development of the Constitution.  A broader application of 
the Beards’ ideas placed the Constitution within the context of class conflict, suggesting 
that the Constitution acted as “an aristocratic document to check the democratic 
tendencies of the period.”4  This chapter begins with the understanding that the Framers 
hoped this new type of government would endure and this foresight, rather than a 
concern for their immediate pecuniary interests, directed their actions.  They wanted the 
government to work, and made decisions and compromises to realize that end.  
This chapter focuses on how the framers of the Constitution allocated the fiscal 
power in a federalist government.  The economic interests of the different sections of the 
country played a role in shaping this development, but the challenge of maintaining both 
the state and national governments played a more decisive a role, I argue.  Concurrence 
rather than discord characterized these debates. Disputes arose over the allocation of 
fiscal authority, particularly with regard to the direct tax.  However, the Framers did not 
dispute the basic premises of fiscal federalism.  The national government would rely on 
indirect taxes, while state and local governments would have few limitations on their 
fiscal power, and rely as necessary on direct taxes.  During the ratification debates, Anti-
federalists argued that the Constitution granted the central government “unlimited” 
taxing powers, however the national government’s fiscal powers remained 
circumscribed. The distribution of the “power of the purse” between the state and 
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national governments played the predominant role in shaping the early nineteenth 
century tax structure. Concurrently, states developed unique fiscal strategies that 
accommodated local economies and interests.  
Second, for over a century scholars have focused on the “centrality of slavery to 
taxation.”5  Slavery became the backbone of the American economy in the antebellum 
era.  It represented the most important “economic interest” until the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  This weight alone made slavery a key aspect in the government 
economic policy.  While not denying that the peculiar institution affected the 
development of national fiscal structure, I suggest that balancing the reach between state 
and national authority played a more important role in shaping national tax policy.  The 
attempt by the early Federalist administrations to expand the accepted limitations of the 
national government contributed significantly to the “Revolution of 1800,” and the 
ascendancy of the Democratic-Republican Party.  This brought the national government 
back within its “due limits” of fiscal authority.  
To understand the actions taken by Republican leaders during the early months 
of the American Civil War one needs to appreciate the limitations created by this system 
of fiscal federalism.  Throughout the antebellum era, the fiscal powers of the national 
government remained constrained.  States had far more flexibility when faced with 
financial crises.  These limitations on financial power greatly influence the decisions 
made on financing the war.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Quote in Robin L. Einhorn, “Slavery and the Politics of Taxation in the Early United 
States,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (Fall, 2000), 182; Edwin R. 
Seligman, The Income Tax: A Study of the History, Theory, and Practice of Income 
Taxation (New York: Macmillan Co., 1914), 548-555; Charles J. Bullock, “The Origin, 
Purpose, and Effect of the Direct Tax Clause of the Federal Constitution,” Political 
Science Quarterly, 15 (September, 1900); Charles Dunbar, “The Direct Tax of 1861,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 3 (July, 1889), 436-461; Bruce Ackerman, “Taxation 
and the Constitution,” Columbia Law Review, 99 (January, 1999), 1-58; Beards, Rise of 
American Civilization, II: 45. 
 29
Development of Fiscal Federalism  
The thirteen colonies first united under one Constitution through the Articles of 
Confederation.  Progressive historians, led by Merrill Jensen, held that the Articles 
resulted from conflict between the “classes” and “interests” in the emerging nation.6  
Jack N. Rakove has challenged this traditional interpretation, and persuasively suggested 
that the Articles reflected an attempt to forge national unity.  He minimized the role of 
competing factions, and instead saw the movement for a new government as a pragmatic 
response to the challenges of war and national formation.7  
The Articles of Confederation created a decentralized government that succeeded 
on some fronts, but failed unequivocally on others. Under the Articles, the states enjoyed 
“sovereignty, freedom and independence” as distant colonies of Great Britain, then as a 
loose confederation of states that assembled in the Continental Congress.  The “league of 
friendship” created by the Articles bowed to state autonomy.  Each state held one vote in 
the unicameral legislature. Decisions regarding appropriations, the conduct of the 
Revolutionary War, and other matters of national concern, required approval by nine of 
the thirteen states, not a simple majority.  In rejecting the British monarchy, the Articles 
created a decentralized government with no executive branch.  This left the country with 
a leadership void, a distinct disadvantage for a nation at war.  Though drafted in 1777, 
the Articles of Confederation did not take effect until 1781, because ratification required 
unanimous consent from all the states. Amending the Articles required consent from all 
the states.8  
States controlled the “purse and the sword,” both requisitions and the militias, 
during the Revolutionary War.  The Continental Congress could not levy taxes.  The 
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eighth article of the Confederation stated that a “common Treasury” would pay the war 
costs and other “national expenses.” The assembly could not compel the states to 
provide either the supplies or funds for the Revolutionary War.  Instead, the Continental 
Congress had to request, hat in hand, for state compliance with wartime requisitions. The 
individual legislatures then determined the level of their contribution to the national 
cause.  State governments, not the national government, held the power of the purse until 
ratification of the Constitution. 
The tax policies within the separate colonies varied.  “By 1763, no two colonies 
had exactly the same revenue laws,” observed Robert A. Becker.9  Rather than trying to 
impose one system of taxation on the separate states, the Articles of Confederation 
allowed the individual legislatures to devise, or continue, their unique tax schemes.  This 
reduced the “public and private finances in America” to a “system that was little short of 
national anarchy.”10 The supplies needed to feed, cloth, and arm the Continental forces 
often did not materialize.  “For some days, there has been little less than famine” in the 
camp, wrote George Washington from Valley Forge during the disastrous winter of 
1777.  “For god’s sake,” pleaded his aide-de-camp, Alexander Hamilton, in one of many 
letters he penned begging for wartime supplies, “our distress is infinite.”11 
The ultimate success of the Revolutionary War did not ensure national survival.  
America entered a “critical period” in which the debt from the war, continued fear of 
foreign powers, competing ideologies, and a collapsing state-based revenue system 
imperiled the future of the country.12 This economic tumult created the desire in citizens 
for a stronger central government. “The movement to strengthen the Union,” observed E. 
James Ferguson, evolved from the need to meet debt obligations and instigated the 
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movement to grant Congress the “power of the purse.”13  Robert A. Becker argued that 
the Constitution stifled the more progressive tax policies emerging in the individual 
states.14 Roger H. Brown counters that the failure of the states to meet their 
Revolutionary War financial obligations provoked the nationalists to draft a Constitution 
that gave the central government more fiscal muscle.15  The states’ failure to act as 
effective “administrative agents” for the new nation began to chip at the fear of 
consolidating power in a stronger central government.16   “The fundamental defect,” in 
the Articles of Confederation,” Hamilton griped to George Washington, is that “the 
power of the purse is too intirely to the state legislatures.”17 
By proposing a five percent duty on imported goods, the Continental Congress 
attempted to address its need for revenue independent of the states. The change required 
unanimous consent from all the states, but Rhode Island refused to acquiesce. The 
objection to the impost, Jackson Turner Main suggested, arose from concerns about 
shifting power to the central government.18  “The issue was control of the government,” 
Thomas Barrow observed, “and in revenue lay the key to sovereignty.”19  The states did 
not wish to relinquish any of their control over the national revenue.  However, the 
Continental Congress had trouble meeting the payments on the war debt. The national 
debt totaled over $27 million; the states had accumulated an even larger burden.  No 
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clear understanding existed as to how, or who (the states or the nation) would service or 
reconcile these obligations.20   
The economy of the fledgling country suffered in the early years. Between 1775-
1790, “something truly disastrous happened to the American economy.”  McCusker and 
Menard estimated that the economic performance during this period fell by 46 percent 
(in comparison, at the onset of the Great Depression the gross national product fell 48 
percent.)21  Strained for revenue throughout the Revolutionary War, Congress in the 
post-war period could not rectify its financial embarrassments. Americans, who as 
citizens of the British Empire had enjoyed a standard of living “probably the highest 
achieved … in any country up to that time,” experienced a rapid reversal of their 
fortunes..22  They had endured “acute suffering” during the war “when prices began to 
run away and everyone felt the pinch.”23 States resorted to “currency financing,” printing 
paper money to pay their obligations, and contracting loans to help meet wartime costs.24  
These currencies depreciated after the war.  Soldiers paid with bonds found the value of 
their securities dwindling, and sold them to speculators. This precarious state of the 
nation’s finances convinced many that they stood on the “very brink of a precipice.” 
Americans abandoned their fear of centralizing power in the national government in 
order to rectify the finances of the country.  To ensure survival, they determined “to 
experiment with a conservative formula of sound money and unrestrained private 
enterprise.”25  
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The Continental Congress’s inability to generate adequate funds and supplies for 
the war had frustrated James Madison, who represented Virginia in the assembly.  On 
the eve of the Constitutional Convention, Madison identified the “Vices of the Political 
System of the United States,” and listed the “Failure of States to Comply with the 
Constitutional requisitions” as the first ailment, and the one that proved “fatal to the 
object of the present system.”26 Although still unsure of how much power to vest in a 
national government, many began to question the state-based economic structure of the 
emerging nation. This sentiment spurred the consolidation of the nation’s fiscal power 
under the Constitution.27  
 
“The Life and Soul of Government” 
“Taxation is the great means of protection, security and defence in a good 
government,” remarked Robert Yates, in one of his many Anti-Federalist tracts under the 
pen name “Brutus.”  However, he continued, it can also produce “the great engine of 
oppression and tyranny in a bad one.”28  The delegates to the Convention faced the 
challenge of providing for the former, without unleashing the latter.  Upon their arrival 
in Philadelphia, a majority of the delegates readily agreed to vest the “power of the 
purse” in the national government.  “The power which holds the purse-strings absolutely 
must rule,” Hamilton noted, and few of the Convention delegates dissented from this 
belief.29  The “vile state governments” niggardly contributions to the war effort “nearly 
prevented America from becoming a nation,” Henry Knox complained.30 Congress’s 
fiscal impotency under the Articles of Confederation spurred the Philadelphia delegates 
to grant new taxing powers to the central government. 
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“The fundamental problem of federalism,” Jack Rakove posited, “was to assure 
that different groups of states would feel that their essential interests would be secure in 
a Union in which they might find themselves a distinct minority.”31  Small states did not 
wish to lose the equal representation they enjoyed under the Articles of Confederation. 
Honoring this tradition, and the power it bestowed on the smaller states, while creating a 
representative government emerged as the decisive issue at the Constitutional 
Convention. “The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation; and if this could be 
adjusted, all others would be surmountable,” Madison noted on June 19.32  The “Great 
Compromise” resulted.  Population became the basis for representation in the “lower” 
House of the bicameral legislature.  States, large and small, shared equal representation 
in the Senate, as they had under the Articles of Confederation.  Achieving this settlement 
consumed the first weeks of the Convention.   
Because of the size of the nation, state governments needed to maintain internal 
order.  This belief helped shape the early commitment to a federalist structure of 
government.  Most political thinkers at the time believed the states needed to retain some 
autonomy and power because no republican government could rule such a large country. 
Even before purchasing Louisiana from France, the United States comprised as much 
land as the largest countries in Europe.  State governments needed to maintain internal 
order, thwart incursions from the European powers that surrounded the American 
territory, and protect citizens from the “merciless Indian savages”33 who resented being 
driven from their lands.  In the second grievance listed in the Declaration of 
Independence, Thomas Jefferson complained that King George III had “forbidden 
governors” from “passing laws of immediate and pressing importance” to the colonists.  
Without some local authority, the Americans would lose the promise of the revolution.  
States needed to retain their self-sufficiency, or only a tyrannical central government, 
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that controlled a large army, could maintain the extensive borders of the new country 
and keep internal peace.   
“A very extensive territory cannot be governed on the principles of freedom 
otherwise than by a confederation of republics,” argued the Pennsylvania Ratification 
Convention’s minority report.  Therefore the states must maintain authority over their 
“internal government.”34  Local representatives and governance best protected the 
interests of the people.  Having rid themselves of one unresponsive, authoritarian 
government, Americans did not wish to establish another. James Monroe articulated this 
fear when he stated that, “the territory lying between the Atlantic Ocean and the 
Mississippi … far exceeds the German Empire.  It is too extensive to be governed but by 
a despotic monarchy.”35   
The breadth of the country made self-supporting state governments necessary.  
As James Madison stated in Federalist 14:   
The subordinate governments … will retain their due authority 
and activity.  Were it proposed by the plan of the Convention to abolish 
the governments of the particular states … the general government would 
be compelled by the principle of self-preservation to reinstate them in 
their proper jurisdiction.36 
 
The states had to retain authority over their citizens, or the United States would 
devolve into a less republican form of government.37 Therefore the delegates in 
Philadelphia had to protect the authority of the state governments. This dilemma 
provided the basis for the federalism that emerged in the antebellum period.  Madison 
confided to George Washington before departing for Philadelphia that he wished to grant 
Congress “a negative in all cases whatsoever on the local legislatures,” while admitting 
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that a “consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it 
is unattainable.”  Pragmatically, he accepted instead that a “middle ground” that would 
support a “due supremacy of the national authority” but “not exclude the local 
authorities wherever they can be subordinately useful.”38  
During the proceedings, Madison told the delegates that the national government 
needed “vast” powers within its sphere, however this authority would not be exercised 
on the citizens of the country “individually.”39  He expanded on this theme later in 
Federalist 45.  The powers granted to the national government, he wrote, were “few and 
defined.”  Its influence would grow only in times of “war and danger.”  Otherwise, the 
central government would exert little “personal influence” over the citizens of the 
country.   State governments would remain the guarantors of the “lives, liberties, and 
properties of the people,” while securing “internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity.”40  These thoughts reflect Madison’s understanding “that a national 
government would be too distant to perform all the functions traditionally performed by 
the states.”41 They also foretold the national system of taxation that emerged from the 
Convention.  
Indirect taxes became the basis of the national government’s finances.  The new 
Constitution granted the central government the power to “lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts, and excises,” independent of the states. States would no longer contribute to a 
“common Treasury,” as they had done under the Articles of Confederation.  The national 
government would not depend solely on state “requisitions” or need unanimous state 
approval to meet the nation’s fiscal needs.  Uniformity in the duties, imposts, and excises 
obligated the same tax on goods throughout the country, and would keep the majority in 
the large states from indiscriminately taxing the smaller states. This system of taxation 
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gave the national government independence from state fiscal control. No longer would it 
have to rely on requisitions from the states to pay its bills.  “Money is the nerve – the life 
and soul of government,” Governor Randolph explained to the Virginia ratification 
convention in defense of taxing powers vested by the Constitution.  The general 
government needs to have, “the power of providing its own safety and existence.” 42 
The Constitutional Convention delegates proceeded with the understanding that 
the United States would generate most of its revenue from indirect taxes. Import and 
export duties, as well as excise taxes comprised indirect taxes. The broad acceptance of 
this form of taxation relied on the belief that levying duties on imported goods steered 
towards a form of progressive taxation.  Imports such as wine, silk, and other fineries 
represented “luxuries,” and taxing these “extravagant” goods shielded those who did not 
indulge from paying these duties. These distinctions have become the difference 
between progressive and regressive taxation. With a progressive tax, the average rates 
rise with the tax base; the wealthy pay a higher percentage of their income as taxes than 
those less fortunate.  Regressive taxes take a higher percentage of the earnings of those 
with low incomes.  Since duties on imports tended to hit goods purchased by the 
wealthy, rather than the poor, taxing imports constituted, at the time, a form of 
progressive taxation.43 “The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private 
oppression may always be avoided by a judicious selection of objects proper for such 
impositions,” explained Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 21. Well-selected import 
duties avoided the “inequalities” in taxation.44  
Thomas Cooley, who wrote a definitive, four-volume study of the development 
of American tax law, gives another reason the Philadelphia delegates embraced indirect 
taxation as the primary source of revenue in the new country. “They are levied upon 
commodities before they reach the consumer,” he noted, “and are paid ultimately not as 
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taxes, but as part of the market price for the commodity.”45 They become a hidden tax, 
with the citizen’s contribution to government masked by his or her consumerism.  
Revolts against state impositions continued throughout the “critical period,” according to 
Roger H. Brown.  Those writing the Constitution wanted to avoid additional unrest, and 
import duties seemed ideal for the task. 
“Strange as it may seem,” remarked historian Frederic C. Howe, “that section of 
the Constitution,” Article I, section 8 that grants Congress authority to levy indirect 
taxes, “was enacted without much opposition or discussion.”46  Relying on indirect 
taxes, especially import or export duties, also seemed the most practical means of 
meeting the Treasury’s needs. “A very considerable part of the revenue of the United 
States will arise from that source,” James Wilson explained to the Pennsylvania 
ratification convention. He then reiterated the virtues of indirect taxation: 
 It is the easiest, most just, and most productive mode of raising 
revenue.  It is a safe one because is it voluntary.  No man is obliged to 
consume more than he pleases, and each buys in proportion only to his 
consumption.  The price of the commodity is blended with the tax, and 
the person is often not sensible of the payment.47  
 
Collected at ports or individual businesses, indirect taxes did not involve 
systematic assessments of individual property. Therefore, they required fewer revenue 
officers. This kept the national government confined within its fiscal sphere, and not 
interacting “individually” with citizens.  Also, the “infatuation with foreign commerce 
and luxury” led to an “anti-luxury hysteria amongst many commentators who extolled 
the virtues of republican simplicity,” Drew McCoy noted.48. Consumption taxes also had 
the advantage of  “discouraging luxury,” since fineries would become more costly.49 
Indirect taxation re-enforced the ideals of establishing a republican nation. 
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The convention delegates considered three options for indirect taxation: import 
duties, export duties, and excise taxes.  Following from colonial precedent, they soon 
agreed on import duties as the best means for collecting national revenue. This continued 
a precedent established during the colonial era.  England had long relied on tariffs for its 
national revenue.  “The duties of customs are much more ancient than those of excise,” 
noted Adam Smith.50 Customs officers inhabited American ports since 1671, when 
Dudley Digges, a native born Virginian, received a royal commission to stem the 
“numerous frauds” on the tobacco trade.51  During the Revolutionary War, the individual 
colonies assumed control over the ports, and customs houses, wrested from British 
control.  Although the Articles of Confederation barred the national government from 
collecting import duties, state governments could and did.  Individual states collected 
tariffs until the ratification of the Constitution.  Americans paid these duties to the 
British government while colonists, thus the practice did not rankle when the states took 
over the customs houses.  A customs administration existed, making tariffs the “easiest” 
to collect in the inchoate fiscal system.  
This helps explain the ready acceptance of customs duties as the primary source 
of federal revenue:  the system existed and would not have to be created anew.  
Although the President George Washington’s first administration revamped and 
expanded the customs administration, a skeletal system existed, complete with customs 
houses, an understanding the productivity of different tariffs, even an internal jargon that 
all understood.  In addition, as Oliver Ellsworth explained to the Connecticut ratification 
convention, import duties do not “fill the country with revenue officers, instead confined 
the tax collectors to the sea coast.”52  
Anti-federalists also acknowledged that import duties should provide the income 
for the national authority.  “The general government ought to have sole control over the 
impost upon goods imported from foreign countries,” commented the usually critical 
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Brutus.53  “The delegation of the power of taxation to Congress,” chimed the Anti-
Federalist, Centinel II, “as far as duties on imported commodities, has not been objected 
to.” 54 Oliver Ellsworth (CT) reassured localists at the Connecticut ratification 
convention that import duties “interfere less with the internal police of the states.”55 The 
central government would not have to “stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the 
people scattered over so vast a country,” observed Gouverneur Morris (PA).56  Finally, 
many believed that the foreign producers assumed a portion of the tariff fee; therefore 
the tax did not fall wholly on American citizens.57  For all these reasons, customs duties 
emerged as the ideal source of revenue for the general government in a federalist system. 
The Philadelphia delegates never considered excise taxes seriously as a 
permanent source of national revenue.  Though the Constitution granted the power to 
collect these “odious” taxes, they had the potential of inciting the citizens’ hostility.  The 
power to lay excises, cautioned Luther Martin, “authorizes officers to go into your 
houses, your kitchens, your cellars, and to examine into your private concerns.”  
Congress could tax “every article of use or consumption, on the food that we eat, on the 
liquors that we drink, and the clothes we wear, or the hearths necessary for our warmth 
and comfort.”58 Excise taxes had been “in detestation in most countries and have always 
met with opposition,” noted a petitioner to the first Congress.59  “The genius of the 
people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws,” Alexander 
Hamilton predicted in Federalist 12.60   Excise taxes also strained the structure of fiscal 
federalism.  Many states collected excise taxes (particular liquor), and they did not wish 
                                                 
53 Jensen, ed. Documentary History, XV: 239.  
54 Jensen, ed. Documentary History, XIII: 465. 
55 Elliot, Debates, II: 190-197. 
56 1787: Drafting the United States Constitution, Wilbourn E. Benton, ed. 2 vols. 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1986), I: 944. 
57 Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols. 
Reprint. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967): I, 85-86. 
58 “Luther Martin’s Letter on the Federal Convention,” in Elliot, Debates, I: 364. 
59 “Petition on the Whiskey Excise,” January 28, 1791. New American State Papers, 
Finance, vol. 32, 13. 
60 Hamilton, Federalist 12, 74. 
 41
to compete with the national government for this revenue.  Collecting excise taxes would 
also mean expanding the role of the federal government, since the “excise man” would 
move within the states collected the taxes.  Only with the beginning of the Civil War did 
the government commence using excise taxes extensively. 
Taxing exports represented the final form of indirect tax revenue considered by 
the Philadelphia delegates. Americans had paid export duties as colonists in the British 
Empire and many states collected export duties after independence. The thirteen 
American colonies shipped on average over  £2.5 million in commodity exports annually 
between 1768-1772, with the upper and lower South dominating this trade.61  Many of 
the “staple states” (Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia) 
collected export duties on tobacco, rice, and indigo, and relied on this source of revenue 
for the local government.  Because this tax would fall primarily on these states with high 
slave populations, this species of tax became entangled with the debate over the future 
place of slavery in a republic. During the discussion that resulted in the “three-fifths 
clause,” General Pinckney (SC) expressed his “alarm” that Congress might tax exports.  
On July 12, he insisted on adding a clause “restraining the Legislature from taxing 
exports.”  Otherwise, this would unfairly burden South Carolina and other “staple 
states,” he complained.62   
Accordingly, when the Committee of Detail presented a draft of the Constitution, 
it included a ban on taxing exports from any state.  Rufus King (MA) angrily 
complained about the “sacrifices” made by the northern states for the benefit of the 
southern states.  “The importation of slaves could not be prohibited, and exports could 
not be taxed.  Is this reasonable?” he demanded on August 8.  “Either slaves should not 
be represented or exports should be taxable.”63 Gouverneur Morris picked up on this 
theme.  “The Southern states are not to be restrained from importing fresh supplies of 
wretched Africans . . . nay they are encouraged to it by an assurance of having their 
votes in the national government increased in proportion, and at the same time have their 
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exports and their slaves exempt from all contributions.”64 Since southern states exported 
more than the other states, their representatives in Philadelphia repeatedly framed the 
demand to ban the tax on exports as a form of “security.”  This security meant not only 
for their property in slaves, but also for their future place in the Union. 
Although the early protests to taxing exports centered on sectional tensions and 
the future of slavery, these subjects did not wholly direct the debate. The continual 
process of creating a nation from a group of sovereign states came to the fore in this 
discussion.  States without large ports, such as Connecticut, sent their exports to 
neighboring states, such as New York, for shipment.  Thus, the Connecticut producer 
and merchant paid an extra tax: the first, upon leaving his state, then again when the 
good left New York.  The states with the large ports also had the opportunity to lay a 
duty on goods produced in other states, unbalancing the relationship between states. This 
would give one state the ability to tax, perhaps prohibitively, the citizens of another 
state.  So barring the tax on exports from the states not only altered the relationship 
between the states and the national government, but between the states themselves. 
The delegates discussed this provision again on August 16.  Madison suggested, 
“it would be unjust to the States whose produce was exported by their neighbours, to 
leave it subject to be taxed by the latter.”  This grievance, he continued “already filled 
New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and North Carolina with loud 
complaints.”  James Wilson (PA) continued with this theme.  He spoke against taxing 
exports, citing the “injustice and impolicy of leaving New Jersey and Connecticut … 
subject to the exactions of their commercial neighbours.”  Elbridge Gerry (MA) noted 
that it “might be exercised partially, raising one and depressing another” part of the 
country.65  George Mason (VA) predicted that allowing the government to collect export 
duties would reduce states “to mere corporations … a majority when interested will 
oppress the minority.”  George Clymer (PA) pointed out that the vulnerability of his 
state as well.  “[The middle states] may apprehend also combinations against them 
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between the eastern and southern states” just as the southern states feared the combined 
forces of the northern and middle states.66  Gouverneur Morris (NJ) also worried about 
the future necessity, as the nation grew, of preventing “the Atlantic States from 
endeavoring to tax the western states.”67  Unless the ban on exports remained in the 
Constitution, “nothing will save states in the situation of New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
and Delaware from being oppressed by their neighbors.”68 
The sovereign authority of the central government presented another concern. 
“The government would not be trusted with such a power,” Roger Sherman (CT) warned 
on August 21.  “A power to tax exports would shipwreck the whole.”69 Taxing exports 
would place too much power in the national government, agreed Elbridge Gerry (MA), 
forcing states “to comply with the will of the general government and to grant it any new 
powers which might be demanded.  It will enable the general government to oppress the 
States as much as Ireland is oppressed by Great Britain.”70 James Madison (VA), who 
wanted the central government to retain as many options for taxation as possible, 
proposed “a lesser evil:” rather than banning the export tax, he wanted a give each 
chamber in Congress the opportunity to levy this tax if a two-thirds majority agreed. 
This suggestion did not pass.71   
Pragmatic concerns also governed this discussion.  Oliver Ellsworth noted that 
“they [export duties] discourage industry”, make “uniformity in taxation difficult”, and 
create “incurable jealousies” between the states.  In Federalist 11, Hamilton also 
declared a practical reason why exports should not be taxed. “Unrestrained intercourse 
between the states themselves will advance trade,” he opined.  Imposing this duty would 
inhibit this trade.72 Allowing states to impose duties would also interfere with 
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Congress’s ability to regulate commerce with both “foreign nations” and “among the 
several states.”  (Article 1, Section 8). 
In the end, after many compromises, Massachusetts and Connecticut joined the 
“staple states” in passing this measure. Article I, section IX bans the national 
government from imposing a “tax or duty” on “articles exported from any state.” Section 
X forbids states from levying export duties “without the consent of Congress.”  
In summary, “all hands” at the Philadelphia Convention agreed that indirect 
taxes, more specifically, import duties, would provide the primary source of revenue for 
the national government.73 Relying on custom duties proved the most politically 
acceptable, and practical means of generating future revenue for the new government. 
An inchoate collection system existed, so the government could start the process quickly 
and efficiently. Accustomed to this “hidden” tax, import duties would not rouse 
Americans as an excise tax might. Relying on import duties gave the central government 
a steady form of revenue without sending tax collectors across the country, allowing the 
individual states to retain their internal autonomy. “They [import duties] will be 
productive … collected with ease and certainty … and constantly increasing fund, for 
our commerce will grow,” Brutus agreed.74 In Federalist 12, Alexander Hamilton stated 
plainly that, “In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means of 
revenue” from “duties on imported articles.”75   
Although sharp debates erupted over export duties, the delegates readily agreed 
on this tax structure for the new nation.  Anti-federalist critics of the Constitution also 
embraced this idea.  Limiting the national government to collecting import duties meant 
less interference with state internal affairs.  States could continue to collect taxes locally, 
while the central government took in revenue at distant ports.  Federalists also accepted 
this revenue structure.  States no longer controlled the national purse, as they had under 
the Articles of Confederation.  Since states could not collect import or export duties, 
they would not compete with the general government over this revenue nor interfere 
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with Congress’s control over interstate commerce.  The national government held a 
monopoly over customs duties, a reassurance after the fiscal chaos that resulted from the 
requisition system during the “critical period.”  Because Americans had paid import 
duties for over a century the new fiscal system would launch efficiently, thus ensuring 
steady revenue soon after the first Congress assembled.   
For these reasons, the tax policy of the new country quickly emerged as a method 
for buttressing the federalist system.  Two separate forms of government, able to 
generate distinct revenue for their different spheres, could draw from the same taxpayers 
with out provoking their wrath.  “Congress would take what was easiest to the people,” 
Theodore Sedgwick reassured the Massachusetts ratification convention, “the impost, 
next excise, [and] the direct tax would be last.”76 Although this system of relying on 
indirect taxes for the national revenue emerged with little conflict, vesting the national 
government with the power to collect a direct tax raised more hackles, both in 
Philadelphia and during the ratification debates.  Securing this secondary, “back-up” 
form of income provoked great angst because it deviated from this federalist structure, 
and many believed, threatened the ability of states to co-exist with a more powerful 
central government. 
 
The Direct Tax  
The direct tax provisions in the Constitution unleashed more bitterness and angst 
both at the Convention and in the debates prior to ratification, though all recognized that 
this would constitute a minor form of national revenue.  An indirect tax falls on 
consumption; for this reason, many understood it as an avoidable tax.  “An import duty,” 
Benjamin Franklin explained, “is added to the first cost … if the people don’t like it at 
the price, they refuse it and are not obliged to pay” the tax.77  Alexander Hamilton 
elaborated in Federalist 21.  Indirect taxes provide a “complete barrier against any 
material oppression of the citizens,” he reasoned.  If you set the tax too high, people will 
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not purchase the article, or they’ll smuggle it past the customs agent.  This response 
keeps indirect taxes within their “proper bounds.”78  Further, the consumer paid the tax 
to a merchant through the purchase of a good, and not “directly” to the government. This 
kept the national authority from “individually” taxing Americans and reinforced the 
ideal of allowing the local, rather than the national, government to interact personally 
with citizens.  In contrast, a direct tax bears on the value of what you own, as determined 
by an assessment of your property.  Thus, it represents a forced tax.  You can avoid 
indirect taxes by not purchasing a good, however you could not avoid paying a direct 
tax. The taxpayer must pay or lose his property. Agents of the government would assess 
and collect the tax directly from each person.  These taxes went right from the citizen to 
the national government, without any intermediary.79   
Article I, section II states “representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several states”, and Article I, section IX reaffirms that “no capitation or other 
direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census.” These clauses inflamed the 
populace because they addressed three issues that smoldered throughout the ratification 
debate: the division of power between the state and federal government, how the state 
and central government would share the limited tax revenue extracted from Americans, 
and finally, how slaves should (or should not) be counted when determining 
representation. Before addressing these points, one must first examine the importance of 
the direct tax amongst scholars. 
Like the fury unleashed in the late eighteenth century, the direct tax provisions of 
the Constitution have drawn more attention from scholars than the indirect tax clauses. 
Direct taxes fell on “capitation or poll taxes, taxes on land or buildings, and general 
assessments whether on the whole property or on individuals or on their whole or real 
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personal estate.”80  The exclusion of the word “income,” or a broader definition of what 
constitutes “whole or real personal estates” has frustrated lawmakers and scholars since.  
Did the income tax constitute a direct or indirect tax?  This question became part of the 
“raw class conflict” that engulfed the income tax debates of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.81 
Enacted as indirect taxes, both the 1862 and 1894 income tax laws required only 
that uniform rates be applied across the country. This allowed lawmakers to incorporate 
high exemptions, in an effort to “to equalize the burden” of taxation, and target those 
“able to bear” a tax on income.82 The early income tax statutes thus spared the poor, 
laborers, and farmers from paying these taxes.  If passed as a direct tax, the income tax 
laws would be apportioned according to population, without regard to a person’s ability 
to pay.  This would destroy the progressive feature of the tax, and require all to 
contribute equally, according to their state’s population, regardless of their wealth or 
income.  Those in states with small populations (poor rural farmers) could potentially 
carry a higher burden than (wealthy) urban dwellers. 
Subsequent Supreme Court rulings, most definitively the 1895 case, Pollock v. 
Farmers Loan and Trust Co., concluded that the income tax constituted a direct tax, 
therefore had to be apportioned according to population.83 Pollock destroyed the 
progressive feature of the “indirect” income tax.  Passed as an attempt to distribute the 
burden of taxation off the regressive excise taxes and tariffs of the late nineteenth 
century, Pollack destroyed the progressive feature of the “indirect” income tax. Popular 
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support for the income tax led to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, made 
it a permanent fixture in American fiscal policy.84 The high exemptions in these early 
twentieth century statutes again relieved most Americans from contributing.  Only 
during World War II, when “mass taxation became more important than class taxation” 
did the income tax become ubiquitous.85  
The confusion over how Americans interpreted a “direct tax” began at the 
Convention.  Madison recorded that on August 22 Rufus King (MA) asked for a “precise 
meaning” of the term “direct taxation, but no one answered.”86   However, King later 
showed a clear understanding of the concept when he distinguished the types of property 
that assessors would evaluate.87 After independence, direct taxes provided the primary 
source of revenue for the state and local governments. Though the types of property 
taxed differed in each state, all understood that direct taxes fell on property, real and 
personal, both the value and productive capacity of that property, as well as on 
individuals as capitation or poll taxes.  
“The idea that land is the primary source of wealth and that governments should 
derive support from taxing its produce has deep roots,” wrote historians Carolyn Webber 
and Aaron Wildavsky in their sweeping account of taxation in western civilization.88 
Land provided the basis of wealth in western society.  Direct taxes based on the value of 
land provided a sound basis of taxation for countries with a feudal tradition.  Few 
individuals collected a livelihood independent of the farm, explaining the exclusion of  
“income” or wages from this mix.  Only with the rise of the “fiscal-military” state in 
which individuals earned income from interest and speculation in securities, did tax 
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gatherers start counting wealth in less tangible assets.89  “Tax officials” in antebellum 
America, “bemoaned … the impossibility of tracking down” the “substantial holdings in 
banks and insurance companies” possessed by many of the wealthiest citizens, Edward 
Pessen observed.  These dandies would “swear that they possessed no personal wealth 
whatever, yet how were they to be proven wrong?”90 
Three circumstances not present in Europe further complicated the American 
understanding of direct taxation. First, many Americans speculated in land, owning huge 
tracts of  “unimproved” property. Direct taxes would apply to “surveyed lands and the 
improvements thereon,” the Massachusetts ratification convention determined, rather 
than all the land owned.91  Extensive land speculation made collecting these taxes from 
absentee owners difficult.  Further, owners residing from their property resented paying 
taxes to local governments for services they did not receive.  This forced the “actual 
residents” to “tax their own land more heavily to compensate for the unimproved lands 
of the nonresidents.”92  Another wrinkle came from squatting.  Squatters lived on the 
land, however did not own it.  They instead paid taxes on the improvements, dwellings, 
or livestock (horses, pigs, “milch” cows, for example.) 
Second, direct taxes differed in the United States because of the prevalence of 
slavery for many landowners. Levied on individuals both enslaved and free, capitation or 
poll taxes, fell on each “head.”  Local governments in the colonial era used poll taxes 
extensively.  These taxes placed an additional fee on the slaveholder for each of his 
chattel.   “Southern poll taxes were not sharply regressive levies,” explained Robin 
Einhorn.  They represented “poll taxes on free men, but in an economic sense, they were 
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also property taxes on slaveholders.”93  In a community or state with a high slave 
population, the poll tax becomes a progressive tax, bearing heaviest on the slave owner.  
However in a population of free laborers, the poll tax extracts the same for everyone, 
regardless of wealth. Thus poll taxes became a common source of revenue in slave states 
during the antebellum era, but not used much in the free states. As George Clinton 
warned at the New York ratification convention, any national direct tax targeting 
southern slaves would “all times oppress the poor” in the non-slave states.94 
Finally, sovereignty of the different governments in a federalist system presented 
a third complication in defining a direct tax.  Direct taxes provided most of the revenue 
for local and state governments.  Each state within the union had its own criteria for 
assessing the tax. Direct taxes promoted local control, and reflected the strengths of 
regional economies. The states used various strategies for collecting these direct taxes. 
Some states apportioned them uniformly across the state; others fixed a certain amount 
to specified localities, such as the counties that would benefit directly from a proposed 
canal. Henry C. Adams observed that states also determined how best to collect the 
direct tax.  Connecticut classed citizens by their “religious societies,” with assessors 
beginning their task in different churches.  North Carolina and Georgia used the militia 
musters “to which people prepared lists of property” to determine an individual’s 
obligation.  “The more one studies” the individual state schemes for direct taxation, 
Adams related, “the greater differentiation does he observe.”95 In preparation for laying 
the first national direct tax in 1798, Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott wrote a summary 
of how the different states handled their assessments.  He noted the “diversity of the 
principles by which taxes are apportioned and collected” in the different states.  He 
summarized the “principal” direct taxes collected by the states as:  
1. uniform capitation taxes; 2. taxes on the stock and produce of 
farms; 3. taxes on stock employed in trade and manufactures, and on 
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moneys loaned on interest; 4. taxes on the profits resulting from certain 
employments; 5. taxes on lands; 6. taxes on houses; 7. taxes on slaves.96 
 
Trying to reconcile these different criteria into one national understanding of a direct tax 
further vexed early American jurists and politicians. 
Direct taxes in the United States differed from those in Europe because of the 
unique presence of extensive ownership of cultivated and uncultivated land, slavery, and 
state sovereignty.  Because of the difficulty of assessing income before the nineteenth 
century, direct taxation did not fall on either wages or income, instead on the “faculty” 
or potential productivity, of a farm.  For this reason, nineteenth century lawmakers, 
looking for a means to “equalize the burden of taxation” to those whose wealth came 
from investments and income, referred to income taxes as “indirect taxes.”  Historians 
have added to the confusion by misusing the terms indirect and direct in reference to 
taxes.  Americans now pay many different taxes “directly” to the national government, 
so the important historical distinction has become garbled.97 
Slavery played a significant role in developing of the direct tax powers in the 
Constitution. Offered as a means for breaking the stalemate over representation and 
slavery, the direct tax incorporated the infamous “Three-fifths clause” that counted 
three-fifths of the number of slaves in a state for calculating representation to Congress.  
Delegates from states with small slave populations objected to this proposal, arguing that 
it would over represent slave owners in the legislative branches.98  James Madison 
suggested that the delegates needed to check one “vice and interest” with “another vice 
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and interest” and proposed “representation and taxation ought to go together.”99  The 
next day, July 12, Gouverneur Morris (PA) suggested a “proviso that taxation shall be in 
proportion to Representation.”  He admitted that some objections to this motion would 
surface, but this idea would be favorable by “restraining the rule to direct taxation.”100  
He offered this compromise to assuage those who resented including slaves in the 
enumeration.  His motion passed quickly.  Later he regretted his compromise, and his 
paternity for a tax he came to loathe.  He meant it as a “bridge to assist over a certain 
gulph,” he lamented, not a permanent feature of the tax code.101 Roger Sherman (CT) 
criticized any attempt to tie slaves to taxation.  “It made the matter worse,” he 
complained, because it implied “they were property” and denied their humanity.102  
However, the compromise worked and became incorporated into the Constitution. 
Madison explained to the Virginia Ratification Convention the advantage 
southerners reaped from this arrangement. This “mode of representation and taxation,” 
he informed his fellow Virginians, meant that Congress could never “lay such a tax on 
slaves as will amount to manumission.”103  A majority in the non-slave holding states 
could levy a high excise tax on slaves knowing their constituents would skirt most of the 
burden. An excise tax on slaves could have resulted in slaveholders facing a stiff fee for 
their chattel.  Under the direct tax provision, the same poll tax on slaves would apply to 
free laborers and “five negro children of South Carolina are to pay as much tax as the 
three governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.”104 Southerners 
received further security for their “peculiar” property, knowing that, “Congress could no 
longer tax slaves arbitrarily,” Charles Bullock noted.105  
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Nationalists argued that the direct tax protected the federal government in case of 
a disruption in trade during a war. “Should our tranquility be exposed to the assaults of 
foreign enemies, or violence among ourselves,” James Wilson argued at the 
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, “the objects of commerce may not furnish a 
sufficient revenue.  Certainly, Congress should possess the power of raising revenue 
from their constituents to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the 
United States.”106  Alexander Hamilton, remembering his “infinite distress” during the 
Valley Forge winter, defended retaining the direct tax power in the Constitution as a 
means for the central government to ensure it had enough revenue. In Federalist 36 he 
stated, “I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the 
government of a single weapon which might be usefully employed for general defense 
and security.”107 The direct tax would act as a supplement to the indirect taxes, if 
needed. 
Southerners welcomed the direct tax as a means of protecting their slave property 
from excessive taxation.  Since all agreed that import duties would generate the most 
revenue for the federal government, the additional tax they would have to pay for their 
chattel proved a small concession for the opportunity to expand their representation in 
Congress. When it became clear that southern leaders would not accept the Constitution 
without “security” for slavery, the direct tax provided a reasonable compromise, and 
remained one of many “bridges” erected to ratify the Constitution, but not removed until 
the Civil War.   
Born of compromise, the direct tax appeased both northern and southern 
delegates at the Constitutional convention.  However, the direct tax clauses drew the ire 
of the Constitution’s critics.  Localists interpreted the new government’s power to collect 
direct taxes as an assault on state sovereignty. 
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“To annihilate totally the State Governments” 
A federalist system of government relies on authority being exercised 
concurrently but not oppressively.  Anti-Federalists believed that granting national 
power of direct taxation would undermine the ability of the state governments to collect 
the revenue they needed, thus threatening the viability of the states.  During the colonial 
era and the Confederacy, local governments depended on land, poll, and faculty taxes for 
their revenue. All these constituted direct taxes.  “Land was the major base of taxation in 
colonial America,” and provided the primary means of support for the state 
governments.108  Granting the national government the power to collect these same taxes 
would endanger the revenue base of the states.  George Mason summarized this concern 
during the Virginia Ratification convention.  This power, he railed, “is calculated to 
annihilate totally the state governments,” he fumed.  “Will the people submit to be 
individually taxed by two different and distinct powers?”109  The direct tax power 
provided further evidence to the Anti-Federalists that the Constitution created a 
“national, consolidated government not a federal or confederated one,” according to 
Cecilia M. Kenyon.110  Brutus echoed this sentiment.  “There is no way of avoiding the 
destruction of the state governments” if this provision was not changed, he predicted.111 
Melancton Smith equated the state governments under this provision, to “an animal 
without blood or subsistence.”112  John Williams elaborated on this point: 
States have concurrent jurisdiction with Congress in taxation … it 
is evident as the laws of Congress are the Supreme Laws of the land that 
their taxes whenever they interfere with taxes laid by states, must and will 
claim a priority … they may abolish state taxes; they may constitutionally 
monopolize every source of revenue and thus directly overturn the state 
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governments.  Either the people will be doubly taxed or the state 
governments will be destroyed.113 
 
Destroying state government would extinguish the liberty the nation fought and suffered 
for during the Revolution. “Central to the defense of liberty were popularly controlled 
institutions,” explained Max Edling.  Only the local and state governments, the most 
responsive and representative assemblies, “could secure this liberty.”114 
The Anti-Federalist’s vitriol against this provision had precedent. When the 
British Parliament enacted the Stamp Act in 1765, they stumbled across a barrier that the 
colonists considered sacrosanct.  “Americans,” explained one member of Parliament to 
his colleagues, “think that the imposition of internal taxes ought to be confined to their 
own assemblies.”  The colonists accepted external taxes, such as duties levied on goods 
imported to the colonies, as legitimate sources of revenue for a distant monarch. 
However, internal taxes, including poll taxes, excises, stamp duties, and taxes on land, 
remained the sole purview of local colonial assemblies, according to Thomas Slaughter.  
English rulers in London had no right to share “concurrent jurisdiction” in internal taxes. 
Local representatives best understood their situation and could determine the proper 
means and amount to tax.  Therefore, Parliament had no right to dip into this internal 
revenue well.115   
Parliament’s blunder helped stoke the developing animus that pushed Americans 
to declare independence.  This distinction between external and internal taxes of the 
colonial era re-emerged during the debates over the new republic’s Constitution, 
however the focus changed to indirect and direct taxes.  “All hands” agreed that the 
national government could collect duties on imports, just as England had collected 
external taxes.  However, direct taxes, like internal taxes, remained the sole purview of 
the state and local governments. 
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Allowing the national government to levy direct taxes mimicked Parliament’s 
attempt to collect internal taxes in the colonies.  State and local governments alone 
understood local problems and conditions of citizens and therefore levied fair and 
equitable direct taxes.  A distant government (in Philadelphia, New York, or London) 
imposing a direct tax would apply the burden unfairly, especially if apportioned to the 
states by population without other distinctions.116  Every state collected direct taxes, both 
in the colonial and early Republic eras.  Both the colonies and early states printed paper 
money, necessitated, in part, to provide a mechanism for paying these local taxes.  These 
burdens increased after the war.  “Crackdowns” on delinquent tax payers “detonated 
rural violence” that rocked many state governments and increased the frustrations with 
the confederation’s fiscal structure.117  Shay’s rebellion remains the most prominent of 
these uprisings, but certainly not the only one.  The direct taxing powers in the 
Constitution exacerbated these tensions. 
Anti-Federalists believed that the direct tax clauses granted the national 
government taxing powers that would overwhelm the state governments’ ability to raise 
their own revenues. “The idea of confederation is lost,” lamented Brutus.118  This 
authority, according to Luther Martin, proved the “aim and desire” of the supporters of 
the Constitution, to “encrease the power of the general government as far as possible,” 
thereby “destroying the powers and influence of the states.”119 The Pennsylvania 
ratification convention’s minority report predicted, “Congress may monopolise every 
source of revenue and thus indirectly demolish the state governments.”120  
Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and North 
Carolina shared this sentiment.  The report from the ratification conventions of these 
                                                 
116 Becker, Revolution, Reform and Politics of American Taxation, 1763-1783, 226. 
117 Brown, Redeeming the Republic, 32-40; Perkins gives a thorough description of the 
tax schemes in the different states. Edwin J. Perkins, American Public Finance and 
Financial Services, 1700-1815 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1994), 
137-174. 
118 Jensen, ed. Documentary History, XIII: 414-415. 
119 Jensen, ed. Documentary History, XV: 378. 
120 Ibid, 22. 
 57
states proposed amending the Constitution to deny Congress the authority to levy a 
direct tax, or at least require the government to collect it through the state tax apparatus, 
rather than sending federal officers into local communities.121 
As part of an empire, state governments received significant revenue from the 
British government.  Parliament granted the colonial assemblies “substantial 
reimbursements” for military campaigns.  Between 1740-1775, the British government 
spent an estimated £450,000 ($40.5 million in 1985 dollars) annually on the American 
colonies.  Local officials distributed these funds judiciously, Edwin J. Perkins argued, 
and they quickly became absorbed into the economy.122  This loss of revenue, coupled 
with the new taxing powers granted to the national government, would reduce states to 
poverty, localist leaders believed.  The deterioration of the American economy during 
the Revolutionary era exacerbated these concerns. This economic tumult helps explain 
the vitriolic response to granting the national government the power to levy direct taxes. 
Historians have overlooked the importance of this reaction against direct taxation for 
two reasons. Research on the direct tax has focused instead on its contribution to the 
early decisions regarding slavery in the colonies, concentrating on the implications of the 
Three-fifths clause.  Second, most studies have also concentrated on the development of 
the direct tax and its relation to the income tax, as noted above. These studies jump from 
the Constitutional Convention to the Supreme Court decision in Hylton.  Both strategies 
miss the deep concerns of politicians of the period regarding the role of maintaining 
sovereign states in the federalist system.  
In clouding the literature further, historians have accepted the Anti-federalists’ 
charge that the Constitution grants “unlimited” power to levy taxes “in any mode they 
please,”123 another concern expressed by the Anti-Federalists. E. James Ferguson and 
Thomas P. Slaughter repeat this propaganda, each referring to Congress’s taxing power 
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as “unlimited.”124  Dall Forsythe and Max Edling equivocate; Forsythe stating that they 
were “almost entirely successful” in placing “no limitations on the kind of taxes” the 
government could levy.  Edling noted that Congress had “almost unlimited power to 
tax.”125  
Contrary to these perceptions, the Constitution constrains the central 
government’s taxing power.  First, the House of Representatives, the legislative chamber 
most representative and beholden to voters, levies all taxes.  No monarch or executive 
can arbitrarily demand revenue from the American citizens.  Once enacted by the House, 
the Senate, representing the states, had to concur.  “No taxes [may] be imposed upon 
[Americans] without their consent by representatives of their own choosing, who will 
participate with them in the public burthens and benefits,” Roger Sherman argued.126 
Money cannot leave the Treasury “but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”  
Further, Congress must publish “public accounts of the receipts and expenditures of all 
public money” from time to time. (Article 1, section 9).   
Apportioning the direct taxes by population stripped the national government of 
its ability to levy taxes “discriminatingly” on property.127 One section could not 
overburden another (in principle at least). Again, this restriction calls into question the 
constitutionality of the early income tax. Third, the Constitution permits the central 
government to collect excises, imposts and duties, but requires uniform taxes throughout 
the country.  Individual states could not be selectively taxed, despite their wealth or 
population.  Also, because “there is no material difference” in what individuals in states 
purchase, the uniform duties, the Founders believed, fell evenly across the country.128 
Finally, as discussed above, Article I, section IX bans any taxes on exports; in 1787, this 
greatly limited the revenue gathering opportunities of the government. This restriction 
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becomes important again in 1865, when Congress yearned to place an export duty on 
cotton, but grudgingly followed this restriction. 
The Constitution did not establish a government with “unlimited” taxing powers.  
Tariffs would generate most revenue with other taxes unleashed in times of war or when 
trade fluctuated.  Limiting the taxing authority any further would strip the government of 
its ability to secure the United States against foreign aggression, any disruption in trade, 
or the government ran a deficit. Thus, the taxing authority granted to the national 
government by the Constitution became a perceived power: one that citizens sensed, and 
knew, but remained less tangible than anticipated.  National direct taxes would strain the 
federalist structure.  Loosed from seaports and customs houses, national tax collectors 
would cross the boundary of the state and national “sphere” and cut into revenue 
designated for the local governments.  States wanted to keep these taxing options 
available to protect their viability.  All agreed that state and local governments helped 
preserve and protect national sovereignty and individual liberty across a broad and 
expanding nation.   
 Although the Anti-Federalist efforts to limit the direct tax clauses of the 
Constitution did not work, their reaction helped shape the tax policy during the 
antebellum era.  However, as anticipated, the government resorted to direct taxation only 
during three crises:  the “Quasi-War” scare in 1798, the War of 1812, and the American 
Civil War.  The expense and difficulty in collecting these taxes limited their appeal as a 
regular source of national revenue. The national government would remain within its 
“due limits,” collecting revenue only indirectly from citizens.  During war or disruptions 
in trade, it could invoke greater taxing powers in order to protect the nation.  Otherwise, 
it would have little “personal influence” over citizens.  Limited only by the ban on 
collecting import or export duties, states had more flexibility in their taxing powers:  
they did not face the same uniformity or apportionment restrictions under the 
Constitution.  They needed this flexibility not only to protect the “lives, liberties and 
properties” of their citizens, but also to help maintain a republic stretched over a large 
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territory.  Throughout the antebellum era, the states, not the national government, flexed 
this fiscal muscle.  
 
Government and Taxation 
 Congress enacted the nation’s first revenue measure on July 4, 1789.  The 
resulting tariff provided a modicum of protection, but remained primarily a revenue 
measure.  The legislation imposed specific duties on thirty-six commodities and applied 
ad valorem rates to selected, enumerated imports.  The duties averaged approximately 
fifteen percent.129 
 By 1791, the revenue needs of the government overwhelmed import duties.  At 
the behest of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, Congress levied the first internal 
taxes.  Historically, duties on alcohol had proven one of the most dependable forms of 
taxation.  Many states, including Pennsylvania collected alcohol excises. These taxes 
target distilled liquors.  Duties on “ardent spirits,” Hamilton argued in Federalist 12, 
favored “agriculture, the economy, the morals and health of society.”130  Besides these 
virtues, Hamilton had another motive for invoking a liquor excise as an early tax.  He 
had assured opponents of the Constitution that states would possess “independent and 
uncontrollable authority to their own revenue for the supply of their own wants.”131  
However, he admitted early in his tenure at the Treasury that he hoped to “leave the 
states under as little necessity as possible of exercising the power of taxation.”132  He 
pushed for the enactment of the whiskey excise to claim “so valuable a resource of 
revenue before … preoccupied by the state governments.” Hamilton wanted to “starve 
                                                 
129 Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols. 
Reprint. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967), 114-118.  Ad valorem tariffs, duties 
“according to value,” levy a fixed percentage (forty percent on shelled almonds, for 
example) upon an imported good.  When the value of the merchandise changes, so does 
the actual import.  Conversely, a specific duty affixes a set amount collected on the 
imported good (.04 per pound on shelled almonds, for instance.) The amount collected 
does not fluctuate with the changing value of the imported article. 
130 Hamilton, Federalist 12, 77. 
131 Hamilton, Federalist 32, 197. 
132 Hamilton’s Papers, Sept-Dec, 1789, V: 218. 
 61
the states of revenue,” Chernow theorized, in order to “shore up the federal 
government.”133  He wanted to use the taxing powers conferred in the Constitution as an 
instrument for strengthening the government’s power.  Hamilton espoused taxation as a 
primary vehicle for “consolidating the strength of the [national] government” even after 
he left office.134  These efforts threatened the balance between the state and central 
government envisioned in the federalist system. 
 The excise taxed whiskey at the still, not through sales.  This provision drew into 
the taxman’s net the small scale, rural distiller who produced liquor for home 
consumption or barter, who would escape a tax levied on the sale of distilled liquor.  
This legislation sparked the “Whiskey Rebellion” in western Pennsylvania.  These folk 
had experience protesting liquor taxes.  Western Pennsylvanians harassed colonial then 
state revenue officers as early as 1684 with the same zeal they exhibited in 1794 while 
tarring and feathering the federal taxman.  These demonstrations constituted more than 
an effort to shirk taxes.  Instead, Thomas P. Slaughter suggested the whiskey uprising 
demonstrated the conflict between “center and periphery, cosmopolitans and localists, 
East and West, those who feared strong central government and those who demanded 
local autonomy.”135 The distant governments did not respond to the rural citizens’ need 
for roads and protection from the Native Americans.  They only showed up when they 
needed money.  This angered the residents of rural counties throughout the Republic, 
Slaughter posited. 
 The difference between the protests against the state tax collectors and 1794 
protest against the national government came in the government’s response.  During the 
debates over the Constitution, Anti-federalists warned that the national government 
would use its extensive powers to enforce tax collections.  “Congress, with the purse-
string in their hands, will use the sword with a witness,” predicted William Bodman at 
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the Massachusetts ratification convention.136 What if the “excise man” cannot fulfill his 
commission, Patrick Henry asked at the Virginia Convention.  Will he “call on the 
militia to enable him to collect taxes?”137   
 Although Alexander Hamilton dismissed the fear that allowing the “sword and 
the purse” to reside in Congress endangered “American liberties,” his response to the 
Whiskey Rebellion fulfilled the worst of the Anti-Federalist predictions.138  He 
convinced President Washington the new government must crush the Rebellion.  He then 
marched 13,000 militiamen to the western counties.  “Shall the majority govern or be 
governed?  Shall the nation rule or be ruled” Shall there be government or no 
government?” he demanded in an open letter under the pen name Tully.139  The unrest 
dissipated long before the militia arrived, and excise tax revenue continued to lag in rural 
counties throughout the country.  Despite the show of force, the whiskey tax revenue 
continued to disappoint expectations.  Although the Pennsylvanians stopped tarring the 
collectors, they continued to resist the tax.   
 Since the proceeds from the whiskey excise fell short of expectations, Congress 
levied additional taxes.  To quell criticism that the whiskey excise fell hardest on those 
least able to pay, the Revenue Act of 1794 attempted to fix more progressive taxes, by 
imposing duties on pleasure carriages, luxuries at the time, the manufacture of snuff and 
fine sugar, the proceeds from sales at auctions, and stamp duties.  Under this bill, 
practicing law or selling any type of alcohol required a license.140  Necessitated to meet 
the interest payments on the Revolutionary War debt, this revenue measure became part 
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of the Federalist Party’s program of consolidating power within the new central 
government.  Assuming state debts, fortifying the nation’s credit, and creating a revenue 
system that would support these initiatives would bolster the national government’s 
authority, and undermine the power of the states.  Hamilton wanted to bring the 
“national arm [of the government] into daily contact with the people,” significantly 
fortifying the role of the central government in relation to citizens.  This greatly 
extended the central government’s sphere, and obliterated Madison’s ideal of the 
national government removed from “individually” influencing citizens.141 
 Slavery also tainted the opposition reaction against the 1794 revenue measure.  
The carriage duty troubled Madison.  Classified as an indirect tax, the carriage duty 
posed a particular threat to southern interests.  Virginians owned more carriages per 
capita than any other Americans, so the tax fell disproportionately on those he 
represented.  Also, Madison had assured the delegates to the Virginia Ratification 
Convention that the direct tax clauses protected slave owners from forced manumissions 
because indirect taxes could not be levied on individuals.142  However, the carriage tax 
challenged this supposition.  This duty fell on a specific form of property.  Rather than 
collecting the tax on the sale of carriages, the assessor would tax the ownership of 
carriages, taxing property rather than consumption, the primary difference between 
direct and indirect taxation.  The owner paid the tax directly to the government agent 
without an intermediary.  Classifying slaves as property rather than persons, as southern 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention had done repeatedly, opened slaves to the 
same tax that Hamilton proposed for carriages.  The attack on the carriage duty did not 
just aim to thwart the Federalists’ “nationalizing pretensions,”143 but also provided an 
early attempt to keep the national government from interfering with the ownership rights 
in slavery.   
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 Madison led the attack against the measure in Congress.  The excise duties 
“should be thrown aside” he argued in May 1794.144  Instead, allow state officials to 
collect direct taxes, with assessment and enforcement controlled by local officials.  This 
would limit the national government’s role in collecting the necessary revenue, and also 
give state officials, rather than Hamilton’s Federalist cronies, the ability to determine the 
best objects for taxation.  This also restated the demands of the Anti-Federalists with 
regard to direct taxation.  The revenue measure passed over these objections, so a legal 
challenge ensued. 
 The Supreme Court case of Hylton v. United States (1796) created important 
precedents.  First the justices used the prerogative of judicial review (before Marbury v. 
Madison), where the Supreme Court determined the validity of congressional 
legislation.145  Second, the Court determined that a tax on carriages did not represent a 
direct tax and therefore did not violate the constitution’s restriction on apportionment.  
More specifically, the Court defined a tax on expenditures as an indirect tax.  The 
justices did not enumerate specific items that qualified for a direct tax, only stating that 
“capitation or poll taxes” plus those “apportioned” could be considered under this 
category.  To tax “any specific article by the rule of apportionment would … create great 
inequality and injustice,” Justice Chase observed.146  Direct taxes, then, could not be laid 
on any “specific article.” 
 This decision created the standard for internal revenue in the nineteenth century.  
After the Civil War, it became the basis for the court battles over the income tax.  
Throughout the antebellum era, when the national government needed to supplement 
customs duties, southerners pushed for direct taxes.  Since states with heavy slave 
populations would pay more under this scheme (again because of the 
representation/taxation formula in the three-fifths clause), this seems curious.  However, 
direct taxes, done properly, afforded southerners two measures of comfort: local control 
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of assessments and eliminating the possibility of an excise tax laid on their particular 
form of property. 
 President John Adams’s administration recommended the first direct tax in July. 
1798.  The plan distributed the burden of $1.3 million amongst the states according to 
population.  In collecting the tax, officials could assess “dwelling houses” and land, and 
fix a per capita tax on slaves. Federal officers assessed the property and collected the 
taxes.  Local authorities only outlined the rules for assessment.147  This schema ignored 
the proposals made by the state ratification conventions, Anti-Federalists, and 
Democratic-Republicans in Congress.  The national government, not local governments, 
controlled the assessment and collection process, limiting the state governments role in 
implementing this law.  As with the Whiskey Rebellion, the tax became the most 
tangible means for demonstrating a greater objection to the national government.  
The direct tax passed the same day as the Alien and Sedition Laws.  These acts 
particularly inflamed the residents of Bucks and surrounding counties in southern 
Pennsylvania, because many of these residents claimed recent German ancestry.  John 
Fries, one of the three leaders of the rebellion, had fought in the Revolutionary War, and 
led a militia company against the Whiskey insurgents in 1794. He named his favorite 
dog “Whiskey.”  He considered himself both a loyal American and a Federalist.  
However, the Alien and Sedition Acts angered the veteran.  Compounding the problem, 
most of the residents did not know the assessors and collectors, as they knew their local 
officials.  The collectors did not speak German, as did many residents of the area.  Soon 
after the assessors arrived, a rumor spread that they differentiated between German and 
non-German speaking property owners, and assessed the “foreigners” homes differently 
(by counting windows.) No injuries occurred, and the crowds resisting the tax assessors 
dissipated as quickly as they formed.148  
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When the Whiskey Rebellion erupted, Hamilton advised President Washington 
that, “whenever the government appears in arms, it ought to appear like Hercules”149 
President Adams decided to follow that precedent and sent armed forces into Bucks 
country to stop the revolt.  Like the Whiskey Rebellion, the Fries uprising registered the 
public’s anger at the direction taken by the new government.  The participants in Fries 
Rebellion “believed they had acted in accord with the Constitution, not against it.” The 
opposition centered less on the money requisitioned by the government then the means 
they used to collect it. This represented a reaction against expanding federal power as 
much as a tax revolt. Rather than remaining in its sphere, the national government had 
expanded its power, both in passing “unconstitutional” laws, than sending their agents 
into communities to collect taxes. Anthony Joseph stressed that the Fries Rebellion 
represented an attack on the Alien and Sedition acts, rather than a “tax revolt.”  
However, like later direct tax measures, the return from the tax disappointed.  Only 83 
percent of the anticipated revenue landed in the Treasury.  This long lapse between 
enacting the legislation and collecting the cash became the norm rather than the 
exception with the direct tax.150 
 Tired of the titan knocking on their door, these popular uprisings gave a political 
opportunity to Thomas Jefferson and the emerging Democratic-Republican Party. John 
Fries, for example, after convicted of treason, then pardoned by President Adams, never 
voted again for a Federalist candidate. President Jefferson opposed all internal revenue 
schemes and the Federalist administrations’ methods of collecting them.  The election of 
1800 signaled the public’s desire for a more limited national government “with clearly 
defined and enumerated powers.”151  After his election, Jefferson asked a willing 
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Congress to repeal all internal taxes.  The Treasury relied on import duties and land sales 
for all its revenue until the War of 1812. 
 Jefferson’s Treasury secretary, Albert Gallatin, demonstrated the way in which 
tax policy determines the type of government a nation follows.  In preparing his first 
Annual Report, Gallatin urged Jefferson that, “to strike at the root of evil and avert the 
danger of increasing taxes.”  Taxes, Gallatin warned, led to “encroaching government, 
temptations to [start] offensive wars … nothing can be more effectual,” to maintaining a 
republican government, “than a repeal of all internal taxes.”152  Gallatin held federal 
expenditures below $10 million, raised tariff rates, and then reaped a windfall as US 
trade expended. Gallatin’s frugality and the increasing customs revenue helped generate 
a surplus each year from 1801-1811, excluding the 1809 deficit created by the Embargo 
Act.  The average tariff rate rose from 8.5 percent in 1789 to 16 percent during 
Jefferson’s tenure.  Concurrently, the public debt declined from $86.4 to $45.2 
million.153 
 In advocating limiting internal taxation, a practical concern arose also.  Gallatin 
estimated an average cost of 25 percent to collect the excise taxes, and 35 percent to 
collect the direct taxes.  The revenue produced in either case never met expectations. 
The Federalist Treasury hired 400 officials to implement the law.  In contrast, through 
1815, the cost of collecting customs duties averaged 4 percent.154 To destroy the “root of 
evil” and keep the central government well within its sphere, the Jefferson 
administration dismantled the internal revenue system.  Soon, though, war forced 
another round of internal taxation. 
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War of 1812 
A resurgence of hostilities with Great Britain culminated in the War of 1812.  
The “financial disasters and absurd treasury management” of this conflict portended 
many of the problems that arose during the American Civil War.155  Congress renewed 
internal taxation reluctantly. Secretary Gallatin strongly recommended inaugurating a 
schedule of internal duties, and reviving the collection apparatus, before the war started.  
In his 1812 report, Increase of Revenue, Gallatin proposed doubling selected customs 
duties, as well as imposing an internal tax scheme that resembled the Federalist 
program.156 
Gallatin became Treasury secretary in 1801, and served President Jefferson for 
two terms, then President James Madison until 1813.  He committed his only “political 
sin” as he later described it, when he defended the Pennsylvanians implicated in the 
Whiskey Rebellion.  Thereafter, “he would be forever linked with the region’s 
opposition to the excise,” according to Thomas P. Slaughter.  However, this did not 
preclude Gallatin from proposing his own whiskey excise as a means of funding the War 
of 1812.  “There was not any more eligible object of taxation than ardent spirits,” he 
stated in his recommendation.  His proposal limited the impact on small distillers like his 
brethren in western Pennsylvania, but he acknowledged that these taxes could be 
“augmented” if necessary “with greater ease” than any untried taxes.  Gallatin remained 
a steady “public advocate of free trade” throughout his career, so one cannot accuse him 
of equivocating.  Instead when he faced a fiscal challenge he adopted a pragmatic 
strategy of advocating a tax that he believed would work.  Although most of the 
Federalist excise taxes had returned disappointing revenues, the whiskey tax, despite the 
protests, had succeeded, bringing in almost as much revenue as anticipated.157  Gallatin’s 
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about-face on a whiskey tax shows that the need for securing revenue often 
overwhelmed an individual’s convictions regarding just taxation. 
These internal taxes produced $14.2 million between 1812-1817.  In addition to 
the excise taxes, the Madison administration also levied a series of national direct taxes.  
Apportioned according to the 1810 census, these added another $10.5 million to the war 
chest.  To further assist with the war financed, Congress authorized the Treasury to issue 
short-term notes, most bearing five to six percent interest. These notes soon circulated, 
and depreciated, like a currency.  Soldiers received these notes as their payment.  In 
addition, long term six and seven percent bonds produced $57.3 million.  This financing 
scheme later served as the blueprint from which Salmon P. Chase, a Gallatin admirer 
and first Civil War Treasury secretary, designed his financing plan. 
The Madison administration rejected using Washington revenue officers to 
collect these taxes; instead they gave states a greater role in this tax program.  State 
agents assessed the property then collected the tax.  This gave local control to the 
national taxes.  The Direct Tax of 1813 apportioned the tax not only among the states, 
but also to the different counties within the states.  It gave each state the option of paying 
their tab upfront and receiving a 15 percent discount on their quota. Rather than creating 
a new, and costly, federal bureaucracy as the Federalists did, Gallatin’s proposal used 
state officers to assess and collect the taxes, in the manner recommended during the 
ratification debates.  
Congress enacted one more direct tax during the course of the War of 1812. State 
governments determined how best to distribute the burden amongst the counties. Under 
the Federalist plan, the Treasury determined the amount each county throughout the 
nation would pay.  Also, a state could receive a 15 percent discount on its bill if it paid 
the entire amount within a year.  Eleven states took advantage of this opportunity.  
Finally, the Madison Treasury discarded the complicated valuation system devised by 
Wolcott, instead basing the tax on the value of lands, houses, and slaves “at the rate each 
is worth in money” rather than a predetermined fixed rate.  This resembled the 
requisition system used under the Article of Confederation. While vested with expanded 
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powers under the Constitution, the national government still had trouble getting the 
states to pay in full.  Despite the incentive for paying the tax promptly, the direct tax 
returns disappointed again, and revenue trickled into the Treasury as late as 1825.158 
Throughout the war, Congress expanded the tax schedule in an effort to keep 
pace with the interest payments on the burgeoning debt.  Candles, nails, iron, hats, 
umbrellas, saddles, bridles, shoes, and playing cards all carried new duties.  The 
Democratic-Republicans, who had vehemently protested Hamilton’s economic policies, 
soon found themselves adopting a similar program.  They chartered a Second Bank of 
the United States, revived the most contentious taxes, and increased custom duties, 
culminating in the Tariff of 1816, the most protective tariff enacted in the United States 
at that time.  Necessity overwhelmed earlier concerns about the invidious nature of 
national taxation.159  
 Although Gallatin’s successor, Alexander J. Dallas, recommended retaining 
internal taxes as a permanent part of the government’s fiscal policy after 1817, Congress 
did not comply.  After 1817, Congress levied no internal taxes until 1861.  Tariffs, 
collected “with more ease to Government and less inconvenience to the People,” 
remained the primary source of revenue for most of the nineteenth century.160 
 From these initial experiences with taxation came lessons that guided the fiscal 
system until the Civil War era. “All hands” agreed that tariffs would provide the bulk of 
national revenue.  Stripped of their power to impose import duties, states could not 
meddle or contravene federal tariff policy.  Neither the state nor national government 
could levy export duties.  Customs officials would not interfere with the “internal 
police” of the states.  The hidden nature of the tariff would not excite the taxpayers.  
Duties could target selected luxuries thus putting the burden of taxation on those who 
indulge in such fineries.  Thus tariffs contributed to the vision of creating a virtuous and 
less frivolous society, one of the republican ideals of the Revolution. 
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 Moving beyond tariffs, internal taxes posed more challenges for the emerging 
government.  Anti-Federalists had predicted correctly that taxation would provide a 
vehicle for the national government to establish its supremacy over state legislatures.  
Hamilton’s dual thrust of consolidating the state war debts under one roof, then 
inaugurating a revenue program to meet the interest payments on that debt, aimed, 
according to Barber, “to establish a federal hegemony over all taxation so that Congress 
could raise revenue or shape the national economy unhindered by obtrusive state 
legislation.”161  During the early Federalist administrations, the central government 
stepped beyond the limits of its sphere, unleashing its “vultures” and intruding on local 
matters and state prerogatives.162  The Whiskey and Fries rebels would not pay for their 
allegiance to a government that intruded unsympathetically in their local economic 
arrangements, or flagrantly disregard the liberties guaranteed in the recently printed 
Constitution.  For these reasons, the two disturbances represented more than mere tax 
revolts.  Instead, like the American Revolution, they represented a reaction against 
imposition on local control and a quest for a more representative government. 
 The official reaction to both the Whiskey and Fries Rebellions confirmed 
localists’ fears about uniting the “purse and sword.”163  The Federalist administrations 
set loose a massive army to quell these disturbances; in both cases the uprisings had 
dissipated long before the forces arrived.  The national government had flexed its 
muscle, assembled militias, and marched on citizens.  Whereas unrest, and economic 
dislocation, had inspired the movement to form a stronger national government, the 
overzealous use of that power spurred the desire for a more restrained central authority.  
The Democratic-Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, replaced the 
Federalists, and returned the national government to what citizens considered its 
appropriate sphere.  They dismantled the Federalist tax machine and renewed the fiscal 
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policy shaped by the Constitutional Convention and Anti-Federalists reaction to the 
direct tax. 
 Victory in the War of 1812 led to a more interventionist role in government 
economic and tax policy.  Congress resurrected the Bank of the United States, created a 
standing army and permanent Navy, and initiated a series of protective tariffs that waxed 
until 1833 and the Nullification Crisis.  From then until 1861, tariff rates declined (with 
one brief interruption in 1842).  Limited to the revenue collected from tariffs, the 
restrained actions of the central government reflected American priorities of commerce 
over national initiatives in social, military, and economic affairs.  The power to invoke a 
broader tax program lay dormant. State and local government continued their separate 
and independent fiscal policies that underwrote social spending.  Aid to education, poor 
relief, and internal improvements fell to the states, as the national government assumed 
what Madison called it “due limits.” 
 
Other Revenue Options 
Until the Civil War, customs duties regularly provided 95 percent of federal 
revenue.  “All hands” agreed early they would provide the best source of revenue for the 
government, lawmakers considered other options.  Throughout the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century, Congress debated the extent to which public lands could help 
bolster the government’s revenue.  Both the early Federalist and Republican 
administrations hoped to use public land sales as a reliable source of funds.  The original 
thirteen colonies comprised over 300,000 square miles; the Louisiana Purchase added 
another 400,000 miles to the public domain.  Land remained the single greatest asset 
controlled by the federal government through the nineteenth century. Naturally, many 
saw this asset as a potential source of wealth and stability for the emerging government. 
However, two competing interests soon emerged.  Speculators wanted land sold 
in large tracts, with prices attached to the entire parcel, not per acre. This would favor 
wealthier purchasers with ready capital for investment, and provide a relatively quick 
and easy means of getting money into the Treasury, and allow a relaxation tariff rates. 
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However, speculators would then control the land, and the prices set for selling it to 
future migrants.  Settlers, however, preferred small allotments sold at per acre prices.  
This strategy encouraged more westward migration and provided a greater benefit for 
farmers hoping to develop the vast domain.  Should the government encourage 
settlement or use the land primarily for revenue?  Selling land in small segments to 
individuals provided less revenue and created greater bureaucratic challenges in 
administering the sales, but facilitated the growth of the overall economy.164  
The Land Ordinance of 1785 allowed anyone to purchase 640 acres for one 
dollar per acre. The policy changed in 1800 to selling 340 acres for two dollars per acre.  
These policies favored those with large sums of money, and discouraged the small 
farmer from moving west and establishing his homestead. In 1820, the tide changed to 
opening the land for settlement, rather than using it as a source of revenue.  Land sold in 
lots as small as 80 acres, for $1.25 per acre.  This policy continued until the Homestead 
Act of 1862 granted land to settlers for free, and relinquishing the use of public lands for 
revenue.165  
Settling, rather than selling, the land became the government’s primary objective.  
The presence of squatters, whose farms began to dot the vacant tracts, made relying on 
income from land sales impractical. “The settlers did not have the money were destined 
not to have it, but settle the land they would.  And back of every demand for revenue … 
was the stronger desire to make the government secure and great through the spread of 
people over millions of acres.”166  Relinquishing this bountiful source of future income 
also tied the government to tariff financing and indirect taxation.  The movement to 
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lower the rates of these duties prompted many to call for land sales to help pay the 
government’s bills.  However, public land sales had proven an inefficient and unreliable 
source of federal revenue.   
Selling national public lands spread over millions of acres, and located over a 
thousand miles from Washington proved difficult to administer. (States enjoyed greater 
success because they controlled a small portion of land to sell and distribute.) Thus 
public land sales proved an inefficient and unreliable source of federal revenue.  Most 
land sold on credit or with dubious paper currency, resulting in forfeiture.  In 1820, for 
example, land purchasers owed the government $21 million for their property whereas 
the entire federal budget that year totaled $17.8 million.167  When President Andrew 
Jackson made these transactions payable only in specie, rather than credit or paper 
currency, the revenues from public land sales plummeted from $24.8 million in 1836 to 
$6.7 million in 1837.168  Although abundant, and potentially productive sources of 
revenue, land sales did not provide a practical source of reliable funds for the national 
government. 
Throughout the antebellum era, politicians faced this choice: either use the public 
domain for generating revenue (by selling to the highest bidder, generally speculators), 
and subsequently lowering tariff revenue, or distribute the land for a for a minimal fee to 
those who wished to settle the West.  The latter choice would wed the country to relying 
on customs duties as the primary source of revenue. This debate lay at the heart of the 
controversy over the Homestead policy, and partially explains the vehement opposition 
to providing cheap land for farmers. 
Reviving the direct tax became another financing option for the government 
during the 1850’s.  Calling to “change the existing system of taxation,” advocates of free 
trade wanted to revive the national direct tax.169  The Southern Commercial Convention 
in Savannah, meeting in December 1856, called for the elimination of all customs duties 
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and adoption of a national direct.  “Each man would pay according to his ability … [and] 
Congress would be more economical of the public money as the rich and influential 
would be averse to taxing themselves.”170  John C. Calhoun, Jr. argued further that, “the 
South had been prosperous in defiance of a most unjust and oppressive system of 
taxation.” Repealing the tariff would allow southern commerce to “flourish like the 
green bay tree.”171  Collecting direct taxes through the states would relieve the 
dependence on tariff income, which would allow for an easing of the rates.  However, 
the difficulty of collecting direct taxes made this idea unpopular outside of the southern 
commercial interests.  Keeping the government dependent on tariffs also freed states to 
experiment with their own financing options. 
 
State Policies 
 While the central government resorted to tariff financing, state and local 
governments developed an imaginative array of fiscal schemes.  “Tax free finance” 
became the objective of most states, according to Peter Wallenstein.172  Hamilton’s plan 
for assuming and centralizing the Revolutionary War debts not only strengthened the 
national government, but allowed states to begin their federal life with a clean fiscal 
slate.  
  A series of three ordinances passed between 1784-1790 that established the 
policy of the federal government allocating public lands to states for education and 
development.  Grants of the public domain benefited “directly or indirectly” virtually 
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“every function of state and local governments,” Daniel Elazar explained.173  Allocations 
of public lands allowed states to support education, commence internal improvements, 
and, through land sales to settlers, provide revenue for state budgets. Local 
administration made state land sales a more stable and reliable source of revenue than 
national land sales.  States acquired land from federal allotment, but also “the seizure 
and redistribution of Indian land.”  Grabbing “western lands” from Native Americans 
gave states “revenue far exceeding the costs of administering the land program.”174   
 States also invested in “quasi-public corporations.”175  These activities produced 
revenue that paid for social welfare and education initiatives. Banks emerged as one of 
the favorite ventures for state investment.  States purchased bank bonds and stocks, and 
also taxed the capital, dividends, deposits, notes, and profits banks generated. 
Throughout the antebellum era, Massachusetts, for example, collected over half of her 
revenue from a one percent tax on bank capital.  “New York and Virginia were the only 
states to derive less than 20 percent of their revenue” from banks in any five year period, 
Sylla, Legler, and Wallis found.176    
 The purchase of stock or investment in bonds of corporations helped underwrite 
internal improvements in states.  The interest from these investments provided another 
source of “tax-free” revenue. States helped foster private initiatives.  Between 1807-
1867, France chartered 647 corporations, whereas the six New England states alone 
chartered over 6700 corporations from 1800-1862.177  Road, canal, and railroad 
companies all received state support and in turn helped support social spending through 
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interest and dividend payments as well as toll collections.  New York’s sponsorship of 
the Erie Canal remains the most famous, and successful, example of state support for a 
“quasi-private” venture.  The state reaped a great windfall from the canal’s success, and 
this example encouraged other states to provide support for internal improvement 
projects.  Not all these projects succeeded.  John Majewski reported on the “disastrous” 
investment made by Pennsylvania on the Mainline canal system.  The state poured over 
$100 into the project, with little return.  This misadventure, coupled with the Erie’s 
success, helped propel New York City past Philadelphia as the nation’s leading 
commercial metropolis.178  Although the federal government withdrew from supporting 
internal improvements after the election of President Andrew Jackson in 1828, states 
quickly filled the void.  Between 1790 and 1860, state and local governments spent over 
$425 million on transportation, while the federal government spent only $54 million.179  
In Pennsylvania, for example, the Legislature enacted 132 laws in 1815, and 725 in 
1860, and “perhaps 90 percent of these” involved private business concerns.180 
 Where did the states get this money, if not from general taxation? States 
demonstrated flexibility and ingenuity in their tax schemes. Many states employed 
specialty taxes, such as licenses, fees, taxes on corporate profits, and poll taxes. 
Maryland passed a tax on the notes used by the Bank of the United States notes that led 
to the famous Supreme Court decision McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), which asserted 
the supremacy of the national government over the states when the two collide. 
Mississippi used her tax policy to advocate social and economic policy.  The state’s first 
constitution exempted banks and railroads from taxation to encourage development.  To 
discourage free blacks from settling in the state, the Mississippi legislature in 1822, the 
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state levied a $3.00 capitation tax on each “free male of color,” while male slaves and 
free white males paid only 75 cents.181   
These various taxes contributed a small portion to state finances.  For the real 
money used to fund the purchase of banks and corporate shares, and support the 
development of internal improvements, states borrowed money.  Capitalists near and far 
invested in state bonds, and the private securities that received the backing of state 
governments.  Foreign investors poured over $500 million into the United States before 
the Civil War, underwriting national and state debts. Foreigners liked these state-
supported bonds because “faith in the nation’s resources were so great,” and Americans 
“were so frugal.”182  Also, the investors believed they would receive steady interest 
payments from taxation if the states’ other financing schemes fell short. 
 This expectation received its first great trial after the Depression in 1837.  “One 
after another” of the state budgets collapsed under the weight of their indebtedness. The 
states carried a debt of $230 million at the time and could not keep up with the interest 
payments.  Florida and Mississippi completely repudiated their obligations.  Arkansas, 
Indiana, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana all defaulted on 
interest payments.  This defalcation created a great backlash, both within the states and 
abroad. Jefferson Davis, the governor of Mississippi when the state defaulted, would 
later regret his indifference to the “crocodile tears” shed by English investors who lost 
thousands on the bonds issued by his state.  During the American Civil War, English 
investors who remembered Davis’s role in the default hesitated to lend money to the 
Confederate States of America.183 The enthusiasm foreign capitalists had for all types of 
“American things” soured.  When questioned on why American railroad securities sold 
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poorly on the British market in 1859, an Englishman replied that, “the record of that 
experience [states defaulting] now operates as a bugbear to Englishmen to this day.”184  
Although national bonds continued to attract foreign investment any sign of trouble 
made these investors cautious.  Bond sales during the Civil War relied heavily on Union 
army victories. 
Movements to revise state constitutions swept the country.  Before 1840, no state 
constitution limited the amount of debt a state could carry, but within 15 years, 19 states 
added these restraining amendments.185  Until the early 1840’s, states succeeded in 
bolstering their budgets without extensive taxation.  Once they could no longer depend 
on deficit financing, states relied on direct taxes to provide for the basic services of 
governing.  “They provided minimum revenue but remained cumbersome and 
unpopular,” Sylla noted. Alexis de Tocqueville described the process for collecting these 
taxes:  
The state usually employs the officers of the township or the 
county to deal with the citizens.  Thus, for instance, in New England the 
town assessor fixes the rate of taxes; the town collector receives them; 
the town treasurer transmits the amount to the public treasury; and the 
disputes that may arise are brought before the ordinary courts of justice.  
This method of collecting taxes is slow as well as inconvenient.186 
  
Poll and property taxes, tailored to local conditions, predominated.  In response 
to the fiscal collapse of states under their debt obligation, tax revenue had to increase.  
Most states adopted a general property tax, both to provide more secure revenue, but 
also to keep officials from encumbering the state with unsustainable debt. Sixteen states 
adopted uniformity clauses that applied the same rate to both real and personal 
property.187  States also experimented with income taxes (Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
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Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, and Florida), and inheritance taxes (Pennsylvania, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Maryland.)  Though Americans 
paid taxes to the national government only through tariffs, they experienced taxation 
through their state and local governments.  In 1860, states collected $93.6 million in 
direct and indirect taxes from their residents, whereas the national government collected 
$56 million.188  
 When all else failed, states turned to lotteries.  Approximately 130 separate 
lotteries were authorized for “government functions” between 1790-1860.  Virginia used 
lottery proceeds to build a toll bridge whose revenue supported “needy children.”  In 
1811, Maryland promoted a lottery to erect a monument to George Washington.189  In 
1832, lottery sales throughout the country generated $66.4 million in revenue; the 
national government’s receipts for that year totaled only $31.8 million.190 
 
Conclusion 
 States emerged as the sources of finance for internal improvements as well as 
social welfare and education spending.  They accomplished this through direct taxation 
of citizens and a number of innovative financing strategies.  Through these initiatives, 
the federalist ideal of states meeting the needs of citizens “individually” strengthened. 
The national government remained removed, both in collecting taxes and in spending on 
social welfare or education. In 1860, as the nation stumbled toward war, this system 
impaired the ability of the national government to address the pressing needs for 
economic mobilization. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE “EXHAUSTED CONDITION OF THE TREASURY” 
 
The Civil War fiscal crisis began before April 12, 1861. The United States 
Treasury tottered in a state of “utmost confusion” months before Edmund Ruffin shot at 
the troops holed up in Fort Sumter.1  The Treasury had been the country’s traditional 
“dynamic center” of government, yet now it faced bankruptcy.2 Congress was notified 
on February 11, 1861 that “little more” than $500,000 remained in the central depository 
in Washington.  Demands for $2 million “unanswered” requisitions had accumulated in 
the department, with $6 million more due to public creditors in early March.3  Staff in 
most executive departments could not draw their salary that January.  Members of 
Congress had gone unpaid since the start of the session the previous December.4  Worse 
yet for a nation stumbling into war, “The War and Navy departments,” reported the 
department’s secretary, John A. Dix, “have calls for large requisitions [that] have been 
delayed on account of the exhausted condition of the Treasury.”5 
 “To understand the measures submitted to Congress,” John Sherman wrote in 
reference to the fiscal legislation introduced in the Thirty-seventh Congress, “it is 
necessary to have a clear conception of the condition of the Treasury at that time, and of 
the established financial policy of the government immediately before the war.”6  Yet 
historians rarely include the state of the pre-war Treasury in their review of the Civil 
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War legislation.7  Studies of finances during the war usually offer only a brief mention 
of the “unsatisfactory condition of the Treasury in 1860,” then move on to the wartime 
policy.8 
Analyses of the economic impact of the Civil War era often begin with a litany of 
Union strengths: in manpower, industrial output, capital resources, railroad miles, and 
the value of real property.  These factors gave the Union “an overwhelming 
preponderance in most sources of economic power,” according to Richard N. Current.9  
However, in April 1861, the economic power of the Union seemed more tenuous. 
Merchants and planters in the future Confederate states owed northern businesses 
approximately $200 million in unpaid receipts at the start of 1861; as more southern 
states seceded, repayment seemed unlikely.10  Throughout 1861, 5935 northern 
businesses failed, with over $193 million in liabilities.11  When Civil War erupted, trade 
revolving around cotton represented the “major feature in American commerce.”12  
“King Cotton” not only intoxicated southern Firebrands, but also held many northern 
businesses in his grasp.  The secession crisis foretold a great financial loss, rather than a 
potential war boom, accompanied the secession crisis.  In part, this explains why many 
northern “economic interests,” especially the “vast majority of merchant and capitalist 
classes” in New York did not vote for the Republican ticket in 1860.13 
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The economic dominance of the Union seems obvious in hindsight, but those 
engaged in managing the Union’s finances perceived economic weakness and 
uncertainty. On the eve of the war, the Union finances “humiliating,” John Sherman 
worried that, “The problem was not whether we could muster men, but whether we 
could the raise money.”14  The lawmakers charged with organizing the divided nation’s 
finances had to balance their great faith in the future with the limitations inherent in the 
federal fiscal system. Victory seemed less likely the longer the war continued.  We know 
that the United States emerged one hundred years after this catastrophe not only as a 
stronger country, but also as a dominant economic power.  However, those who tended 
the nation at the onset of the war had a different perspective.  “Confidence in everyone is 
shaken to the very foundation,” Massachusetts Republican Henry Dawes wrote to his 
wife on January 6, 1862.  “The credit of the country is ruined … and [the nation’s] ruin 
inevitable.”15 
One can trace this uncertainty, in part, to the fiscal federalism erected during the 
Constitutional Convention, and solidified throughout the antebellum era. Contrary to the 
perception that the national government possessed “unlimited” taxing authority, a tight 
fiscal leash inhibited the options available for addressing “financial embarrassments.”16 
Americans created a government that taxed its citizens minimally and indirectly.  
Throughout the antebellum era, state and national leaders reinforced this structure.  
America did not need standing armies, Alexis de Tocqueville explained, because, “no 
discontented minority has as yet been reduced to declare open war.”  Should this occur, 
he continued, the American fiscal system “would prove a perpetual hindrance to a 
government whose pecuniary demands were large.”17  The antebellum determination to 
curtail the national government’s role in managing the economy created obstacles to 
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generating enough revenue for fighting the war. The “purse and the sword” had become 
separated. The “hindrances” in fiscal authority played a significant role in directing the 
Union’s financial options as the Civil War began.  The men who redesigned this system 
did so with more urgency than deliberation or conviction.  The need to overcome the 
antiquated fiscal system fostered during the antebellum era played the predominant role 
in influencing the financial decisions of the administration. 
 When Charles and Mary Beard declared that the Civil War represented a 
“Second American Revolution,” they continued their iconoclastic disclosures of the 
influence wielded by “economic interests” throughout the course of American history.18  
Louis Hacker refined the Beards’ ideas in 1940.  The resulting “Beard-Hacker” thesis 
identified the economic determinism of the industrial North as the primary force in 
establishing the Civil War political agenda and post-war development.  The Republican 
Party, established in 1854 and triumphant in the presidential election of 1860, 
represented the interests of this rising order. “Industrial capitalism was now in control of 
the state,” Hacker declared. Republicans succeeded in “capturing the state” and used it 
as an instrument to secure the “progress of industrial capitalism.”19 The secession of the 
southern states, and withdrawal of their elected officials from Congress, allowed the 
economic structure of “machine industry [to] tower above agriculture” once the 
“capitalists, laborers, and farmers drove from power the planting aristocracy.”  This 
upheaval created a “profound social and economic transformation.”20 
 The Beard-Hacker thesis has permeated the literature on economic change in the 
Civil War era.  So thoroughly that scholars, such as Richard F. Bensel, who find this 
thesis “colorful, but theoretically unsatisfying,” nevertheless mimic much of the 
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language and theses presented by the Beards and Hacker.  “The American state was 
captured by the Republican Party,” Bensel contended.  Thus, the “antebellum northern 
agenda for the political economy was impressed upon the American state with little 
compromise or mediation.”  He continued, “The party-state sponsored the creation of a 
new class of finance capitalists during the war.” These “finance capitalists” emerged as 
direct beneficiaries of the “Republican hegemony.”21   
 Starting in 1961, economic historians launched a sustained challenge to the 
premise that the Civil War sparked an industrial revolution and economic 
transformation.22  These scholars have demonstrated instead that a “tremendous thrust” 
in manufacturing production occurred before the war.23  Rather than an impetus to 
industrialization, the war represented a “costly and bitter interruption” to the dynamic 
economic expansion that occurred during the antebellum era.24  While exposing one 
fallacy of the “Beard-Hacker” thesis, they have overlooked one relevant aspect of this 
argument.  In challenging the breadth of revolutionary change, economic historians have 
focused too narrowly on production.  By limiting their explorations to enumerating and 
comparing the scale of industrial output, they have lost sight of the many ways in which 
the Civil War “fundamentally altered the economic structure of the United States.”25 
 On another front, scholars intrigued by the resonance of the Republican Party’s 
pre-war ideology have discounted the economic determinism of the Beard-Hacker 
approach.  “Republicans brought into the war an ideology grounded in a conviction of 
the superiority of free to slave labor,” noted Eric Foner, the historian who identified the 
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new party’s “free labor ideology.”  Republicans believed the “distinctive quality of 
Northern society as the opportunity it offered the wage laborer to rise to the status of 
independent farmer or craftsman.”26  Where the Beards depicted economic goals as the 
impetus for change, scholars intrigued the free labor ideology view it as the primary 
determinant in shaping wartime legislation.  “Party members’ faith in individual labor 
made them pass sweeping laws to enable workers to prosper and develop the nation, but 
the same faith made Republicans oblivious to the actual conditions they were creating 
for those workers,” concluded Heather Cox Richardson.27  Similarly, Michael Green 
asserts that Republican policy flowed from “their shared beliefs.”28  One common 
“Beardian” element in these studies presumes that the Republican lawmakers managed 
to promote a preconceived agenda undeterred by the tumult of the Civil War.29  These 
interpretations also neglect to adequately address the challenges the Republicans 
inherited from the previous administrations, particularly the “exhausted” state of the 
Treasury when they came to office. 
 I do not deny that constituent interests influenced Republican legislators.30  Nor 
do I question the ideological commitment made by politicians or soldiers to preserving 
the Union.31  Instead, I argue in this chapter that the condition and structure of the 
government in 1861 greatly influenced the wartime policy.  The Republicans assumed 
control of a government that had been systematically “divorced” from the economy 
during the antebellum era.  The limitations inherent in the federalist system created 
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many “hindrances” as de Tocqueville predicted.  Because states, rather than the national 
government controlled policies regarding banks and currency, the national government 
could not readily harness the wealth of the nation when the Civil War erupted.   
 The first “modern war in American history” compelled many changes in the 
economy, particularly the fiscal system.32  These developments did constitute 
“revolutionary” changes, as the Beards suggested.  However, the effort to manipulate 
these transformations, either for ideological reasons or to reward specific economic 
interests has been overstated.  Rather the exigencies of war overwhelmed the limits that 
constrained the government during the antebellum era.  The “revolution” identified by 
the Beards did not occur because a “capitalist class was marching onward in seven 
league boots” intent on rewarding their patrons.33  Nor did the “Republicans’ belief in 
the ultimate power of individual labor” play a dominate role in shaping wartime fiscal 
policy.34  Rather preserving the nation placed insurmountable strains on the antebellum 
organization of government finance.  Overcoming this antiquated fiscal system played 
the primary role in the financial decisions of the administration. “When I left 
[Washington],” Dix wrote to retired president James Buchanan on March 28, 1861, “I do 
not think the [Lincoln] administration had any settled policy.  It was merely drifting with 
the current, at a loss to know whether it were better to come to an anchor, or set sail.”35   
This statement, I believe, more accurately reflects the nature of the “party-state,” and the 
nation, on the eve of the Civil War. 
 
The Growing Debt  
President James Buchanan’s administration mismanaged the nation’s finances.  
Upon Buchanan’s inauguration in 1857, the Treasury recorded a $1.3 million surplus, 
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and a moderate $28.7 million debt.  By the start of Abraham Lincoln’s first term, the 
Treasury sagged under the weight of a $25.2 million deficit and a $76.4 million debt, the 
largest peacetime obligation in the nation’s history.36 
Bad luck, fiscal imprudence, and political stalemate fostered this derangement.  
Soon after President Buchanan settled into the White House, the Panic of 1857 swept the 
country. The Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company failed in August 1857.  The 
largest bank in Ohio and purveyor of eastern loans and specie to the western states 
collapsed after embezzlement and easy credit emptied its reserves. Banks in New York 
responded by calling many of their loans, thus triggering a ripple effect.  Businesses and 
banks nationwide, unable to respond to the demands of their paymasters, declared 
bankruptcy.  One by one, New York, Boston, and Philadelphia banks reacted 
defensively, hoarding their reserves and tightening their credit.  As a result, an epidemic 
of business and bank failures occurred.37 Harper’s Weekly reported in December 1857 
that, “the people are suffering from a revulsion almost unprecedented in severity.”38  
Iron furnaces throughout Pennsylvania, the president’s home state, closed and 
production fell from 883,000 tons in 1856 to 705,000 in 1858.  The value of wheat 
exports dropped from $22.2 million to $9 million between 1857 and 1859.  Wheat 
comprised the largest export commodity produced by the northern states.  Contrasting 
this despair, foreign and domestic cotton sales continued apace.  Cotton exports rose in 
value to $161.4 million in 1859 from $131.56 million in 1857. The economy of the free 
laborers languished, while the “King Cotton” economy, built upon the scarred backs of 
slaves, flourished. The economic effects of the Panic further exacerbated this sectional 
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tension.  This disjunction convinced many southerners of the “superiority” of the slave 
labor based economy.39  
Although the Panic ended quickly, the downturn in northern and western states, 
coupled with the growing prosperity of the South, increased sectional tensions.  The 
Panic, according to Samuel Rezneck, “The South boasted of its relative immunity to the 
shock of depression, inasmuch as the [panic] was felt most severely in the East and the 
West.”40  Debow’s Review bragged in December, 1857 that, “The wealth of the South is 
permanent and real, that of the North fugitive and fictitious.”41 
The Panic also initiated a financial crisis.  Customs receipts, the primary source 
of revenue for the national government, lagged throughout the Buchanan administration.  
Federal revenues never matched the income collected during any year of President 
Franklin Pierce’s term.  Import duties fell from $64.2 million in 1856 to $41.7 million in 
1858 with only a slight rebound to $49.5 million in 1859.42  While the Buchanan 
administration had the misfortune of coming to office at the onset of the Panic, they 
exacerbated their troubles by not adjusting their wants to fit this new economic climate.  
Reduced revenue did not curtail the administration’s spending.  Expenditures 
from 1857-1861 topped those of any previous peacetime administration’s, despite the 
drop in income.  Buchanan initiated a “flood of innovations,” according to Philip 
Klein.43  His attempt to acquire Cuba, the attack against the Mormons, using the Navy to 
“protect” American vessels engaged in the illicit slave trade, and expansion of the postal 
service all extended the scope of government spending and increased the deficit.44  
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Heated exchanges in Congress over these problems added to the political and sectional 
tensions.  As Roy Nichols noted, “The bitter struggle for money had widened the 
political divisions and intensified the rival attitudes which encouraged them.”45 
Corruption also sapped the federal budget.  Historian Mark W. Summers 
described the administration’s malfeasance as “the most devastating proof of 
government abuse of power since the founding of the Republic.” President Buchanan 
built his cabinet from political friends and supporters.  This “compatible group” shared a 
common sympathy with the objectives of the tenacious southern wing of the Democratic 
party. President Buchanan gave autonomy to his secretaries, dubbed the “Buchaneers,” 
and rarely questioned their appointments or budgets. Corruption and profiteering beset 
the War and Navy departments.  Scandals erupted in the War Department over excessive 
payments to political friends.  Secretary John Floyd bought everything from military 
sites to mules for excessive prices.  He facilitated a shady payment scheme with a 
military contractor that allowed over $6 million in payments to channel through his 
personal bank accounts. Government printing contracts were used to finance Buchanan’s 
political machine, including the intra-party war against his chief political rival, Stephan 
A. Douglas.46   
Republicans in Congress convened the Covode Committee to investigate the 
charges.  Although they could not find any hard evidence for an impeachment 
proceeding, they uncovered many dubious and suspicious activities conducted by the 
president and his “Buchaneers.” “Considerable evidence” exists, according the Jean H. 
Baker, “that the president’s efforts to bulldoze the Lecompton Constitution” through 
Congress “involved several forms of bribery.”47  These rumors of improbity also 
extended to lending aid to the seceding states.  During the “secession winter,” Henry C. 
                                                                                                                                                
(New York: D. Appleton, Co., 1916), 8: 358-360; Carl H. Scheele, A Short History of 
the Mail Service (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1970). 
45 Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1948), 194. 
46 Mark W. Summers, The Plundering Generation: Corruption and the Crisis of the 
Union, 1849-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 239-260, quote on 258. 
47 Jean H. Baker, James Buchanan (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), 113-116. 
 91
Adams reports, “rumors circulated of cabinet secretaries aiding the secession 
movement.”  Suspicions of disloyalty circulated throughout the capital.  “Many believe,” 
he writes, “ that [John Floyd] ordered the transfer of arms to southern states threatening 
secession.” Howell Cobb, Adams continued, quietly moved specie from depositories in 
northern states to those in states that eventually seceded.48 Cobb denied this charge, but 
carried it for years. Alexander H. Stephens, while vice president of the Confederate 
States, teased him about “not even leaving ‘old Buck’ two quarters to put on his eyes 
when he died.”49  Although the historical jury remains uncertain about the validity of 
Adams’s and the Republicans’ charges, investors looking for a reliable and stable place 
to place their funds viewed the Americans situation with skepticism.  Remembering the 
losses from the 1840’s, when two state governments repudiated their debts, foreign 
investors were not anxious to place their faith in a deteriorating situation. These rumors 
dampened investor confidence in United States securities. 
On top of these extravagances, the government had legitimate bills to pay. To 
meet all these obligations, President Buchanan’s administration resorted to deficit 
financing.  Treasury notes and longer-term bonds paid the accumulating expenses.  
Issued for one or two year terms, Treasury notes could be renewed each year, whereas 
investors held bonds for longer periods (at least five years, but not more than 20 (5/20’s) 
for example.) Authorized only five other times in American history before 1857 (War of 
1812 and Panic of 1837), Treasury notes provided a means of overcoming deficits.  If 
redeemed quickly, they incurred less overall expense than bonds, because of the shorter 
period of interest payments. However, these notes often exacerbated any financial 
distress, because investors redeemed their principal sooner than on bonds.   
The Treasury issued $30 million in Treasury notes during Buchanan’s term. (In 
contrast, during the Depression of 1837, the nation’s worst downturn before the Great 
                                                 
48 Henry C. Adams, The Great Secession Winter and Other Essays, George Hatfield, ed. 
(New York: Sagamore Press, 1958): 7-8. 
49 Ellis P. Oberholtzer, Jay Cooke: Financier of the Civil War, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: 
George W. Jacobs, Co., 1907), I: 124.  Buchanan denied these charges.  See George T. 
Curtis, Life of James Buchanan, (New York: Harper Bros., 1883), 261. 
 92
Depression, the government issued $43 million in Treasury notes.)  In the past, the notes 
carried a uniform interest rate of 5.4 percent, but the credit of the nation suffered from 
the Panic and sectional animosity.50 The first issue, released in December, 1857, sold at 
6 percent.  The Treasury issued another $10 million another in notes in December, 1860. 
This began the pattern of short-term borrowing that characterized one facet of the Civil 
War financing.   
Issued in smaller denominations than bonds, and received for all [state] taxes, 
import duties, public land sales, and federal bond purchases, Treasury notes acted as a 
form of currency. Three types of “money” were used at the onset of the Civil War.   
Gold, silver and copper coins, state bank notes, and Treasury notes.  Received as 
“money” and convertible to specie at most banks, Treasury notes performed many of the 
functions of a currency.  When faith in the government’s ability to redeem the notes for 
gold waned, they sold at a discount, for higher interest rates. For this reason, the 
Treasury notes issued in December, 1860 sold well below par (between 86-94, meaning 
$100 worth of notes could be purchased for $86-$94), and the lenders demanded interest 
rates as high as 36 percent.51  
To reign in these expenses, and recover some of the outstanding Treasury notes, 
Secretary Cobb also issued 10 – 20 year bonds. “It would be ruinous practice in the days 
of peace and prosperity to go on increasing the national debt to meet the ordinary 
expenses of government,” Buchanan acknowledged in 1859.  However, he never stopped 
the borrowing binge.  Buchanan authorized the last loan of his administration on March 
2, 1861, two days before the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln.52 
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The United States had managed its debt well, despite early republican concerns 
about the perils of indebtedness.  Rafael Bayley, who completed a history of U.S. debt 
for the Census Bureau remarked, “The United States have been wonderful in their rapid 
accumulation of debt and their equally rapid reduction.”53  Only during times of great 
uncertainty, such as the months before the War of 1812, did the government sell 
securities at interest rates higher than 8 percent. On a decennial average, United States 
long-term interest rates never went higher than 6.39 percent between 1810-1820.54  The 
United States carried a debt throughout its history, except briefly in 1835.55  
Throughout the antebellum era, investors had poured money into the United 
States. The reliability of the federal interest payments enticed many Europeans to invest 
in U.S. securities. After the collapse of the state bonds in the 1840’s foreigners surveyed 
the debt in the United States more cautiously.  Foreign investing declined, but did not 
stop.  In 1853, investors abroad held $222 million in American securities, or about 18 
percent of all outstanding debt (including state bonds, railroad stock and bonds, bank 
shares, and federal government securities.)  By 1860, this amount increased to $400 
million. “We are heavily in debt to Europe,” the New York Tribune noted in April, 4 
1857.56  Despite the experience with the states, the national debt remained a good 
investment for Europeans because scheduled interest payments arrived on time and in 
gold. However, skittish concern for these securities resurfaced. Between 1857–1861, 
investors expressed their distrust in the stability of the Union by demanding some of the 
highest interest rates and steepest discounts ever.  
The debt accumulated during Treasury secretary Howell Cobb’s tenure imperiled 
the national budget.  Interest rates soared as investors viewed the growing sectional 
                                                 
53 Rafael Bayley, Public Indebtedness: A Report in the Tenth Census, (Washington: 
GPO, 1884), 269. 
54 Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A History of Interest Rates. Third ed. (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univerity Press, 1991), 286-287. 
55 Dewey, Financial History of the United States, 124-126;  John Jay Knox, United 
States Notes, second ed. (New York: Sanford J. Durst, 1978), 21-23, 60-62. 
56 Margaret G. Myers, A Financial History of the United States (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970), 117-119; New York Tribune, April 4, 1857, 2. 
 94
tensions in the United States with deep wariness. In the past, Congress relieved these 
derangements by trying to increase revenue.  Since customs duties overwhelming 
provided the bulk of funds for the Treasury, duties would be placed on selected imports, 
such as coffee, tea, and sugar that would otherwise enter the country duty-free.  
However, the political crisis of the late 1850’s stymied the chances adjusting the tariff in 
order to raise more money for the ailing Treasury. Internal taxes had not been collected 
in the United States since the War of 1812, so adjusting tariff rates provided the most 
efficient means of correcting budget shortfalls. In 1859 Buchanan asked Congress to 
raise tariff rates, stating that, “I would recommend that the necessary revenue [for 
government expenses] be raised by an increase in the present duties on imports.”57 
However, the sectional tensions stymied legislative action on adjusting the tariff.  
Both the Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth Congresses became bitter forums for the 
increasing sectional divide. These tumultuous congresses featured the angry debates over 
the admission of Kansas and the Lecompton Constitution, the reaction to Dred Scott 
decision, the vitriol over the John Brown raid, and the caning of Senator Charles 
Sumner. A “fiscal logjam” resulted.58 No tariff measure could pass, although both 
Republicans and Democrats agreed that something needed to be done.  “Things look 
dark here,” Secretary Dix lamented on January 16, 1861. “The utter inactivity of 
Congress stupefied those who otherwise would have some hopes.”59 
Not until March 2, 1861, when President Buchanan signed the Morrill Tariff into 
law, did Congress fulfill his request for increased revenue. Obscured by the political cant 
of both contemporaries and historians, the bill’s significance as a revenue measure has 
been under appreciated.  Implemented as a direct response to the fiscal crisis created by 
the Buchanan administration, the Morrill Tariff represented a bipartisan effort to 
augment federal revenue for the depleted Treasury. As Justin S. Morrill (R. VT)  noted 
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repeatedly during the course of the debates, that the tariff aimed to reinstate the rates of 
the “free trade” tariff of 1846, rather than implement a new system of protection.  The 
administration needed funds to pay the interest on the accumulating debt.  Without more 
revenue, the government’s credit remained impaired.  However, congressional stalemate 
blocked the efforts of both Democrats and Republicans to pass this tariff bill.  The 
political acrimony overwhelmed repeated efforts to address the “exhausted condition of 
the Treasury.” 60  This impasse and the resort to Treasury notes began the government’s 
dependence on short-term borrowing that became an integral part of the Civil War 
financing.  Sectional tensions hobbled all remedies to the fiscal emergency that rended 
congress and the nation. 
In December 1860, the Buchanan administration began to disintegrate.  Four 
cabinet officers resigned in support of the secessionist movement. Howell Cobb left his 
post at the Treasury on December 8, 1860.   Secretary Cobb’s “gross mismanagement of 
the Treasury,” led Senator James Blaine to grouse that, “There was embarrassment when 
there should have been security; there was scarcity when the most ordinary prudence 
would have insured plenty.” The “money markets of the world” lost faith in US 
securities. Interest rates for Treasury notes rose, and prospective investors demanded 
discounts on the issues.61 
Disarray ensued.  The president asked Philip F. Thomas, commissioner of 
Patents and former governor of Maryland, to fill the Cobb’s slot.  On December 18, 
1860, Thomas attempted to issue $5 million in Treasury notes, but only 1.8 million sold 
at the extraordinarily high interest rate of 12 percent. The remainder of the loan attracted 
few takers, and those who bid demanded interest rates as high as 36 percent. 62  The 
“awakening political fears,” created, according to Hunt’s Merchant Magazine, 
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“prostrated credit.”63 Buchanan’s choice of Thomas further undermined the 
government’s credit.  Thomas openly sympathized with the secessionist movement (later 
his only son served in the Confederate army); this did not inspire confidence from 
investors.  Thomas confided in his memoirs that, “New York capitalists had gone to Mr. 
Buchanan and said they would not subscribe for the loan as long as a southern man 
remained at the Treasury.” Buchanan sacked Thomas after the new secretary had served 
less than a month.64 
Immediately thereafter a meeting of “bank officers and directors of moneyed 
institutions,” held at the Bank of Commerce recommended John A. Dix as the next 
secretary. He was confirmed on January 11, 1861. Dix had served in the Army for 
sixteen years and fought in the War of 1812.  Admitted to the bar in Washington, D.C. in 
1824, Dix returned to New York, and quickly emerged as a leader in his state’s 
Democratic Party.  He held a number of public positions in the 1830’s and 40’s, 
including Secretary of State for New York.  Between 1845 and 1853, he served in the 
U.S. Senate, completing the term of the Silas Wright, who became New York’s 
governor.  Dix ran unsuccessfully for governor of New York in 1848. President Franklin 
Pierce asked Dix to serve as his Secretary of State.  A “cabal” of southern politicians, 
who abhorred Dix’s sympathy for the Free Soil Movement, thwarted his nomination.  
Dix’s son later reported that, “great indignation was felt by this breach.”  This fostered 
Dix’s long animosity for the Democracy’s “slave interests.”  It also invoked great 
sympathy and support amongst the northern Democrats, particularly in New York.  Dix 
returned to private law practice and launched a literary magazine called the Northern 
Light.  Regarded as a cultured and well-read man of great integrity, he traveled 
frequently in Europe, and his travelogues enjoyed popularity in the U. S.  When “great 
frauds” besmirched the New York post office in 1860, President Buchanan, a long-time 
friend of Dix’s, asked him to take over the position of Postmaster.  He established order 
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to the New York postal service, which endeared him to the political and business leaders 
of the city.  They turned to Dix again to rescue the Treasury in 1861.65 
When Dix arrived at the Treasury, he found that, “Public business had been 
neglected, letters from merchants and capitalists remained unanswered, complaints from 
all parts of the country had been unheeded.”  The New York banking community felt 
more confident with Dix in charge at the Treasury, but Boston bankers announced they 
would make no further loans unless the “affairs of the South are satisfactorily settled.”66   
Dix resorted to an inducement to bolster confidence in the market. He asked Congress on 
February 12 to accept the offer from several states, “to superadd a pledge of their faith  . 
. . for the redemption of any bonds” issued by the government, “using public moneys 
deposited with them in June, 1836.”67 This offer of the federal surplus funds distributed 
to the states during the Jackson administration, “seem[ed] strange to the ears of those 
who were accustomed to the unbounded credit of the Republic,” commented James G. 
Blaine.68 In his last Treasury report, Howell Cobb had suggested using public lands as 
collateral for bond sales.  These offers revived financing schemes employed during the 
Revolutionary and Early Republic Era; the tenuous prospect of “deals,” rather than solid 
credit once again seemed necessary to secure financing. Congress rejected these 
suggestions, fearing a greater loss of faith in the public credit. Bray Hammond noted 
sardonically that, “On the eve of the Civil War, the United States represented a 
sovereignty that had far less credit in the market than most of the states it comprised.”69 
With the debt enlarged by $50 million during the four years of the Buchanan 
administration, faith in U.S. securities now ebbed.  The deterioration of the country’s 
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finances inspired the London Economist to observe in the early months of the war that, 
“It is out of the question, in our judgment, that the Americans can obtain, either at home 
or in Europe, anything like the extravagant sums they are asking – for Europe won’t lend 
them; America cannot.”70 Even before the large outlays for the war, lenders expressed 
skepticism about the debt carried by the United States.  The fiscal straits of the country 
only grew worse as the Civil War approached. 
 
The Secession Crisis and the Treasury 
Secretary Dix soon faced new difficulties. As the southern states seceded, local 
authorities claimed the federal revenue stored in their local customhouse vaults. On 
January 30, 1861, for example, Joseph E. Brown, governor of Georgia, ordered the 
collector in Savannah to pay “no more money from the customs house to any 
government or person without my order.”71  Of the 152 ports of entry that collected 
tariffs in 1858, 52 of these lay in states that eventually joined the Confederate States of 
America.72  These ports generated approximately six percent of the federal customs 
revenue (New York alone accounted for 68 percent) during the late antebellum years, 
but their detachment threatened to disrupt trade at a time when the government needed 
every cent.73  More importantly, cotton would no longer travel North for export, which 
would curtain northern imports. 
Dix received a flurry of dispatches, many from southern customs officers 
declaring their intention, “as good and loyal citizens to obey the authority of my state,” 
and turnover the duties they collected to their state governments.  Other officials who 
wished to remain loyal to the Union wrote Dix, pleading for instructions.74  Many 
                                                 
70 Quoted in J. W. Schuckers, Life and Public Services, 225-226. 
71 Dix, Memoirs, I: 366. 
72 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, House Ex. Doc. 3, 35th Cong., 2nd 
sess., ser. Set 996, 240-259. 
73 “Collection of Duties in the Seceding States,” House Ex. Doc. 73, 36th Cong., 2nd sess, 
ser set 1100, 3-8. 
74 Ibid, 3-8; Sampling from Dix, Memoirs, I: 366-372. 
 99
captains of the revenue cutters stationed in southern ports surrendered their ships.75  The 
captain of the McClelland, a cutter anchored in New Orleans, refused to obey the order 
to depart for a safe port.  Dix instructed the lieutenant who reported the insubordination 
to arrest Captain Breshwood and sail for New York.  “If anyone attempts to haul down 
the American flag,” Dix commanded, “shoot him on the spot.”76 (This occurred 10 
weeks before the assault on Fort Sumter.)  Despite Dix’s bravado, the McClelland fell 
into Confederate control until June, 1862 when Major General Benjamin Butler 
reclaimed federal authority in New Orleans.  As a token of respect and friendship, Butler 
sent Dix “an identical flag” plus the “Confederate flag which was hoisted by traitor 
hands in its place.”77  Revenue cutters were not the only loss.  When the Louisiana 
secession convention seized the port, they also took control of the Mint and Customs 
House.  The vaults in the two buildings contained approximately $600,000 in specie, a 
further blow to the ailing Treasury.78 
Losing New Orleans had long-term repercussions beyond that of coin, tariffs, and 
revenue cutters.  It imperiled the economic stability of the Union because, as a Treasury 
report warned, the seizure of the port, “struck a fatal blow at the free navigation of the 
Mississippi.”  Seizing this key port gave the future Confederate States control of the 
“commerce of the West … Any importer sending his wares up the river to northern 
consumers would have to pay two tariffs – one to the [Confederate States] when he 
passed through New Orleans, and one at the final destination.”  Over 20 Union inland 
ports would be affected, including Chicago, St. Louis, and Pittsburg.  Farmers exporting 
their commodities might face to an export tariff, the report speculated, a scenario that 
eventuated when the Confederate Congress enacted an export duty in May, 1861.79 
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General William T. Sherman, whose service in the army had taken him to many 
southern states, and therefore given him a keen perspective on southern politics and 
culture, outlined the magnitude of the problem to his brother John in a February 1, 1861 
letter:  
 If the South have free trade, how can you collect revenues in the 
eastern cities?  Freight [from these cities] would be about the same as rail 
from New York, and importers at New Orleans [who] have no duties to 
pay undersell the east … the north [must adopt free trade] or blockade 
because it could no longer control New Orleans.80  
 
John Sherman, representative, and soon senator, from Ohio, found these events 
of special importance.  As Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee he remained 
deeply concerned with the fiscal straits of the government.  Further, his constituents 
relied on the export of farm commodities for their well-being and had elected Sherman 
to represent these interests.81  He understood that the loss of New Orleans as a blow to 
the economic fortunes of his state as well as the Union.  The disruption in trade led to a 
fall in customs receipts for the first three months in 1861.82  
The money grab extended to the capital as well.  According to the New York 
Times, on March 3, the day before Lincoln’s inauguration, federal employees scrambled 
to pocket some loot before the change in administrations.  Under the “spoils system,” a 
new administration meant a change not only at the helm, but also throughout the 
government, particularly with a new party in power.  Federal workers expected to lose 
their sinecures to Republican partisans, and determined to take what they could. 
The rush upon the Treasury was greater than was ever before 
known, and before noon, every dollar in the public vaults had been paid 
out.  [One man] ran from room to room endeavoring to get ahead of the 
crowd and secure the requisite officials’ signatures before he could reach 
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the Treasurer’s counter . . .When every eagle had taken flight, drafts were 
issued on the sub-Treasurer at New York.83   
 
Marauding civil servants emptied the Washington vaults, leaving little behind for the 
new administration.  “There was not enough money,” at the beginning of the Lincoln 
presidency reminisced Lucius E. Chittenden, Register of the Treasury, “to pay for the 
daily consumption of stationery [and] no dealer would furnish it on credit.”84 
The Lincoln administration faced these challenges when sworn into office on 
March 4.  The Union carried the largest debt the government had ever accumulated 
without engaging in a war.  The growing hostilities made large outlays inevitable, 
although the vaults stood empty. Note and bond holders expected their interest 
payments, on time and in gold, an inflexible demand if the government wanted to keep 
its credit from sinking any lower.  Attempts to borrow additional funds met with 
skepticism. The loss of customhouses and the uncertainty of trade curtailed government 
revenue. The Union faced the prospect of war with an empty Treasury, no secure source 
of income, and the national credit hobbled.  “Financially, the federal government was 
more poorly prepared for war in the early months of 1861 than it had been since its 
establishment,” stated economist Robert T. Patterson.  On the eve of the Civil War, the 
Treasury stood broken and bereft of funds, facing a perilous future as new leadership 
assumed responsibility for the bankrupt, crumbling nation.85 
 
The New Administration 
Into this mess stepped an administration comprised of a political party that had 
existed for only seven years.  The Republicans, a minority party with an unstable base, 
had won their first national election against a divided opponent, and with fewer votes 
than the other candidates combined.  They won 116 seats to the Thirty-sixth Congress, 
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but did not reach that number of seats again until the Thirty-ninth Congress.86  Roy 
Nichols noted that, “in the spring, 1861 elections – the first public referendum since the 
Republican administration was assembled, Lincoln faced defeat at the polls, particularly 
in Ohio and Connecticut.”  The withdrawal of southern representatives gave them an 
overwhelming majority in Congress, however they knew the Democracy remained 
strong, and their majority could slip away.  Throughout the Civil War, they had a 
tenuous political mandate and always had to look over their shoulders to gauge the 
voters’ reaction.87  
A rejection of the more aggressive policies of the southern slaveholders’ 
demands had united a disparate group of Democrats, Whigs, and American Party 
nativists under the banner of this new party.  Although they agreed that a “political 
heresy” now dictated that slavery could exist “in any or all territories of the United 
States,” they did not agree on many other substantive issues.88  Richard Hofstadter 
described the early Republican Party as a conglomeration of: 
abolitionists and Negrophobes, high and low tariff men, hard and 
soft money men, former Whigs and former Democrats embittered by old 
political fights, prohibitionists and tipplers, Know-Nothings and 
immigrants.89    
 
Although they shared a common “rising hostility to the aggressive slave power” 
and believed this threat endangered the future for free labor, other political issues 
continued to cause rifts within the ranks.90  Sharp disagreements over practical matters 
of governance plagued the Republicans as they assumed leadership. This dilemma 
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surfaced quickly with regard to fiscal policy.  Many former-Democrats, most notably the 
new Treasury secretary, Salmon P. Chase, did not dance to the Whig fiddle. 
Former Whigs dominated the Republican Party. The Whig party, which rose and 
fell between 1834-1856, coalesced in opposition to President Andrew Jackson’s 
economic initiatives.  A common approach to handling the nation’s finances lay at the 
core of their organization.  Michael F. Holt summarized their approach to governance in 
stating that, “government at all levels of the federal system should be used positively to 
elevate people economically, socially, and morally through internal development of the 
nation’s civil institutions and economic infrastructure.”91 
This faith in an energetic government translated into defense of the Second Bank 
of the United States, “a well-regulated currency, a tariff for revenue to defray the 
necessary expenses of the government, and discriminating in special reference to the 
protection of domestic labor,” as they stated in their 1844 platform.  The Constitution 
vested Congress with the power to “make [internal] improvements [that] are necessary 
for the common defence,” they reiterated in 1852.92  Jackson’s attack against the Second 
Bank of the United States united Whigs; they continued to rail against the state bank 
system erected in its stead. Whigs justified protective tariffs to spur industry, provide 
wage security for workers, and generate additional revenue for federally funded internal 
improvement projects.  The “American System,” articulated by Whig leader Henry Clay, 
epitomized the Whig economic philosophy.  
In contrast to the Whigs, the Democratic Party espoused a limited national 
government and repeatedly extolled the virtues a “laissez-faire” doctrine for the national 
government.  Their “characteristic commitments,” according to Jean H. Baker, “included 
states rights, federal restraint, and an assertive Unionism … they were for state rather 
than national government, for white rather than black, for freedom rather than control.”93   
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The Jackson administration’s economic policies emphasized these philosophies.  
In “killing” the Second Bank of the United States, the Jacksonians hoped to end the 
“privilege” and “monopoly” in the distribution of government funds.  State banks 
became the main government depositories in an effort to provide them, and their 
customers “greater regularity and predictability” in finances.94  “Government should 
have no more concern with banking and brokerage than it has with baking and tailoring,” 
lectured William M. Gouge, a Democratic Secretary of Treasury.95 The complementary 
call to restrict government transactions to “sound currency,” with gold and silver coins 
the soundest of them all, emphasized the Jacksonian desire to retain “economy” in 
government.  The use of bank notes, checks, and other forms of “paper money,” led to 
extravagance, overspending, and “ruinous fluctuations arising from alternate expansions 
and contractions of bank issues.”96  To further limit government expenditure, the 
Democratic Party in the post-Jackson era abhorred protectionism and called repeatedly 
for tariffs for revenue only. 
These approaches to fiscal policy differed sharply. “The Constitution does not 
confer upon the general government the power to commence internal improvements,” 
stated a series of antebellum Democratic platforms.  The “federal government is one of 
limited powers,” that has no right to “interfere or control the domestic institutions in the 
states.”97  Democrats relied on “hard” money, where Whigs looked to the credit 
opportunities available through “soft” currencies. Democrats distributed many of the 
financial powers of the government to the states, whereas the Whigs fought for 
economic development through national programs.  Democrats consistently invoked the 
benefits of free trade, where Whigs aimed to instill a protectionist trade policy.  
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Democrats wanted state governments to fund internal improvements; Whigs believed in 
federally directed, large-scale improvement projects.  Democrats advocated using direct 
taxation when necessitated by “embarrassments,” than loans or increased tariffs. Whigs 
preferred the ease, efficiency, and benefit of protection for industries provided by raising 
import duties.  Horatio Seymour, a New York leader in the Democratic Party, 
summarized the parties’ differences when he characterized the Democrats as the “let-
alone party” and the Whigs as the “meddling party.”98  
Salmon P. Chase came to the Treasury through a winding political course.  He 
had supported the Attorney General William Wirt’s 1832 Anti-Mason candidacy for 
president.  He served on  the Cincinnati City Council in 1840 as a Whig.  Chase worked, 
unsuccessfully, to solidify the Liberty and Free Soil parties during the 1840’s.  In 1849 
he was elected to the Senate as a Democrat.  In reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, in 
1854, he started work on a new political organization that became the Republican party.  
Ohio voters chose him as their first Republican governor in 1855, then senator in 1859.99  
Chase’s commitment to the abolitionist movement spurred this eclectic political 
journey. He emerged as one of the nation’s leading anti-slavery politicians in the 1830’s, 
before the movement gained popular support.  As an attorney in Cincinnati, Chase 
represented fugitive slaves fortunate enough to escape into Ohio.  So many, in fact, that 
Chase developed a reputation as the “Attorney-General for runaway slaves.” His well-
publicized briefs in these cases, and frequent denunciations of the peculiar institution, 
gave Chase a national reputation as a leader in the effort to end slavery.  “It is difficult 
now for any one unacquainted with the earlier days of the slavery struggle,” to 
understand the intense animosity toward Chase because of these efforts, according to 
Jacob W. Schuckers, Chase’s secretary and later biographer.  Chase, “was the object of 
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hate, bitter and unrelenting” because of his abolitionist views, according to Schuckers.100  
However, when the public sentiment turned, and support for abolitionism spread in the 
northern states during the 1850’s, Chase received accolades for his many years of 
service to the anti-slavery cause. In moving between parties, Chase wanted to find the 
best political vehicle to abolish slavery.  The Republican party finally achieved this goal.  
On the eve of the 1860 Republican convention, Chase enjoyed a greater national 
reputation than Abraham Lincoln, and thought, optimistically, that he might win the 
nomination.  However, his well-known criticism of protective tariffs made him an 
impalpable candidate for the former Whigs in the party.   
Despite his political vacillations, and early legal career representing the Bank of 
the United States in Ohio, Chase consistently retained his faith in the economic 
principles of the Democratic Party.  In a 1851 letter, Chase restated his belief in the 
“fundamental laws” that included: 
Limitation of state indebtedness, coupled with prompt and 
honorable discharge of existing obligations; equal taxation of all property, 
whether corporate or individual (direct taxes), restriction of legislative 
power to legitimate subjects … No Democrat,” he continued, “will 
dissent from those resolutions which administer a deserved rebuke to the 
Whig administration now controlling the actions of the general 
government, and reaffirm those Democratic doctrines in relation to the 
tariff, the Bank of the United States, and the Independent Treasury.101 
 
Later, in 1868, he confided to a friend that, “on the questions of finance, 
commerce, and administration generally the old democratic principles afford the best 
guidance.”102  Chase distrusted banks and bankers, supported “sound” rather than “soft” 
money, remained uneasy with the large loans contracted during the Civil War, preferred 
direct rather than indirect taxes, and continually urged “economy” in government 
administration.  All these views expressed the core economic principles of the 
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Democratic Party. “The first Republican Secretary of the Treasury,” quipped David H. 
Donald, “was a Democrat.”103 
In reference to Chase, Justin S. Morrill, Republican member of Congress and 
author of the Morrill Tariff, lamented that, “His philosophy is free trade.”104  Chase tried 
to soften his anti-protectionist position to earn the 1860 presidential nomination, but his 
equivocating earned him distrust rather than supporters.  Indeed, the many former Whigs 
in Lincoln’s administration never warmed to Chase because he suffered from the cancer 
of “excessive ambition.” Despite Chase’s consistency in supporting the abolitionist 
cause, many suspected that his desire to become president often trumped his anti-slavery 
fervor.  He migrated to different parties not only to end slavery, but also to provide a 
vehicle for his presidential aspirations.  He wanted that office, and set his mind and heart 
to winning it.105  “He strove to attain an honor which was never his,” Jay Cooke 
related.106   
Former Whigs’ suspicions regarding Chase seemed justified when he mounted a 
surreptitious campaign to take the 1864 Republican president nomination from President 
Lincoln while serving as Treasury secretary.  After this attempt failed, he courted 
Democrats to win their support for their party’s nomination in 1868, while he served as 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  Chase’s demeanor only exacerbated these 
misgivings.  His niece recalled that  
He abominated cards and waltzes … there was no going to the 
races or the theatre for any member of his family.  He was very religious; 
and almost puritanical in his observance of the Sunday.  He would not 
even allow us to write letters on Sunday.107 
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Jay Cooke described Chase as “somewhat severe, ponderous, and ostentatiously correct 
Puritan.”108  These misgivings, coupled with Chase’s differences fundamental 
differences with regard the economic policy, created a great animosity toward the 
Treasury secretary.  Chase maintained a “cold courtesy” with the William H. Seward and 
other former Whigs in the party.109 One “Ohio Whig” who learned of Lincoln’s plans to 
include Chase in his Cabinet in order to represent all elements of the new party, 
mourned, “in the name of God can it be that,” you incorporate, “such incongruous and 
repulsive elements as Chase.”110 
Deep differences on the core economic issues of the antebellum era still divided 
the Republicans when they assumed the leadership of a broken nation. Republican 
candidates had practiced “avoidance and compromise” in articulating their economic 
platform before and during the 1860 election.111  Members of the party wrangled 
throughout the war years on the basic economic questions that had divided the political 
classes throughout the antebellum era.  Hard money or soft, free trade or protective 
tariffs, expansive or limited government:  these differences did not disappear once the 
Republicans came to office.  These internal differences tainted the efforts of the 
administration to meet the fiscal challenges brought by the Civil War.  
Chase began his tenure at the Treasury without preparation.  He and President-
elect Lincoln had not developed any plan or strategy for addressing the economic peril 
of the nation.  Chase met with Lincoln in Springfield, Illinois for two days in January, 
1861, but left the meeting believing that “he would be more useful in the Senate” than as 
Treasury secretary.112  Lincoln told Chase during their discussions that, “I sent for you to 
ask whether you will accept the appointment of secretary of Treasury without, however, 
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being exactly prepared to offer it to you.”113  Chase lobbied for the position, telling those 
who agreed with him with regard to the “proper financial and economical policy of the 
Administration,” that they needed to “visit Mr. Lincoln and discuss everything and 
unreservedly with him,”114   
However, Chase began to reconsider.  He preferred to represent Ohio in the 
Senate, he concluded.  Chase knew he had strong support from many fellow Democratic-
Republicans in the ranks of the party, but he also knew he faced strong opposition within 
the Cabinet.  When Chase arrived in Washington, D.C. on March 1, 1861 he still 
believed he represented Ohio as its Senator. Without informing Chase, Lincoln sent his 
name to the Senate for confirmation after the start of the session. Selecting Chase as 
Treasury secretary “nettled” the Whig establishment in the party, most prominently, 
William H. Seward, Lincoln’s choice for Secretary of State. The President-elect believed 
that all elements of the party needed representation in his Cabinet. “It became apparent,” 
observed John Niven, “that Lincoln wanted a coalition Cabinet in which previous party 
affiliations, competing ideologies, and representatives of the distinct sections of the 
Union were balanced.”115   
The Cabinet divided along sectional and political lines.  Their ideological 
commitment to limiting the expansion of slavery did not lead to any agreement over how 
to manage the crises of disunion and national bankruptcy.  Little cooperative discussion 
occurred before the inauguration. The Lincoln administration began its tenure without a 
firm plan of action in hand. The skirmishing between former Whigs and Democrats to 
secure factional influence in the new administration replaced meditative discussions over 
how best to address the nation’s problems. Seward so opposed Chase’s nomination that 
he offered his “resignation” even before the inauguration, an offer Lincoln declined. The 
dialogue that did occur, particularly between Chase and Seward, seethed with tension.  
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At one cabinet meeting, while Chase discussed his “financial views,” Gideon Welles, 
Secretary of the Navy, observed that the other secretaries, “were not prepared to have 
him [Chase] set up a standard of financial, political, or party orthodoxy for them.”116  
Chase had no time to work on the economic problems of the country before he took 
office. 
Although known for his haughtiness and ravenous ambition, one may look at 
Chase’s predicament upon assuming his new job with some sympathy.  In his first 
official report to Congress in July 1861, Chase wrote that:  
He [Chase] has but reluctantly assumed the charge of the 
vast and complicated concerns of his department, and he is deeply 
conscious how imperfectly he is qualified by experience, by 
talents or by special acquirements for such a charge.  He 
understands also, better perhaps than anyone outside can 
understand, the difficulties incident to the task . . . the criminal 
insurrection deranges commerce, accumulates expenditures, 
necessitates taxes, embarrasses industry, deprecates property, 
cripples enterprise, and frustrates progress.  He has simply 
endeavored, under these perplexing circumstances to meet the 
case just as it is.117  
 
Although the Republicans won a majority in the House of Representatives in 
1858, they had no experience as a governing party.  They did not share common beliefs 
regarding economic policy. This lack of cohesion, coupled with the  “exhausted 
condition of the Treasury,” did not bode well for successful implementation of a strategy 
to correct the nation’s economic distress.   The disaffection within the ranks extended 
beyond the Whig-Democrat divides. Senator William Pitt Fessenden, an old line Whig, 
admitted two months before Lincoln’s inauguration that, “I am getting fairly to detest 
him [Seward].”118   
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Once the war began, a common purpose to reunite the nation emerged, both 
within the party, and the nation.  However, the challenges faced by the new 
administration continued.  The government’s finances rested upon an antiquated fiscal 
system. When the Civil War erupted, the new administration labored under the 
constraints of a fiscal system designed to “divorce” it from the economy.  The 
Republicans did not initiate a fundamental change in the nation’s financial structure, the 
war forced it. 
 
The “Stunted Government” 
A systemic change in the American banking system occurred after President 
Andrew Jackson’s “Bank War” of 1832.  The demise of the Second Bank of the United 
States, followed by the Panic of 1837, left the financial institutions of the nation in a 
state of disarray, and subsequently depression.  Peter Temin has argued persuasively that 
many exogenous factors led to the Panic, and not solely the domestic financial 
policies.119 Those who suffered during the downturn believed the actions of private 
bankers created the crisis. “By casting doubt on the solvency of some banks,” Harry 
Scheiber wrote, “Jackson contributed to public distrust of all banks and increased the 
tendency of private persons to hoard specie.”120   One congressman declared in 1838 
that, “Hereafter I will doubt the solvency of all banks.”121 The void created by the 
dissolution of the Second Bank of the United States, plus the public perception that bank 
policy had created the depression they endured, led to the fundamental reordering of the 
fiscal framework of the country.  “Whether caused by specific economic grievances or 
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qualms about the perversion of the proper moral order,” Michael Holt noted, “anti-
banking sentiment was a major political force until the 1840’s.”122  
Congress established the Independent Treasury in the wake of this financial 
upheaval. Inaugurated in 1840, at the end of Martin Van Buren’s one term as president, 
the “Constitutional Treasury,” or “Sub-treasury” as its advocates liked to call it, aimed to 
“divorce” public funds from private banks. The Treasury alone should secure public 
funds, rather than placing the wealth of the nation in the hands of untrustworthy bankers. 
Bank failures took public as well as private funds. Banks recklessly issued notes without 
sufficient reserves, and this ended the nation’s prosperity, according to the political 
rhetoric. Therefore the Independent Treasury, which kept government funds out of weak 
banks, best protected the public credit. David Kinley, who wrote the definitive history of 
this institution, summarized this sentiment when he noted that, “the severance of the 
government from the banks, as banks were then constituted . . . was the means of 
removing a large element of uncertainty from the credit of the government, and of 
insuring to the currency the “soundness” for which the people had struggled so long in 
vain.”123 
The Independent Treasury act, repealed in 1841 when the Whigs ascended to 
power, returned in 1846 during the administration of James K. Polk.  The key provision 
of the revitalized law directed receivers of public funds to keep them “safely without 
loaning, using, or depositing in banks or exchanging for other funds.”  The government 
would not entrust its revenue to state or private banks, except to facilitate a transfer from 
receivers to a public depository.  This measure aimed to “divorce” public funds from 
capitalists who could use them for private gain.  In addition, the 1846 act introduced the 
“Specie clause”:  the Treasury could use only of gold and silver coins, or Treasury notes, 
in all transactions. This law also left the regulation of the banking industry to the 
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individual states.  The national government became its own banker and securities broker, 
and allowed states to frame the rules under which banks operated.124 
Supporters of the Independent Treasury hailed the institution as the ballast that 
secured the government’s credit. William Gouge, a former Treasury secretary in the 
Jackson administration who emerged in the 1850’s as the Independent Treasury’s 
ombundsman, captured the Democracy’s enthusiasm for this system in 1855: 
 [the Constitutional Treasury] is all that now stands between us 
and paper money inflations similar to those of 1817 and 1835 to be 
followed by revulsions similar to those of 1819-21 and 1837-43. It is a 
system which ought to be strengthened and extended so that it may be 
faithfully carried out in all its provisions.125   
 
The ease with which the government raised $49 million to finance Mexican-
American War, and blunted the impact of the Panic of 1857, convinced Democratic 
officials that the Independent Treasury best secured the government’s credit. “I am well 
satisfied,” Howell Cobb stated in his 1858 annual report, “that the wholesome restraint 
which the collection of the government dues in specie exerts over the operation of our 
present banking system contributed in no small degree to mitigate the disasters of the 
late revulsion.”126  President Buchanan, two months later, also cited the Independent 
Treasury as a great success.127 “Notwithstanding its many imperfections,” Kinsley 
commented, “the system seems to have been at this time in good working order, and was 
apparently accomplishing all that its advocates had claimed for it.” 
Some of these “imperfections” demonstrate the rigidity of the Independent 
Treasury, and why it created problems for the management of the economy on the eve of 
the Civil War.  Under the 1846 law, Treasurers and receivers could deposit their specie 
with banks only  to facilitate transfers and exchanges.  The banks often ignored this 
provision, and used the deposited specie for their purposes, allowing for handsome 
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profits to select banks, a situation that undermined the spirit of the law.  Because banks 
had a disincentive to transfer money quickly, these transactions moved slowly. 
Transferring funds from New York to Washington, for example, took as long as 135 
days; in one case, 604 days passed before $25,000 arrived in New Orleans from 
Boston.128  Mobilizing the nation’s wealth under this system proved problematic.  
Because of these delays, and the commissions charged by bankers, Gouge 
suggested that the proliferation of railroads and steamboats allowed for government 
agents to transfer specie from one depository to another, “with great dispatch and very 
small expense,” and without using banks.129  When implemented, this change resulted in 
the wealth of the nation moved about in steamboat holds, railroad cars, and in some 
instances, “horse-pulled dray-carts.”130  When the vaults in Washington, D.C. were 
emptied on March 3, 1861, officials were not sure when they would have money at their 
disposal in the central Treasury.  
Another “imperfection” related to how the Treasury held the funds.  The 
depositories secured funds in the insecure manner in many facilities. When Gouge 
toured the different depositories in 1855, he found a lack of vaults or protection from fire 
or other natural calamities.  The 1846 legislation had directed the Treasurers to hold the 
public funds in safes, but did not allocate the money for their purchase until after 1857. 
$10,000 had been stolen from the Pittsburgh depository when the nightwatchman (“a 
drunkard”) accosted the Assistant Treasurer and took his keys.  One depository in 
Indiana consisted of an apartment off the “chief tavern in town” where “hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of United States money” rested peacefully over the years in 
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“wooden boxes resembling in form a giant coffin.”131  Small-scale transactions, such as 
those at the post offices across the country, could not be completed with specie; so those 
civil servants ignored the law and traded in local currency, postage stamps, or other 
substitutes for money.  After collecting the fees for postage, they turned to banks to 
convert the local currency into coin, and paid a fee for the service.   
The limits of this archaic system did not impede the expanding economy of the 
late 1840’s and pre-Panic 1850’s. California gold, as well as an upsurge in cotton and 
wheat exports, doubled the amount of specie circulating throughout the country. The 
increase in commerce created “little friction in the workings of the new fiscal 
machinery,” Kinley opined.132  Despite the withdrawal of public revenue from the 
monetary mix, the economy continued to chug.  “The specie from these sources 
[California and exports] so greatly increased the gross amount in the country that the 
spasmodic influence of Treasury receipts and disbursements upon the reserved and the 
lending power of banks became apparent only in crises,” Bray Hammond noted.133 
Treasury Secretary Cobb strengthened the Independent Treasury in a series of 
circulars issued between 1857-8 that prohibited the deposit of public revenue in banks 
even for transfers.  Instead the Treasurers could issue drafts that could be cashed for 
specie at a depository.  (Only postmasters were exempt from this rule.)  He ordered the 
number of depositories increased to “one or more for each state,” to encourage collectors 
in rural areas to follow the rules and not use banks as intermediaries.  He also allocated 
more funds for vaults and fireproof safes.  Cobb’s orders further strengthened the 
“divorce” between the government and the banks by not interjecting public funds into 
private or state banks for any purposes.134 In interpreting these regulations as late as 
1862, Salmon P. Chase advised his employees that, “It must be remembered that the law 
confined national payments and receipts to coin and notes of the United States.  Officers 
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of the Treasury, army or navy, all officers of all departments must obey and enforce this 
law.”135 Bray Hammond quipped, “Like a good lawyer, Chase was sticking to what he 
considered to be the law’s demand.”136 Rather than “eased constitutional scruples about 
the government’s role in economic activity,” Chase’s decision to adhere too firmly to the 
law set in motion the sequence of events that led to the suspension of specie payments 
the following December.137 
The Independent Treasury had two important implications at the onset of the 
Civil War.  First, it concentrated public funds in diffuse locations and rendered them 
only as secure as the rectitude and loyalty of their keepers.  This facilitated the spoliation 
that occurred in New Orleans and throughout the southern states during the secession 
crisis. Officials with access to the Treasury vaults in the seceding states could, and did, 
take the customs revenue, minted coins, and other government receipts, and transfer 
them to the Confederate state governments without any intervention from a third party 
(such as bank officials).  Employees in Washington grabbed all they could before the 
change in administrations.   
Second, the government had to sell its own loans.  Before 1846, banks “sold” 
government loans, and provided credit while holding the issued notes and bonds.138  
Banks not only facilitated these transactions, but “private bank note companies” printed 
the securities (the actual pieces of paper that constituted the bonds), a duty the Treasury 
had to assume.139 Under the Independent Treasury, banks could no longer act in this 
intermediary role. Instead they had to purchase the bonds with specie, then turn around 
and resell them to the public. The loans taken to prosecute the Mexican-American war 
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totaled only $49 million, during a period when the economy showed strength and 
promising future. Senator Thomas Hart Benton noted that the “Sub-treasury system” 
sold more bonds for that war than expected.  “Government bills were [sold] above par! 
And every loan taken at a premium! . . . this is the crown and seal upon the triumph of 
the gold currency.”140   
The situation at the start of the Civil War differed dramatically.  The government 
needed more money than in the Mexican-American War, but the system in place could 
not handle the burden. With the Treasury forced to market its own securities, the 
decision to turn to Jay Cooke to help with the bond sales becomes more understandable. 
Cooke’s biographer Henrietta Larson noted that, “Nobody in the United States knew 
how to sell hundreds of millions of bonds.  Such a thing had never been done.”141  
Enriching his “finance capitalist” acquaintance concerned Chase less than obtaining the 
funds he needed to prosecute the war.142 The limitations imposed by the Independent 
Treasury created, according to Bray Hammond, a “stunted government” that greatly 
circumscribed the operations of the Treasury. These institutional restrictions, erected 
purposefully, minimized the role of government in the economy and society.  This 
system limited the options available to rectify the “embarrassments” faced by the 
Treasury on the eve of the Civil War.143  
Congress revised the Independent Treasury law on August 5, 1861 to allow the 
government to borrow from banks and keep funds lent in bank vaults until the Treasury 
disbursed it.  However, the “specie clause,” instructing the government to pay for its 
goods in gold, remained in place.  In practical terms, this meant that the government 
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could not use checks, state bank notes, or other “paper heresies” to purchase war goods 
or pay soldiers; disbursements still had to be made in specie or Treasury notes, by the 
Treasury, which held only $3.6 million when Chase came to office. Because of the 
dearth of coin, beginning in August 1861: 
[Treasury notes were used] for salaries in Washington.  They were 
received with reluctance, and the merchants and shopkeepers endeavored 
to discredit them.  Railroad corporations refused them in payment of fares 
and freight; and leading banks in the city of New York refused to receive 
them except on special deposit.  The Secretary [Chase] and other officers 
of the treasury signed a paper agreeing to accept them in payment of 
salaries … General Scott issued a circular on September 3, 1861, 
announcing to the army that treasury notes in five, ten, and twenty dollars 
would be used to pay troops … The available coin [was needed] in 
payment of the interest upon the public debt.144 
 
This sorry state prevailed at the onset of the war. The federal government held 
only perceived powers: the successful separation of the government from the economy 
impaired the effort to resolve the “exhausted condition of the Treasury,” and meet the 
long-term challenges of paying for the coming war. 
 
The “Paper Anarchy” 
The Independent Treasury represented the first structural defect that inhibited the 
government’s actions to address the fiscal emergency at the beginning of the war.  The 
second impediment relates to currency.  The revulsion against banks that manifested 
after the Panic of 1837 also affected state banks.  The demise of the Second Bank of the 
United States effectively ended the national government’s oversight of banking 
procedures until 1863.  Each state established its own set of rules for chartering banks.  
From this void emerged the system of “free banking.” 145  
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New York State instituted a Free Banking law in 1838 that soon became the basis 
of banking reform at the state level (and the model for the National Bank system 
introduced by Chase in 1863).  Sixteen of the thirty-four states adopted free banking 
laws by 1860.  Free banks could open without a state legislative charter as a limited 
liability company.  Any individual or consortium could open a bank if he/they could 
accumulate the capital required by the state.  Once incorporated, the free banks would 
deposit bonds or mortgages with a state auditor as security against any notes they issued.  
The composition of these securities varied from state to state; originally most relied on 
state bonds, but federal issues also fulfilled the requirement.  Increasingly, after the mid-
1840’s railroad bonds became an acceptable form of security.146   
Banks proliferated under this state centered system.  The number of banks in the 
United States jumped from 829 in 1838 to 1601 in 1861.  This lack of oversight created 
economic instability in many regions of the country.  A study conducted of the free 
banking system in Minnesota, Indiana, Wisconsin, and New York found that 104 of 709 
free banks established before 1861 failed.  Nationally, about half the banks formed under 
this deregulated system closed within ten years of opening.147  
The pubic tolerated this spurious system of public finance because banks in all 
states during the antebellum era served a different function then they do today.  Besides 
their role in bolstering state revenues, they existed to create and circulate money. “The 
most important public function which banks perform is the creation of a currency for the 
people,” noted an 1860 Treasury report.148 Article 1, section 10 of the Constitution 
forbids states to “coin money, emit Bills of Credit, make anything but gold and silver 
coin a tender in payment of debts”; however a liberal interpretation of the Constitution 
implies that no limitations prevented private entities from issuing script or notes.  Since 
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states could not disseminate money, Congress allowed banks throughout the country to 
fill the void.  This practice began in the colonial era, when Great Britain banned the 
incorporation of banks in British North America.  In order to have some form of money, 
Americans adopted a loose system of paper currency, another sign of American 
pragmatism with regard to fiscal policy. After independence, state banks circulated their 
own notes as a form of currency to keep pace with the growing demands of 
commerce.149  In 1860, approximately $180 million in state bank notes circulated, most 
of this “money” controlled by “a relatively large number of incorporated banks operated 
in the interests of their owners.”150 The Treasury estimated over 7,000 various forms of 
legitimate bills circulated in 1860.151 More over, 80 percent of these individual bills had 
been successfully counterfeited.  This meant that various “forms of money may have 
performed as a reasonably effective medium of exchange within localities,” where fake 
bills could be recognized, but “they were unacceptable at par outside the local 
community.”152  A “paper anarchy” resulted.153 
Theoretically, the states required free banks to pay specie on demand for any of 
their circulating notes, but in practice states did not enforce this regulation. Gold and 
silver coin constituted only one quarter of the money in the United States, with deposits 
and bank notes comprising the remainder.154  Louisiana, the state with the tightest “free” 
banking laws, required banks to maintain a specie-to-deposit ratio of 33 percent.  Most 
state banks had only ten percent of their notes guaranteed by reserves, according to Paul 
Trescott.155 “It is not possible,” noted Schuckers, “that these state institutions” could act  
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as “auxiliaries to the financial measures of the government” during the course of the 
war.156 
“Currency, not credit” became the distinctive problem in American commerce, 
especially in the western states.157  “Manufacturers had always done business in an 
atmosphere of monetary uncertainty … forced to use “money” issued by banks, 
customers, and merchants. Expenses required immediate payment, whereas income 
trickled in through the credit cycle,” Porter and Livesay related.158 And when funds 
arrived, distinguishing the good money from bad became a business in itself. Private 
banks, which functioned without a charter and whose principals bore the liability if the 
bank failed, often acted as “note shavers,” validating and converting state bank notes to 
specie for a premium.  Businesses employed “note detectors” to examine the notes they 
received and determine their validity: 
The note detector scrutinized the worn and dirty scrap for two or 
three minutes . . . turned it up to the light and looked through it, because it 
was the custom of banks to file the notes on slender pins which made 
holes through them.  If there were many such holes, the notes had been 
often in the bank and its genuineness was ratified.159   
 
“Runs on banks,” in the antebellum era John Knox related, “were not made by 
depositors, but by note holders,” eager to reclaim what they could from the issuing bank 
at the first sign of weakness.160 
The Coinage Act of 1834 abetted the emergence of this crazy monetary system. 
This legislation reduced the gold content of the dollar, which changed the ratio of silver 
to gold from 15 to 1 to 16 to 1, making silver (for cutlery or jewelry) more valuable then 
silver coins.  Gold coins soon overwhelmed silver coins, which circulated less 
frequently. Substituting for silver coins, a variety of small “change” notes exacerbated 
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the proliferation of paper currency.  The intent had been to fortify the bimetallism but 
instead silver coins, the only official monetary instrument under the value of $2.50, were 
hoarded or exported.  This mistake was corrected in 1853, when the silver ratio was 
lowered so the coins were no longer squirreled away or shipped to England for bullion.  
But the use of postage stamps, “shinplasters,” and fractional notes for change continued 
in many parts of the country. “We never had money enough in this country for the 
proper conduct of business,” Samuel Hooper (R. MA)complained in 1866 that, “The 
effect of the bank notes, under the old system of state banks, was to expel the money 
from the country.  Those notes were not money but only used as substitutes for it within 
certain localities.”161  Not only did the government face the challenge of trying to utilize 
this peculiar monetary system to pay for munitions, supplies, and soldiers, but an 
estimated one quarter of the circulating currency had left the Union with the seceded 
states.162 
This created the second great structural challenge facing the Treasury on the eve 
of the Civil War:  how do you pay for a war when your vaults are nearly empty, your 
credit impaired, and the “money” of the nation comprised of 7,000 different types of 
hole-ridden scraps of paper?  Approximately $253 million was deposited in banks in 
1860, $104 million in New York alone.  Banks held roughly $83 million in specie. The 
government had no claim or ready access to this wealth; the coins circulated or were 
hoarded at their owner’s discretion.  The currency held value in its locality only, where 
those familiar with it could detect counterfeits.  Once it left the area, the value 
depreciated. The state was prostrate, weakened not only by the political and economic 
turmoil, but also by the limitations of the government’s fiscal structure.163 
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The Secretary’s Choices 
Salmon P. Chase faced these challenges when he was sworn in as Treasury 
Secretary on March 7, 1861.  The Union carried the largest debt the government had 
ever accumulated without engaging in war.  Empty vaults, unpaid bills, and large outlays 
awaited him. Creditors expected their interest payments as scheduled, a demand that 
would have to be met to keep investor confidence from sinking any lower.  The law 
bound the Treasury to a fiscal system that barred it from using anything but coin and 
Treasury notes as a means of payment.  The currency circulating in the country worked 
where it was issued, but depreciated quickly once it left its locality. 
These limitations placed Chase in an awkward position.   He could only sell 
bonds that Congress had authorized.  President Lincoln did not want Congress to 
convene until July, because “he thought it best for the administration to have a free hand 
in coping with the emergency.”164  Chase could only acquire needed funds by selling 
undersubscribed loans approved during the Buchanan administration (June 22, 1860, 
February 8 and March 2, 1861).  Further, Chase determined that the Treasury would not 
to sell the issues at “market price,” meaning well below par, as the Buchanan 
administration had done.  This decision greatly vexed the domestic bankers whose 
capital Chase needed.  “[Mr. Chase] determined to accept par bids for Treasury notes 
rather than dispose of [them] at any considerable discount,” according to Jay Cooke.165  
Selling them at a discount would have reaped profits for the “finance capitalists,” and 
incurred greater expense for the nation.  This in part explains their animosity towards 
Chase. The secretary explained his reasoning in the July 4 Treasury report to the 
Congress: 
as the contest in which the government is now engaged is a 
contest for national existence and the sovereignty of the people, it is 
eminently proper that the appeal for the means of prosecuting it  . . . 
should be made to the people themselves.   
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He wanted to extend the “circle of contribution” as widely as possible, to make the 
“burden press as lightly as practicable upon each individual contributor, and if possible, 
to transmute the burden into a benefit.”166  Chase wanted the “people,” not just the 
“finance capitalists” would benefit from holding the bonds .   
Chase secured just over $15 million by the end of May.  His “puritanical” nature, 
and obsession with economy, did help rally the bond market.  However, the position of 
the Treasury deteriorated so rapidly that by June, Treasury notes could not be sold at par. 
Chase instead used them as collateral for a $5 million, 60-day loan.  On July 17, 1861, 
Congress authorized the first “war” loan, and the secretary began borrowing anew.167   
Even with this new authorization, Chase faced limited options.  Foreign 
investment, traditionally a reliable source for government bonds, could not be tapped for 
wartime contributions. Remembering the defaults on state bonds in the early 1840’s, 
foreign investors, particularly the English, remained cautious when investing in US 
securities.  “It was obvious [that] if a war should occur,” Hugh McCulloch recounted, 
“that no money could be borrowed on the other side of the Atlantic.  [During the 1860 
bond sales] not a bond could be sold in either English or French markets. Mr. Chase 
perceived that the home market was the only one in which the United States securities 
could be disposed of – that to the people of the loyal states he must look for support of 
the Treasury.”168  Indeed, Americans owned most of the debt accumulated by the Union 
during the war.  By 1866, foreigners held only 13 percent of the United States debt, the 
lowest percentage of overseas investment in United States history to that time.  Once 
Union victory became certain, foreign money resumed its historic pace:  by 1869, over 
$1 billion of the U.S. debt was owned by foreigners, or approximately 45 percent of the 
debt.169  Foreign investment had the additional advantage of bringing needed specie into 
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the country.  Conversely, the lack of foreign investment during the war further limited 
the specie available to the Treasury. 
Chase did not trust state banks as a source of steady investment for government 
bonds.  “As a chief reliance in the varying fortunes of war, they were clearly 
inadequate,” Shuckers related.  “They were located in widely separated places, they were 
managed by men of every shade of political opinion; their capital varied largely; they 
were bound by no public purpose and were subject to no common direction.”170  Also, 
the state banks would use their own notes to purchase government bonds.  During the 
War of 1812, banks used state bank notes to purchase federal government bonds, with 
calamitous results.  The notes depreciated to just half their value, causing considerable 
loss to the national government.171 
 
Conclusion 
We must evaluate Secretary Chase’s early decisions regarding war finance in this 
context.   Both Chase and many leaders in Congress abandoned their principles of 
political economy to do what they felt was needed to prosecute the war. Chase, the man 
who believed in “economy” in government spending, oversaw the creation of the largest 
debt in American history at that time.  He trusted only “sound” money, yet ran the 
Treasury when it introduced a national fiat currency for the first time.  Later, as a 
Supreme Justice of the Supreme Court in 1870, Chase wrote the majority decision that 
declared the “Greenbacks” an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment.172  As 
Treasury secretary, he supervised the collection of the largest tax program up to that 
time, though he hoped to use only limited direct taxation.  
On April 23, 1861, the New York Times compared the new Republican 
administration to “a person just aroused from sleep, and in a state of dreamy half-
consciousness.”173  The challenges of secession and war, coupled with the government’s 
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structural liabilities, influenced many of the policy decisions made during the four years 
of conflict.  The limitations inherent in the American fiscal system of 1860 narrowed the 
choices opened to the new administration.  The constructed divorce of the national 
government from banks and local economies hindered Secretary Chase’s ability to 
address the overwhelming pecuniary needs that hit the Treasury as the war began. Faulty 
credit that limited their borrowing options, a spurious system of paper currency, and a 
Treasury secretary who did not wish to invoke the “implied powers” of the government, 
limited the options for war financing. The delay in launching a vigorous tax program 
earlier has generated the most uniform, and barbed, criticism of Chase’s performance.  
Immediate and more aggressive taxation would have been the answer to the Union 
financing dilemmas, critics contended. The delay in introducing tax legislation cost the 
reunited nation millions from inflated currency and additional interest payments. We 
will examine this argument in Chapter IV.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ENGLISH ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CIVIL WAR TAXATION 
 
The economic legislation drafted during the American Civil War restructured 
national development for the remainder of the nineteenth century.  Although historians 
have debated the degree to which the war spurred or impeded industrial development in 
the United States, they do agree that the wartime initiatives, including the Homestead 
Act, the creation of a national banking system, the adoption of paper currency, renewed 
investment in internal improvements, and the emancipation of four million slaves, 
defined the contours of the “blueprint for modern America.”1 
“Why did economic institutions and patterns of economic action start when they 
did and in the way they did,” Alfred D. Chandler asked at a 1964 conference addressing 
the impact of economic change during the Civil War era.2  Within this broad context, 
historians have been grappling with a narrower question – What guided the Republican 
legislators to develop the economic programs inaugurated during the American Civil 
War?  The financial legislation initiated during the war reshaped the American economy.  
The currency, banking, and government revenue policies laid permanently altered the 
government’s role in the economy.  Introduced by a new political party during the crisis 
of Civil War, the question provides an opportunity to study how men and events collide 
and shape one another.  
The internal revenue laws enacted during the war provide a unique opportunity to 
address this question.  Since no national internal revenue laws were in effect when the 
war began, these law represent original policy. Tariffs had provided the federal 
government with its revenue before the war.  The bitter tariff controversies of the early 
antebellum era did not resurface after 1846. Prosperity throughout the 1850’s muted any 
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calls for tariff revision, so the Tariff of 1846 remained in place throughout the 1850’s, 
with only slight adjustments.   Only when surpluses piled in the Treasury’s coffers did 
Congress move to reduce import duties.  The Tariff of 1857 received support across 
party lines, and overcame the sectional tensions that impeded the passage of other 
legislation.  The controversy regarding this tariff erupted between producers of raw 
goods, such as woolgrowers, and manufacturers who wished to import cheap materials 
for their industries. The tariff removed, or lowered, most of the duties on wool, cotton, 
sugar, and wheat.  Farmers depended on this protection to keep their goods competitive 
with cheaper imports.3  
The introduction of systematic internal taxation demonstrated one area of fiscal 
policy initiated solely by the advent of the Civil War.  Taxation, unlike other policy 
decisions made during the war, had not undergone the intense partisan and sectional 
debates that characterized the late antebellum congresses. The direct tax movement 
remained a small dissent within the broad context of the growing sectional tensions. 
Since Congress had not enacted internal tax legislation since the War of 1812, no 
representatives in either the House or Senate had experience with formulating national 
tax policy. Thus, the internal revenue laws represent original policy. The overwhelming 
costs of feeding, supplying, and moving armies across the country necessitated the 
development of new revenue sources.  Thus the initiatives did not arise in response to 
antebellum political objectives and ideals, but rather from the dire needs of the nation. 
The “fiscal and monetary policy” enacted during the war years offers a “less 
colorful and contentious”4 field of research than many of the social changes spurred by 
the war, particularly in terms of race and the future of the freedmen.  For this reason, the 
topic has drawn less attention since the advent of the “new” histories (social, economic, 
political) that emerged from the social convulsions of the 1960’s.  Inspired by the Civil 
Rights and Women’s Liberation movements, scholars have focused on a “bottom up” 
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approach that concentrates on how individuals of all classes, races, and the different 
sexes, have shaped American institutions. This approach has redirected historical 
research to exciting areas hitherto ignored, and produced a great body of work that 
provides a fuller and more accurate picture of historical change in the United States. 
However, this new focus also leaves open the question of how broader policies, 
instituted by political leaders, also directed the course of American development.  As 
Michael Holt recently stated, “What politicians do in elective office matters, often 
profoundly, to the lives of ordinary Americans.”5   
Ideology played a significant role in the prosecution of the Civil War.   James 
McPherson has demonstrated the soldiers who suffered most directly throughout the war 
shared the commitment to a larger cause. “Everyday I have a more religious feeling that 
this war is a crusade for the good of mankind,” wrote a Pennsylvania office to his wife.  
McPherson’s study of soldiers’ diaries and letters convinced him that, “A large number 
of these men of blue and gray were intensely aware of the issues at stake and 
passionately concerned about them.”  McPherson found this ideological commitment to 
the war up and down the Union and Confederate ranks.6  “The disease of sectional 
ideology,” as Foner described it, overwhelmed the confines of the late antebellum 
political parties and reasonable debate.  Men in both the Union and the Confederacy 
picked up their arms and marched into Gahanna because of, “the conviction that North 
and South represented two social system whose values, interests and future prospects 
were in sharp, perhaps mortal, conflict with one another.”  Without doubt, the Civil War 
represents an intensely ideological battle.7  
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However the political lines did not break solely on ideological grounds. This 
assertion is supported by analysis of congressional voting records during the war.  Glenn 
M. Linden conducted a roll call analysis of the votes on economic policy of Republican 
and Democratic congressmen and senators in the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth 
congresses.  He concluded that loyalty to one’s “geographic section” played a greater 
role in voting on economic issues than party ideology.8  Constituent interests did 
influence Republican legislators, as one would expect in a democracy with narrow 
representation.9  Although the franchise had expanded beyond property limitations, only 
white males could vote, and congressional leaders often voted with their interests in 
mind.  Further, as Yontan Eyal explained, the Democracy began to unravel because 
many northern Democrats in the “Young America” movement embraced the economic 
ideals put forth by the opposition party.10   Similarly, Roger Ransom noted that many of 
the “Republican” policies inaugurated during the war had antecedents before the war in 
both political parties. “Only the National Banking Act could be described as a truly 
novel experiment,” he observed.  And that measure, he continued did not represent a 
“Republican” initiative since the measure “faced serious opposition from within the 
Republican party.”11 
Neither ideology nor the determinism to establish a new economic order for the 
benefit of their constituents determined the course set by the war leaders. “Neither North 
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nor South engaged in Civil War to achieve economic gain,” Patrick O’Brien noted.12  
When examining the guiding principles of the Republicans during the war, the literature 
has overemphasized motives, rather than interpreting the legislation as a reaction to the 
circumstances they faced throughout the course of the war. The Republicans needed to 
meet the fiscal challenges of a nation at war, in whatever way possible.  Therefore the 
revenue system they inaugurated resulted more from the exigencies of war then the 
desire to fulfill a political agenda. And in doing so, they relied on precedent.   
As mentioned above, the most recent example in the American experience came 
from the War of 1812.  The fiscal demands of the Civil War exceeded those of that 
earlier conflict, and the means for funding that war would not suffice.  Thus, the 
lawmakers turned to the English tax system.  As America’s most important trading 
partner, legislators closely followed English tax practices, particularly with regard to the 
tariff.  This chapter examines the English origins of the American internal revenue 
system.  This piece of American fiscal legislation had long historical roots, and did not 
spring from an original, antebellum era ideology.  The urgent needs of the Treasury 
dictated the development of legislation rather than a deliberative process to erect long-
term changes in the American fiscal system.  In relying on precedent, the leaders who 
drafted Civil War fiscal policy fell back on the distinct American pragmatism that had 
shaped the nation, particularly in the area of economic policy. 
The congressional leaders who drafted the fiscal legislation that financed the war 
were forced to make a series of capitulations as they crafted their measures. While 
governor of Ohio, Salmon P. Chase modified his well-publicized enthusiasm for hard 
currency and free trade.  Both times he described his change of heart as a “practical” 
acceptance of a situation that would endure for “an indefinite period.”  While Treasury 
secretary during the Civil War, Chase oversaw the adoption of Greenbacks as a legal 
paper currency, earning him the nickname “Old Greenbacks”. “Chase had resorted to 
greenback currency . . .as a matter of necessity in a unique situation [although] he had 
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always been a hard-money man,” concluded John Niven, his recent biographer. He 
turned to greenbacks solely as a “wartime expedient.”  Similarly, Hugh McCulloch first 
visited Washington DC in 1862 in his capacity as a bank president to lobby against the 
National Bank bill introduced by Chase.  A year later, he accepted the nomination for the 
position of comptroller of the currency, with administrative duties over the very system 
he journeyed to Washington to oppose.  “My opinion in regard to the establishment of a 
national baking system underwent a change,” he admitted later.13 
In each instance, these Civil War leaders faced enormous challenges and ceded 
their principles to the circumstances. The economic policies crafted during this period 
were dictated less by Republican determinism or ideology than by the exogenous forces 
of war. These demands compelled the Republican lawmakers to pass legislation that they 
would never have considered previously. And they had to do so hastily. The historical 
literature places too much emphasis on how Republicans directed the course of the war.  
Instead, the war directed the policies.  The crisis that rent the nation soon after the 
Republicans took office played a far more significant role in the development of their 
fiscal policy then the predisposition of the party leaders.  
The tax policy crafted during the war must also be appreciated as a series of 
capitulations, rather than the fulfillment of a party’s economic determinism.  Gavin 
Wright once observed that, “ . . . in many areas, Republicans were pressured by events 
into accepting policies they would otherwise not have dreamed of adopting."14   The 
Republicans enacted legislation to cope with the fiscal pressures created by the war, not 
to fulfill their antebellum economic agenda. They acted less like captains charting a new 
economic course than sailors clinging to the ships’ steering wheel hoping to survive the 
storm.  
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Borrowing from English practices helped hasten the flow of needed funds into 
the Treasury.  The lawmakers understood that they needed to devise a wartime revenue 
system quickly.  In facing this real challenge, they did not turn to unpredictable theory or 
rely on party ideology, but instead took practical steps to overcome the troubles they 
inherited and the crisis they anticipated.  They replicated practices that had been tested 
and proven effective in similar circumstances.15   
In response to Chandler’s question, I suggest that the internal revenue policies 
enacted during the American Civil War claim a mixed parentage. The principles of 
taxation established in England during the internecine wars within the country and with 
European monarchs became the basis for American Civil War taxation.  The reliance on 
credit as the primary source of war revenue, with interest payments supported by excise 
taxes on consumer goods, apportioned direct taxes on land or levies on the value of 
property, stamp taxes, licensing fees, and internal duties on manufactured products were 
known sources of reliable revenue.  The experiences of England in developing her 
internal revenue system through the tumult of national consolidation, Civil War, and 
expansion abroad provided the “blueprint” for American Civil War tax polices.  Robert 
A. Becker observed that Americans during the colonial era, “developed no radically new 
form of taxation when they came to the New World for they took their taxes as they took 
most of their political and social institutions, from the mother country, but with a 
difference.”16 I propose that the legislators of the Civil War era followed this example, 
and created a revenue system based on English precedents, but with differences. 
 Senator James F. Simmons, (R. RI), a member of the Senate Finance Committee, 
predicted during the July 1861 special session of Congress that, “I suppose the House of 
Representatives propose to follow . . . the rule of the British Parliament and their [tax] 
system … I do not think it strange that statesmen in this country should conclude that 
that is best.”  Simmons’s insight proved accurate.  In looking for a model upon which to 
base the emerging tax system, the Civil War legislators turned to England.  American 
                                                 
15 Patterson, “Government Finance on the Eve of the Civil War,” 35. 
16 Robert A. Becker, Revolution, Reform, and the Politics of American Taxation, 1763-
1783 (Baton Rouge, LA, 1980): 6. 
 134
lawmakers modeled the war tax policies on those employed by English statesmen to 
cope with the fiscal challenges created by intermittent war.   Simmons continued, “In 
drawing a bill of this kind, going into any system of taxation, I think it is a pretty safe 
rule to follow the practice of older nations who have had this tax for many years.”  Civil 
War congressmen repeated many of the policies employed by the English because they 
needed a stream of revenue quickly and writing comprehensive tax laws took time.  The 
necessity of generating enormous revenues quickly induced them to adopt a wartime 
revenue system that they knew and understood.  Because of their urgency, the Civil War 
Republicans drew their inspiration for the new revenue measures from the English 
system of taxation.17 
 
English Taxation 
 The British fiscal system remained remarkably static from the Norman Conquest 
until the beginning of the English Civil War in 1641. Two sources generated most of the 
ordinary government revenue:  land and customs duties. Custom duties provided the 
regular and stable source of ordinary revenue for the realm. For the privilege of trading 
within the Kingdom, the merchant paid custom duties as “prisage” or in-kind 
appropriations to the King’s household. The King routinely took from incoming ships 
portions of a merchant’s cargo that he “prised,” such as a cask or two of wine.18  “The 
Crown claimed and exercised from time immortal” the right to “take and buy” “at its 
need, or for its use, an indefinite bulk of cargo at such prices and on such terms of 
payment as the circumstances of the case may warrant,” according to Herbert Hall.19 The 
King routinely took from incoming ships at the port of entry portions of a merchant’s 
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cargo that he “prised,” such as a cask or two of wine. These goods provided exotic fare 
for the King’s table. 20 
King Edward I (1274-1307) organized the collection of regular duties.  Before 
his reign, “kings made frequent levies upon merchants’ goods and purses”21 Thereafter, 
merchants no longer had to provide a portion of their wares to the Crown as prisage, but 
as a fee for the privilege of engaging in commerce. The fees fell predominantly on wine, 
wool, woolfells, hide, cloth, and wax22. A “triangular system” of customs administration 
standardized the processing of articles, by first, “examining the goods, collecting the 
duties, then updating the accounts.” The “King’s weight,” formulized the scale for 
appraising the goods by load, that became a feature in all markets and port towns. By the 
mid-fourteenth century, the Crown had established “staple towns,” or ports that had the 
monopoly on trade. A customs service developed with regular officials who oversaw the 
collections of customs to replace the looser system of local collection.23   
Ostensibly designated as the means for maintaining the Navy, the Crown also 
used customs duties as a source of ready money to discharge troublesome debts, pay 
soldiers, and mollifying local officials. Customs duties quickly emerged as the Crown’s 
preferred source of revenue.  Altered with ease when necessary and collected by officials 
loyal to the Crown customs became an effective and efficient source of revenue, 
particularly in times of distress, such as war.  The English customs taxed goods both 
entering and leaving the country. Once awarded, Parliament granted the custom duties to 
the Crown for the life of the monarch.  
Originating in the tribute collected by the King from his royal demesne, land and 
property taxes became a staple of Crown finances. Robert S. Hoyt defined the royal 
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demesne as, “all lands in England which the King held in dominio, in his own hand  . . . 
[including] forests and highways.”24  The feudal tradition of a vassal paying tribute to his 
Lord provided the basis for the regular income and provisions the King received from 
the demesne lands.  The later system of direct taxation sprang from these “medieval 
fiscal arrangements.” This revenue furnished the Crown with the means to meet the 
expenses of day-to-day operations, as well as provide comestibles for the “King’s table.” 
The revenue and goods produced on the royal demesne were collected and tabulated by 
Crown officials. The income from the royal demesne provided the means for the Crown 
to maintain itself.25 
Until the sixteenth century, these two sources of revenue, proprietary income 
from Crown lands and customs duties, provided the government with its ordinary fiscal 
needs.  However, when these sources would not suffice, the government requisitioned 
“extraordinary” sources of revenue. Invoked most frequently for the “defense of the 
realm,” these taxes  “developed as an obligatory response to the necessity of war,” 
according to historian G. L. Hariss. Initially, these taxes included a scutage, or knight’s 
fee, that replaced the required military service performed by knights, with an in-kind 
payment; the tallage, a percentage of the fees paid by the inhabitants on the royal 
desmesne, and the caruage, or tax on plowed land. “The Crown exploited its feudal and 
traditional taxes, and was extended them to meet the requirements of new military 
demands,” according to Harriss.26  Customs duties also contributed to supporting 
military campaigns.  “The correlation between war and customs revenue is a close one, 
according to Norman Gras.”27  
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The early abuse of this system of “extraordinary revenue” led to the principle of 
taxation by popular consent, the fundamental aspect of the English revenue system 
introduced with the Magna Carta, and strengthened during the Glorious Revolution. 
When King John I (1199-1216) changed the purpose of the scutage from “an 
extraordinary impost reserved for extraordinary occasions,” to “ a means of supplying 
his heavy financial needs,” his barons objected.  This and other grievances led his 
subjects to craft the Magna Carta in 1215, which dictates that “no scutage shall be 
imposed unless by common counsel,” and further limits the right to seize property, and 
set arbitrary fees in lieu of feudal service. “[These] taxes were imposed on the nation 
only when war, or the likely prospect of it, could justify such exceptional burdens,” G. 
L. Harriss noted, “war always affected the national purse in the most direct and obvious 
manner.”28  This document became the basis for the “eloquence against arbitrary 
taxation from the time of John to the acceptance of the United States Constitution,” 
according to Shepard A. Morgan.29 Americans adopted the principle of limiting the 
executive’s ability to levy taxes by requiring all government expenses must be “drawn 
from the Treasury” (Article I, section 9) and that these revenue measures must originate 
in the House of Representatives. (Article I, section 7).  
Levied in 1188 as the first general tax on moveable goods (including farm stock, 
corn or other products of the land, furniture, and money and stock-in-trade of the 
burgher or townsmen) the “Saladin Tithe” contributed to the expenses of the Third 
Crusade.  Each contributed “one tenth” of the value of his possessions to help rid 
Christendom of the Muslim threat.  Morgan noted that this tithe represents the “earliest 
recorded instance of a general tax upon movables.”30    
Apportioned to counties or towns throughout England, “each person was to 
swear to the number, quantity, and value of his movables and those of his two nearest 
neighbors; disputed cases were settled by the elected knights by means of a jury of 
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twelve of the neighbors of the person assessed.”   This process of self-assessment, 
allowing the taxpayer to make the first declaration of his wealth, becomes an important 
feature of English and American tax practices.  The success of “fractional taxation” of 
personal property soon endeared the Crown and Parliament to the method of generating 
extraordinary revenue.  Levied more regularly for defensive or military purposes, by 
1334 the fractional fifteenths and tenth changed from a general percentage to an 
apportioned, or quota, tax. Officials collected a tenth of the value of movables or 
personalty in cities and on the royal demesne, and a fifteenth from the value of rents or 
realty.  This extraordinary revenue “evolved to a fixed land tax” and became the 
“standard form of direct taxation on land” in England.  Required to pay a set amount, 
every town and county determined locally how best to raise its share.31  Though a 
national tax, local authorities maintained control over how best to extract their quota.  
Americans incorporated this concept when levying the direct tax.   
Parliament experimented with other means of generating revenue, most notably 
the “subsidy” and poll taxes. The subsidy became a tax on the value of wealth, with 
assessments made by local officeholders.  This system “tested the relationship” between 
local and national government.  Too often, the assessor evaluated the property on the 
basis of “perceived ability to pay rather than actual wealth.”  For this reason, in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the quota taxes (tenths and fifteenths) proved more 
productive than the assessed subsidies.32  Parliament levied poll taxes as singular 
requisitions for specific purposes, generally for military expenditures.  Levied “per 
head” as a capitation tax, the poll taxes featured a “bewildering” array of “complex 
gradations according to wealth and status.”33  Because of the limitations on these other 
levies, the fifteenth and tenths became methods of collecting extraordinary taxes, and 
“continued in force for nearly 300 years.”  Apportioned throughout the kingdom, then 
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collected through “local arrangements” these taxes gave each town or district the ability 
to determine how best to administer their portion. What began as an extraordinary tax to 
finance “defense of the realm” evolved into a “standard tax” that provided general 
support for the Kingdom. “Anything resembling a systematic assessment was, as a rule, 
unknown.”34   
Thus, by the mid-fourteenth century, elements of the English fiscal system 
emerged that Americans would later replicate. Both governments relied on customs 
duties as the primary source of revenue through standard levies, collected at selected 
ports, by agents of the Crown/government. Direct taxes, in the form of apportioned taxes 
on land and “movable property,” provided another source of dependable revenue. 
Assessed and collected locally in England, these direct taxes became the primary means 
of supporting local government.  Originally, the national government used them only for 
“extraordinary” expenses, but national taxes on movable property became an accepted 
and familiar element in royal government.”35  They became more a more regular fixture 
of the national revenue. Local officials, appointed for the purpose, collected these 
national taxes. Self-assessment and local determination made this a less oppressive form 
of taxation.  
“In England, the property tax remained for centuries the sole local tax,” while 
[continental European governments] also collected local excise taxes that became the 
staple of their revenue systems, Seligman noted.36  Americans replicated the English 
system of relying primarily on direct, property taxes for local government.  Direct taxes 
would be levied in the United States only in times of “extraordinary” revenue needs. 
Because the direct taxes addressed local needs, and were collected by local officials, the 
English citizen believed himself, as Sir Francis Bacon stated, “the master of his own 
valuation, and the least bitten in purse of any nation in Europe.” Americans would 
express the same sentiment during the Civil War.37  Once apportioned, the local officials 
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determined how best administer the valuation.  For this reason, “direct taxes appear in 
the records under a variety of names,” according to O’Brien and Hunt.38  So too in 
America, as noted in Chapter II.   By apportioning these direct taxes, and relying on 
local officials for assessing and collecting the dues, the English system reduced number 
of bureaucrats needed for tax collection. Historian D. M. Palliser estimated that at the 
commencement of Queen Elizabeth’s reign (1558-1603), England employed one royal 
officer for every 3000 Britons, whereas the French monarchy employed one officer for 
every 400 citizens.39  
Finally, an intimate symbiosis existed between war and taxation. Wars 
necessitated taxes, and these funds kept armies on the march and stoked the fires of war.  
“Ordinary” revenue supported normal government operations, but war created the need 
for “extraordinary” sums.  Incrementally, these war taxes became permanent revenue 
machines for the government.  Americans inculcated this principle as well, expressed 
later through the “republican” linkage of taxes, armies, and corruption.  Limiting taxes 
and standing armies, keeping the national government confined within its “sphere,” kept 
Americans out of war, and corruption at bay.  
Many of these elements of taxation appear in other governments. The concept of 
direct and indirect taxation has many homes.  Most countries that emerged from a feudal 
tradition based taxes on land, and some measure of the productivity of land. Customs 
duties became a standard form of indirect taxation in many countries. However, in other 
European countries, other elements of taxation appear that England and America did not 
embrace.  Labor as a form of tax payment, the corvée in France for example, do not 
appear as a systemic, forced contribution in Anglo-American tradition.40  Although fiscal 
privileges for the nobility and clergy existed in England, the highly regressive tax 
structures do not appear in early English or American fiscal experience. Also, the Anglo-
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American tradition that states individuals own their property and contribute to the state 
differs from the idea of sharing the product of the land with the state, as practiced in 
France before the Revolution.41   
 
“Ye Best and Easiest Tax” 
The English direct taxes periodically exempted the poor, representing a unique 
feature of their fiscal system. One 1336 statute announcing the fifteenth and tenth 
decreed that “people . . .whose goods in all exceed not the value of 10s  . . . and from the 
goods of people of cities [and] boroughs which exceed not the value of 6s in all.” The 
direct taxes in England regularly differentiated taxpayers according to their class.  Not 
strictly collected “per head”, rates on poll taxes also took into account a person’s wealth 
and status. Only “bona fide beggars” received exemptions from the poll tax, but 
individuals paid at graduated rates. The traditional fifteenths and tenths included 
exemptions, but not high enough to exclude many, and still welcomed most to the tax 
rolls.  The laboring poor did pay taxes, but at lower rates than “dukes, earls and widowed 
countesses, barons and baronets and widowed baronesses, knights, esquires, lawyers, 
traders, franklins and farmers.”42  While the local officials determined the standard of 
assessment, the “income of the taxpayer became the standard for all who paid direct 
taxes by the seventeenth century,” according to William Kennedy.43 
 Early in the reign of King Henry VIII (1509-1547), the number of vagrants in 
England rose sharply.  Inflation swept Europe with the influx of gold taken from the 
Americas during the Spanish conquest. Traditional labor relations in England underwent 
a transition.  The feudal system of land tenancy disintegrated as more landowners turned 
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from farming to wool production. The prices of food and clothing rose faster than wages, 
and contributed to the suffering of the poorest in England.  “English poor relief law 
developed between 1514-1644 . . . with the assumption that all able-bodied persons 
could find work if they tried.” English society distinguished between the “able-bodied” 
and the impotent, leading to vagrancy regulations that shock modern sensibilities:  
whippings, the stocks, and hangings awaited “idlers.”  “The Tudor policy of dealing with 
poverty and vagrancy was two-fold: to punish and deter the vagrants and to relieve the 
‘deserving poor.’”44   
“The earlier years of the sixteenth century began a period of great changes in the 
position of the poorer classes,” stated E. M. Leonard.45  The growth in population, 
coupled with the economic changes of the period, “strained food supplies, and added to 
the number of landless laborers.”46  These changes led to a significant reappraisal of 
English policies towards the poor. With England expanding its “continental 
engagements” and initiating the settlement of Ireland, direct tax levies became more 
frequent.  This, coupled with the growth in the impoverished lower classes, led to a 
movement to exempt the poor from taxation. “Over a course of centuries [in English 
fiscal history] there was no uniform tradition regarding the taxation of the poor man,” 
William Kennedy explained, “but the tradition of exempting the poor from taxation 
reigned during Elizabethan and Stuart England.”47  
From 1629 until 1640, Parliament did not meet, and King Charles I (1625-1646) 
relied on customs and ship writs (a demand to supply a ship) for his pecuniary needs. 
War with Scotland prompted Charles to summon Parliament in 1640 to raise funds. This 
“short Parliament” proved uncooperative, and Charles soon released them. However the 
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second Parliament he called, while still rancorous, cooperated in raising funds and 
launching a permanent change in English fiscal policy. Parliament levied a poll tax in 
1641 that signaled the beginning of a new attitude toward taxation of the poor.  This tax, 
as other poll taxes, differentiated individuals based on class, but included a levy even on 
the “meanest throughout the kingdom.” With the outbreak of the English Civil War in 
1642, Parliament needed a the resources “for the speedie raising of money,” which led to 
the enactment of the first national excise tax, which “clearly fell upon all sectors of 
society.”48  
The Civil War excise taxes provoked a systemic change that altered English tax 
policy.  First adopted as a temporary wartime measure, soon they became the “key to the 
fiscal cupboard.”49  Continental European countries had incorporated the excise into 
their fiscal structure long before England.  Considered “un-English . . . because of the 
inquisitorial activities of the excise man,” English Kings had avoided these duties.50  
Excise taxes are collected as indirect taxes on consumption.  Instead of local 
administration and collection, excise taxes were organized from the Treasury, with 
commissioned officers used for collection. Mass opposition to the excises, including a 
1647 riot in Smithfield that started over the tax charged for the purchase of an ox, 
induced a cutting of the charges on the “prime necessities of life.” However taxing the 
sale of domestic and select imported goods, particularly beer, ale, cider, perry, French 
wines, and coffee, continued.51  “The revenue from this source was so considerable and 
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so indispensable,” J.E.D. Binney observed, “that however unpopular the duties, it was 
virtually impossible to discontinue them.”52 
 Collecting excise taxes provided a challenge to the government.  Unlike the 
earlier direct taxes, the central government administered and collected the excise. 
Parliament empowered commissioners to collect the tax in London and appoint a team of 
sub commissioners for the countryside.  Merchants and brewers made weekly payments 
to these worthies.  Despite the centralization of this system, during the first three years of 
the Civil War, locals pilfered the duties. The division of loyalties inherent in a civil war 
further complicated the collection process.  “Parliamentary commanders or sheriffs 
seized the proceeds in their districts as a means for recruiting and paying their local 
forces and garrisons . . . a disquieting number of the sub commissioners ignored the 
commissioners’ directions, falsified their amounts and either embezzled or unduly 
retained their excise receipts,” Chandaman reports.53   
 To circumvent these administrative problems, Parliament initiated a system of 
“tax farming.”  In exchange for remitting a portion of the tax receipts in advance, private 
individuals collect the tax. The government secured the needed revenue while the tax 
farmer earned a nice commission (generally 2 percent) for his services.  Despite these 
advantages, excise tax farming ceased in 1683.  Curbing the “abuses” of the 
“mercenary” tax farmers proved more difficult under this system.  The replacement of 
local officials with professional, private tax gatherers undercut the traditional basis of 
support and patronage, a disadvantage to the restored monarchy.  The death knell for 
excise farming tolled when gross revenues did not keep pace with the expanding 
economy.  Corruption sapped the revenues from this system.  The graft and inefficiency 
in many districts convinced the Crown to reassert its control over excise collection.  The 
Treasury department assumed control, and by 1688, the “Restoration excise” grossed 
twice what had been realized under the farm system.54  Tax farming re-enforced the 
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public’s distrust of the “little pestilent creatures,” “dregs and scum,” and “dirty little 
fellows” who collect the tax.55 The public’s unhappy toleration of the taxman into an 
intense vitriol that Englishmen, and American colonists, have expressed since.  
 Once invoked, excise taxes soon became the largest single source of government 
revenue. The excise gave government officials advantages over direct taxes, explained 
by John Brewer thus: 
They were assessed less obtrusively and more accurately than 
duties on wealth or realty; their incidence was less visible than a poll tax 
because they were levied on producers and distributors who passed the 
costs onto consumers, and less subject to fluctuations that plagued 
customs.56 
 
The reliability of the excise, especially those levied on goods with steady demand, such 
as beer, domestic spirits, salt, coal, tea, and sugar, made this tax the staple of British 
public finance.  Indeed, King Charles II (1660-1685), in recognizing the potential for the 
excise, referred to it as, “ye best and easiest tax.”57 
Introduced as a temporary measure, the Civil War excise became a permanent 
fixture in English fiscal policy. The adoption of the excise tax marked a significant 
transition in English fiscal policy. First, the tax receipts and system of collection 
elevated the status of the Treasury department within the central government.  The 
Treasury “established its authority over the monarch, the Privy Council and the spending 
departments, and successfully defended its power against the expanding authority of the 
secretaries of state.”  The Treasury hired more revenue officers with the termination of 
tax farming. By the dawn of the eighteenth century, the department directed the nation’s, 
and soon empire’s, fiscal policy.  This vigorous Treasury would serve as the model 
followed by Alexander Hamilton eighty years later.58 
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Second, from the time of the English Civil War onward, the poor in England paid 
taxes, “regularly in excise duties, and at intervals in direct taxes.”59  This led to a 
defining concept in taxation, both in England and later in the United States: all citizens 
must contribute to the maintenance of government, to the best of their abilities.  Not  
until after the Great Depression did the ideal of exempting the poor from contributing 
taxes towards governance take root in America.  Just taxation did not mean exempting 
people from paying taxes, but instead ensuring that the poorer citizens paid in proportion 
to their ability.  The tax policy during the American Civil War did not attempt to shield 
any class in society from bearing a portion of the taxes, but only to limit the impact of 
the burden on the less fortunate. 
 
Necessaries of the Poor 
Permanent excise taxes inculcated the English to the practice of taxing all 
citizens. Indirect taxes do not separate the duty from the final price of the good, thus all 
who purchase the article pay the tax.  Conversely, direct taxes can incorporate 
exemptions.  With the heavier reliance on indirect taxes came a growing acceptance of 
all members of society, even the poorest, would pay taxes. Excise revenue depended 
heavily on alcohol and other goods with inelastic demand that all classes consumed. 
Unwilling to forsake this treasure trove, but cognizant of the burden this placed on the 
poor, lawmakers determined to mitigate the impact.  During the period of the Glorious 
Revolution, the conviction advanced that everyone must contribute towards the support 
of the government. The poor ought to pay taxes as part of their duty to society, and 
contribute to the best of their ability. This became part of the evolving liberalism 
unleashed during the late seventeenth century, a legacy that “was ongoing” to the “end 
of the eighteenth century in the American colonies.”60   
 To secure the Crown, William of Orange accepted a settlement with Parliament, 
called the “Declaration of Rights.”  This document became the “Bill of Rights” when the 
                                                 
59 Kennedy, English Taxation, 83. 
60 Lois F. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1981), 291. 
 147
newly coroneted King William III (1689-1702) accepted its terms on December 16, 
1689.  Americans recognize not only with the document’s title, but also many of the 
tenets it affirms. These include the right to bear arms (in England, as long as you are a 
Protestant), freedom in elections, a ban on “cruel and unusual” punishment, and the right 
for citizens to have trials heard by a jury.   
For the purposes of this study, Article 4 proved most important.  This re-
established the restriction, first articulated in the Magna Carta, that the Crown could not 
levy taxes without the consent of Parliament, a requirement incorporated in the United 
States Constitution. Second, Parliament granted revenue from customs and the excise to 
the Crown for limited periods, typically four years, rather than for life.  Americans 
followed this example as well.  “The theory of our government,” John Sherman noted 
just before the American Civil War, “is that a specific sum shall be appropriated by a 
law originating in this House [of Representatives] for a specific purpose and within a 
given fiscal year.”61  
John Locke, the political theorist intimately connected with the Glorious 
Revolution and whose writings served as the basis for the Declaration of Independence, 
also strongly supported the idea that all citizens needed to support the government.  The 
contract between government and its citizens, he believed, included an obligation on the 
part of each constituent for the maintenance of the administration. “Governments cannot 
be supported without great charge,” Locke professed, “and it is fit everyone who enjoys 
his share of protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of 
it.” Adam Smith’s first “maxim of taxation” declares, “The subjects of every state ought 
to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion 
to their respective abilities.”62 In turn, this obligated governments, “not [to] raise taxes 
on the property of the people without the consent of the people.” 63  In this spirit, one 
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pamphleteer, writing in 1690, proposed that if excises did not touch the food of the poor,  
“there could be nothing said against this tax.”  This did not represent an entirely new 
concept.  As early as 1608, English customs duties did not tax the “necessaries of the 
people.”  The pervasiveness of the excise taxes gave this idea new currency at the end of 
the century.64 Indeed, in 1776, Adam Smith argued that “every tax, however, is to the 
person who pays it a badge not of slavery, but of liberty. It denotes that he … has some 
property, [and] cannot himself be the property of a master.”65  Paying taxes 
demonstrated that an individual had a place in civic life. 
These ideals, that the poor should pay taxes, but the government, in turn, should 
spare their “necessities” shaped tax legislation in England through the eighteenth 
century.  According to William Kennedy:  
 
The three ideas that most influenced eighteenth century view on 
taxation were, first, that everyone should pay taxes, including the poor 
man.  Second, that necessaries of his subsistence should, if possible, be 
exempted out of compassion.  Third, exempting these necessaries served 
not only a charitable purpose, but also prevented high wages and 
benefited trade.  These ideas led to the condemnation of taxes on 
necessaries, … and the acceptance that the tax on luxuries” represented 
the most “ideal tax.66 
 
Necessaries encompass, according to Adam Smith, “not only the commodities 
which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the 
country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be 
without.”67  But an acceptable “departure from the principle” allows a minimal tax on 
some necessities, because of their ubiquity and inelastic demand such as salt.  A small 
tax on items of great demand goes unnoticed to the taxpayer, but returns great revenue to 
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the Treasury.  Other items included “candles, beer, cider, soap, coal, leather, and malt.”68  
“By the mid-eighteenth century there was a general condemnation of taxes on 
necessaries,” while the “ideal tax” became “the tax luxuries.” These luxuries included, 
“male (not female) servants, carriages, pleasure horses, larger homes, wine, spirits, 
imported foodstuffs (sugar, dried fruit, nuts, citrus fruits, and spices), glass, printed 
cloth, linens tobacco, and stamp duties on legal services.”69   
Increasingly over the course of the eighteenth century imports, and the customs 
duties collected thereon, became associated with luxuries.  Domestic goods, fixed with 
excise taxes, were seen as necessities.  This explains part of the later American 
acceptance of import duties as an appropriate tax, while excises constituted a more 
repressive tax. Import duties tax luxuries while excise duties fall more often on 
necessities. This dichotomy, as demonstrated in Chapter II, resurfaced at the 
Constitutional Convention and became the basis tax policy in the United States. 
Liquor, lawmakers agreed, proved another ideal source of tax revenue because of 
the tax “is finally by the different consumers exactly in proportion to their respective 
consumption.” Further, liquor has an “infelicitous effect upon the health and morals of 
the laboring classes,” and therefore the tax penalizes the intemperate.70 This belief 
resurfaced as well in the American concept of the ideal tax.  Taxing “ardent spirits,” 
Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist 12, “might furnish considerable revenue,” and 
“would tend to diminish the consumption of it,” which would “be favorable to the 
morals and health of the society.  There is,” he continued, “nothing so much a subject  of 
national extravagance as these spirits.”71 Indeed, when launching internal tax programs 
in the United States, Federalists in the Washington administration, Republicans in the 
Madison administration, then Republicans in the Lincoln administration, all turned first 
to taxes on liquor as their first source of revenue.  
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These principles of taxation embraced by the English became the creed in 
America when implementing tax policy; first, that all must contribute to the support of 
government; second, that indirect taxes should spare the “necessaries of the poor;” and 
finally, that taxing luxuries provided the “ideal tax.”   
 
The Fiscal-Military State 
The intimate symbiosis between war and taxation escalated through the “Long 
Century.”  Between the period of the Glorious Revolution (1688-9) until Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s final defeat (1815), Great Britain “plunged into financial commitments on 
level previously unimaginable.”72 War became the centric force in British society, and 
completely altered her political economy. This level of warfare required dramatic 
increases in revenue, and new sources of funds.  The British embarked on the “financial 
revolution,” that transformed England into an international financial and military 
powerhouse. 73 
Taxes alone could not provide enough revenue to build this new “fiscal-military 
state,” so the British government embarked on an intensive program of deficit financing.  
The “funding system” relied on a “powerfully extractive fiscal system” to secure the 
interest payments for both the short and long term debt.74 The British raised 
approximately 75 percent of the finances needed for their eighteenth century wars (1702-
13; 1739-48; 1756-63; 1775-83) by borrowing funds.  They incorporated the Bank of 
England to facilitate the management of their debt.75   The capacity of the English 
government to levy taxes efficiently proved a crucial element in this transformation. 
Without the tax machine constructed during the late seventeenth century, this rapid fiscal 
transformation would not have occurred so expeditiously.  This, again, becomes an 
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important point in comparison with the American experience during the Civil War; no 
similar structure existed in the United States Treasury department, which delayed the 
implementation tax collecting. Edward Hughes observed that, “efficiency in the sphere 
of revenue collection was the first condition of success of the new funding devices.”76  
This “efficiency” eluded the inchoate American Civil War tax system, since no national 
internal revenue apparatus existed in 1861.  
This “financial revolution” encumbered the public with a massive debt.  The 
interest payments on that debt devoured half the annual expenses of government.  To 
“service” or meet steady interest payments, a more aggressive tax regime also 
emerged.77 While the English believed themselves the “least taxed” in Europe before 
their Civil War, Mathias and O’Brien demonstrated that they emerged from the 
Napoleonic Wars as the bearers of a higher tax burden than most of the citizens on the 
Continent.78 
The eighteenth century taxes secured and serviced the loans that financed the 
expansion of the fiscal-military state. The taxes paid the interest on the loans.  The 
steady interest payments, secured by tax revenue, gave investors confidence that their 
investment would reap steady profit, while the principal remained secure.  The 
“stability” in this system came primarily from the implementation of the Land Tax, “a 
direct tax levied year in the year out in peace and war.”  Until 1714, receipts from the 
Land Tax dominated the revenue supporting this new fiscal structure.   Direct taxes were 
transformed from extraordinary to ordinary sources of revenue.  Apportioned across the 
country, the Land Tax, like the tenths and fifteenths, assigned a quota to each county in 
the kingdom, and “most counties utilized whatever system they found to be most 
appropriate to collect their share.”  This gave local control to a portion of the national tax 
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system.  Beckett continued, “The land tax was based upon consent and not force, and the 
government preferred to take the guaranteed income it provided rather than endanger 
this principle by attempting to adopt a more inquisitorial income tax.”79   
Introduced as a war tax in 1692, the Land Tax provided the British government 
approximately 47 percent of its revenue initially.  This tax attempted to “bring taxation 
into some proportional relation to income,” without the intrusiveness of an income tax.     
However, by the dawn of the nineteenth century, this tax accounted for only 21 percent 
of government revenue.80 “Perhaps the country could have given more,” through the 
land tax, Colin Brooks observed, “but the country gave a massive amount, and perhaps 
more critical, gave year in and year out.”81  The reliability of this income provided an 
important base for government revenue, even as the Land Tax provided less of the 
overall revenue.  Increasingly, during the eighteenth century, the “excise became the 
most important source of state income,” Brewer noted.82  The revenue from excise taxes 
increased “ten fold” during the course of the eighteenth century.83  However, the British 
citizens accepted these taxes, O’Brien suggested, because flexible administration and 
enforcement.  The continued policy of self-assessment and local administration of the 
direct taxes created a non-coercive manner of generating revenue that did not pique 
citizens.  Second, the indirect taxes remained hidden within the objects consumed, thus, 
also deflecting the anger felt by taxpayers who paid lump sums of tax at set times of the 
year (as with an income tax). O’Brien posited that:  
flexible administration, complemented by an expedient tolerance 
of evasion and a prudent selection of the commodities and social groups 
“picked upon” to bear the mounting exactions of the state made rising 
taxation tolerable and politically manageable from 1660 - 1815. Apart 
from revolt in the thirteen [American] colonies the assessment and 
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collection of taxes within the kingdom provoked only the mildest of 
political crises over the long eighteenth century.84 
 
As the demands for money grew in the eighteenth century, the British 
government returned to indirect taxes, both excises and custom duties, as the primary 
source of revenue. Whereas the direct taxes provided the backbone of the tax regime, 
indirect taxes became the bulk. The ideal of avoiding the “necessaries of the poor” gave 
way to placing light duties on common household goods, such as soap, salt, leather, and 
newspapers and newspaper advertising.  Small taxes on articles of widespread 
consumption would generate large revenue without inflicting a heavy burden on any 
individual. In defending the salt duty in 1732, Sir Robert Walpole stated that, “the tax 
which is the most equal and the most general is the most just and the least burthensome.  
Where every man contributed a small share, a great sum may be raised for the public 
service, without any man’s being sensible of what he pays.”85  Thus, a tax could be laid 
on necessities as long as it remained a light tax that did not prove “burthensome.”  
Walpole also introduced the idea of devoting a portion of the tax revenue to a “sinking 
fund” that would whittle down the principal of the debt, on top of meeting the interest 
payments.   
When William Pitt became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1784 he determined 
to continue the practice of winnowing the debt.  As a student of Adam Smith’s, he also 
resolved to rationalize the British tariff system by lowering a number of high duties in 
order to thwart smuggling and restore revenue from tea and other popular goods.  Pitt 
also shifted the tax burden by increasing the duties on “luxuries of the well-to-do, 
including hats gloves, mittens, perfumery, female servants, and horses.”  He championed 
Walpole’s idea of making taxes “diffuse,” by placing a light duty on articles in wide use.  
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The most equitable principle of taxation will be to render the objects as diffuse as 
possible,” he stated in 1796.86  
In 1792, at the end of the American Revolution, and just before the start of the 
Napoleonic Wars, the British collected £17.25 million in revenue; the two primary direct 
taxes, the land tax and tax on houses, contributed only £3.75 million to that total.87  
Another shift in tax policy occurred during the 22 years of war with France (1793-1815). 
As public discontent mounted over increased taxation on consumer goods, Parliament 
devised more methods of direct taxation.88 William Pitt, British appointed First Lord of 
the Treasury and Prime Minister in 1783,  at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, 
determined to augment revenue, in an attempt to “raise supplies within the year.”  Pitt 
revived Walpole’s practice of creating a “sinking fund,” that devoted a portion of the 
annual revenue to retiring the debt. Pitt introduced the “triple assessment” in 1798.   This 
increased the “assessed” direct taxes (trebling some, but not all categories, as the name 
suggests), and graduated the tax, to “weigh less heavily upon the lower classes of 
housekeepers.”89  Most significantly, the tax helped shift war financing from the 
“funding system,” of depending on loans, toward one that tried to raise the needed funds 
through taxation.   
With expenditures still outpacing revenue, the British implemented their first 
income tax.  Inaugurated in 1799, the income tax shifted the source of revenue to the 
more “modern” construct of taxing income instead of expenditure.  Although not an 
abandonment of the tenet that “all must contribute to society," the Triple Assessment and 
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Income Tax began the movement toward “the fairest form of taxation possible.” The 
British Income Duty set high exemptions, but still collected from all who earned an 
income as well as émigrés who continued to draw from assets in their homeland.  
Repealed in 1802, after the short-term Peace of Amiens, then re-introduced in 1803, the 
Income Duty continued until 1816. Although graduated, the Income Tax raised the ire of 
the British, Arthur Hope-Jones mused, “because payments are visible and made in 
comparatively large sums at fixed intervals.”  Indirect taxes, on the other hand, 
“although unfair is often unnoticed and always paid in the form of small additions to the 
price of the article taxed.”90 It did not become a permanent fixture in British fiscal policy 
until 1842.91   
This brief history of the British income tax resembles the start and stop nature of 
the American income tax, with some notably differences.  First, the British classed their 
income tax as a direct tax, whereas the first two American income tax bills passed as an 
indirect tax.92  Second, the income tax represented a high hurdle for the British to 
overcome.  One consistent lament in British tax history deplores the “most tormenting of 
all taxes.” The “quantity and value of land” cannot be hidden, whereas “inquisitorial” 
methods are needed to determine the profits from stock, interest payments, and non-farm 
income of the individual.  Thus, the “impossibility of taxation according to revenue,” 
discouraged implementing an income tax.  However, like the earlier direct taxes, using a 
mix of local officials to assess and collect the tax, and a strict procedure for reporting 
and counting conducted by national officials, the income tax become a begrudged, but 
accepted feature of British national revenue.93   
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To claim that Americans adopted their tax policies from England may seem at 
odds with the great myth that Americans rebelled and established Independence because 
of onerous taxes. During the late colonial period, the belief grew that the English 
government had become corrupted, both from within through political favoritism, and 
from outside by the pernicious influence of the “idle drones” who lived off the public 
debt.  As Drew McCoy noted, fear of  the  “Anglicization” of American government 
facilitated rise of the Democratic-Republican party.94  Taxing the population to pay 
interest to wealthy investors became the loud and angry republican criticism of 
government debt, and corruption, voiced repeatedly during the Early Republic and 
Antebellum eras. After a century of internecine warfare, the British revenue system 
relied on taxing “expenditure rather than possessions.”  The American colonists had only 
contributed to this burden through tariff duties. Their local tax payments stayed at home. 
As the British sought new sources of revenue, they naturally looked to their colonists in 
the Americas.   
Beginning in 1660, the British controlled the colonial trade through the 
Navigation Acts that required selected goods going to and from the colonies to sail on 
British ships and pass through her ports before entering the European market.  This 
helped insure that the English would benefit most directly from colonial trade, but also 
facilitated tariff collections on both imports and exports. Americans paid no other taxes 
to Parliament, however they paid a variety of direct taxes to their local, colonial 
government. After the War of 1763, George Grenville, First Lord of the Treasury, 
decided to curb smuggling, enforce customs laws more strictly, and impose limited taxes 
on the American colonists.  These taxes followed the practice of targeting the prosperous 
through stamp duties, as well as better supervision and collecting on the lucrative 
molasses-rum trade. On top of this, Redcoats, dispatched to the Americas to fight the 
French in the War of 1763, lingered and raised colonists’ concerns about “standing 
armies.” This dual thrust of increased vigilance with a new judicial and military force, 
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combined with taxation “without representation in Parliament,” exacerbated the tensions 
that culminated in the Declaration of Independence in 1776.  
 American revolutionaries criticized the heavy debt carried by the British 
government, and the subsequent taxation to provide the interest payments for that debt. 
“Republican” revolutionary leaders continually expressed their concerns for the “social 
dangers traditionally associated with regular armies, high taxes, and preparations for 
war.”95 The amount of the revenue Parliament now tried to extract from the prosperous 
colonists did not bother Americans as much as the idea the “unconstitutional taxing, the 
invasion of placement, plural office holding, and standing armies, were major evidences 
of a deliberate assault of power upon liberty.”96  McCoy added, “In the eyes of the 
American Revolutionaries, England had degenerated by the 1770’s into a state of 
irredeemable corruption … the revolutionaries had little doubt, moreover, that England’s 
contagion would engulf the colonies if the imperial connection was not severed.”97  
Debt, more than taxes, became the source of American distrust.  In paying taxes, 
however, the public has the greatest opportunity to express their displeasure in the 
government, by refusing the money or attacks upon the agent. 
This summary of British taxation through the Napoleonic Wars provided a guide 
for American lawmakers.  Throughout the narrative, I have stressed commonalities 
between the systems, and how Americans broadly shaped their revenue policy on the 
British legacy.  Now, I will show more specifically how American tax policy, 
particularly during the Civil War, emerged from the British mold. 
  
Necessaries of Life 
 Americans inculcated three of the basic tenets outlined above in local and 
national taxation before the Civil War.  First, they assumed the differences in direct and 
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indirect taxation.  Direct taxes fell on “land” and “property,” and became the basis for 
local and state revenue.  Like the British, these became “quota” taxes, apportioned 
evenly throughout the country to states.  Self-assessment of property became the 
standard means of determining each individual’s contribution to the apportioned amount. 
Second, indirect taxes, collected primarily through consumption of imported goods, 
fueled the national government.  Excises became an instrument of “extraordinary” tax 
revenue, collected only in times of war or serious financial derangement.  Although 
Americans resisted excise taxes nationally during the first Federalist administrations and 
the War of 1812, they became permanent in the United States, as in England, after the 
Civil War.   
In the United States, the ideal of limiting taxes on the “necessaries” or 
“necessities” of the poor, while taxing “luxuries” emerged as a standard doctrine. From 
the Constitutional Convention forward, Americans associated imports selected imports 
(such as wine, silk) as luxuries thus suitable targets for taxation. “The theory that 
luxuries are best fitted for internal taxation has been followed consistently,” throughout 
the nineteenth century, asserted Frederic C. Howe.98  Finally, “it was desired that all 
should contribute in proportion to his abilities,” observed Richard T. Ely.99  Exempting 
the poor from taxation has emerged as the goal of tax policy in the late twentieth 
century.  However, limiting, but not exempting, the poor from taxation remained the rule 
in American taxation until the post-Great Depression era.  
The attempt to protect the “necessaries” or “necessities” of the poor from 
taxation re-emerges consistently in discussions of early American political economy, but 
with a “difference.”  The American twist came through embracing the ideal, but 
redefining the term.  In the United States, limiting the burden on the poor transformed 
into an attempt to spare the “necessaries” or “necessities of life.”  This reference appears 
over and over in both official and popular literature from the founding through the 
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American Civil War.100  In one of the earliest official recommendations regarding 
taxation, Alexander Hamilton, in his Report on the Public Credit, advocated high tariffs 
on imported “wines, spirits, teas, and coffee” and other superfluities, to lessen the 
burden, “upon objects [that] are more regarded as necessaries of life.”101  Andrew 
Jackson, in a January, 1833 speech regarding the Nullification Crisis, urged Congress to 
change the tariff law because, “enormous taxes are laid in the necessaries of life …” 
while “articles of luxury, universally acknowledged to be the fittest subjects for taxation, 
are admitted free.”102   
In an effort to revise the Tariff of 1833, Treasury secretary Thomas Ewing 
recommended that “items of luxury not now, may very properly be taxed” while some 
“necessaries of life might” move from dutiable to duty free.103  In anticipation of the 
Mexican American War, Albert Gallatin, a highly respected private citizen at the time, 
recommended levying a “direct tax on property” rather than “taxes on consumption.”  
Levying taxes on articles of “first necessity, such as provisions,” Gallatin continued, “or 
on those articles like sugar, tea, coffee … impose almost the same amount of duty on 
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every individual, whatever that of his property may be.”104  In 1854, a request to lower 
the protective duties on sugar asserted that, “to tax sugar is to tax the comforts and 
necessities of the poor for the benefit of the wealthy,’ who live in the most magnificent 
and profitable estates of the country.”105   
The emphasis on the “necessities of life” rather than the “poor” demonstrates the 
inherent belief in many Americans that the richness and vastness of the country allowed 
any person willing and able to work could care for himself and his family, thus avoiding 
poverty. The dearth of labor across the country allowed workers to ask for higher wages, 
reinforcing the idea that American workers fared better than their contemporaries in 
Europe. “Americans insisted that the political (not the economic) system determined the 
extent of poverty and maldistribution of wealth,” according to James L. Huston.106  
Although historians have demonstrated that both poverty, and many dimensions of class 
structure, permeated American society from the founding through the Civil War, this 
belief in upward mobility echoed throughout the literature and official reports of the 
era.107  This ideal, expressed since the early Republic, became the basis of the free labor 
ideology articulated by the Republicans.  Rather than a new or unique concept, this 
belief in the ability of Americans to rise above their status at birth became a central 
feature of national identity. 
“In a country where laborers are few and the means of employing industry to 
advantage are numerous,” noted the North American Review in 1819, “no man remains 
in poverty who possesses even moderate industry and economy.”  Though wages may 
seem low in some places, the employer provides “not wages alone, but the necessaries of 
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life,” so those who possess “even moderate industry and economy” can advance.108  Two 
decades later, the United States Democratic Review, a publication with a different 
political readership, extolled a similar message.  “The nation virtually bestows upon 
each of its poor citizens as much land as he can cultivate,” author W. Kirkland asserted.  
“We secure independence to all who are able and willing to work … an enforced 
simplicity of living will prove a benefit instead of an injury to the farmer and his rising 
family … the real lack of the Western farmer concerns the inner, not the outer man.”109  
Thus, the popular belief that any American could attain wealth if he lived worked hard 
and lived frugally.  Those who purchased “luxuries” could pay the extra price, while 
sparing the “necessities of life” allowed the industrious to prosper and advance. 
What constituted the “necessities of life” in antebellum America? This definition 
kept changing, expanding or contracting to fit different political needs. “Articles which 
are of large consumption and rank among the necessaries of life,” stated an 1825 
congressional report, including “coffee, teas, and cocoa.”110  In 1833, residents of 
Westmoreland Co., Pennsylvania identified, “clothing, salt, implements of husbandry” 
as necessities.111   In 1853, during discussions over trade policy with Canada, “cheap 
lumber,” became a necessity.112  Various congressional reports, especially the 
Commerce and Navigation reports, consistently listed “bread and breadstuff” as 
“necessities of life.”113 Sometimes, though, the fiscal demands of the government made 
these every day articles appropriate objects to tax as long as the duty did not fall too hard 
on individuals. But Walpole’s idea of small taxes on ubiquitous items also came forth.  
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In determining which taxes to eliminate after the War of 1812, the House Finance 
Committee recommended retaining the duty on salt, even though it represented “a 
necessary of life,” because the duty did not increase the price considerably.114 This 
follows the British practice, outlined by Sir Robert Walpole, of placing a small tax on 
articles of common widespread use. 
These influences came forth when Republicans crafted their Civil War revenue 
legislation.  Thaddeus Stevens, Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, 
defended the first Civil War excise taxes in 1862 by lamenting that, “[we] have 
attempted to raise the largest sums from articles of luxury . . . we have the consolation to 
know that the food of the poor is untaxed.”115 Joseph J. Lewis, the first Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, boasted in his first report that Congress had succeeded in providing, 
“relief from taxation on the common necessaries of life” and instead had targeted 
“hurtful luxuries.”116 Lewis also made direct comparisons between the new United 
States internal revenue measures and the British taxes on distilled spirits, malt liquor, 
tobacco, and stamps.  He cited and favorably contrasted British and American collection 
costs for taxes. Writing in support of the new income tax, Lewis reasoned, “If the 
English people could tolerate without murmuring [an income tax], to sustain a war of 
conquest American citizens will certainly endure a lighter one for union and 
freedom.”117  
As the costs of the Civil War outpaced the income from the early tax measures, 
Secretary Chase voiced his opinion that “hurtful luxuries” and other “voluntary 
products” including liquor and tobacco, provided the most appropriate sources of tax 
revenue. Wine, he described as a “luxury, useless to the consumer.”  By taxing these 
objects, “relief could be given to the common necessaries of life.”118  In 1864, Treasury 
secretary William Pitt Fessenden lamented that the “great expansion of prices” on all 
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“necessaries of life” had placed a burden on the lower classes throughout the war.119  In 
the first comprehensive report outlining recommendations for the postwar revenue 
system, David A. Wells, the Special Commissioner for Revenue, in 1866 advised 
exempting from excise taxes “articles of prime necessity” for all consumers.120 
Aside from referring to “necessaries” throughout the tax debates, lawmakers 
made many specific references to British practices while formulating the internal 
revenue legislation.  Senator James F. Simmons (R. RI) who served on the Finance 
Committee and helped write the initial revenue measures adopted during the July 1861 
emergency session, “supposed” that, “the House of Representatives propose to follow … 
the rule of the British Parliament and their system.” He continued, “I do not think it 
strange that statesmen in this country should conclude that that is best.”  Simmons wrote 
the first income tax measure for the United States, and noted that “the time constraints” 
faced by Congress in passing this legislation necessitated using the British bills as an 
early template for the American measures.  Their income tax bill, he noted “filled fifty-
nine pages” of the Parliamentary record.  “I could not write such a bill from now till 
January,” he stated.121   
When discussing excise taxes on liquor, the income tax, licensing fees on 
insurance companies, and taxes on specified commodities, lawmakers repeatedly 
referred the British precedent. Senator Charles Sumner (R. MA) quoted from 
McCulloch’s Commercial Dictionary, “which I have before me” during the debate on the 
cotton tax.122  Senator John Sherman (R. OH), a member of the Finance Committee and 
future Treasury secretary, opposed the preliminary version of a tax on livestock sales by 
invoking three of Adam Smith’s four maxims of taxation.  Sherman charged that the tax 
under review “was not certain,” “difficult to collect,” and that it would not “bear lightly 
on the people.”  Sherman demonstrated his continued knowledge of the British tax 
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policy when, six years later, in a speech advocating the retention of the income tax, he 
quoted extensively from Parliamentary speeches on the subject.123  One observer with 
knowledge of both revenue systems immediately connected the British and American 
policies.  “With regard to the financial measures [passed by the Congress],” Karl Marx 
wrote to Frederick Engels in August 1862, “they are clumsy, as they are bound to be in a 
country where up to now, no taxes have existed; but they are not nearly so idiotic as the 
measures taken by Pitt and Co.”124 
 
Other Origins 
Scholars looking for the origins of Republican economic legislation have focused 
narrowly on the influences of two political economists, Francis Wayland and Henry C. 
Carey, who gained widespread popularity during the antebellum era.125 Although 
Republicans agreed with aspects of the writings of these men, and succeeded in enacting 
an array of “non-military” legislation (such as the Homestead Act and the Pacific 
railroad bill) that incorporated the broad themes articulated Wayland and Carey, many of 
these ideas had been in Congress for years, and came from mixed parentage.  Calling 
these initiatives “Republican” ignores the bipartisan support these measures drew in the 
1850’s, and obscures some of the depth and complexity of the Democratic Party during 
the late antebellum.126 
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Francis Wayland, president of Brown University, wrote The Elements of Political 
Economy, a standard economics text in the 1840’s and 1850’s.  In this treatise, he 
restates many of the English ideals of taxation.  Taxes, Wayland lamented, “torment [the 
taxpayer] and deprive him of his dearest rights.”  However, when collecting taxes 
Wayland professed that, “Articles of necessity should be either exempt from taxation, or 
taxed very lightly.” “Taxation should be heaviest upon articles of luxury and 
ostentation,” he continued.  “The poor man’s clothes, his cow and his pig, should never 
be enumerated among taxable property.”  Ideally, individuals should pay taxes “in 
proportion to their property … or the amount of protection which they receive of the 
government.”127  As we have seen, these ideas on taxation had deep roots, and did not 
originate from an American ideology. Wayland also disavowed government 
manipulation of the economy, especially through protective tariffs. When Wayland 
spoke before the Rhode Island Society for the Encouragement of Domestic Industry in 
1852, “he informed the manufacturers that they ought to depend more on themselves,” 
and less on government protection through tariffs.128  This skepticism regarding 
government influence of the economy runs counter to the Republicans’ broader 
acceptance of active governance. Charles Dunbar, writing in 1904, gave little credence 
to Wayland’s text.  “This [Wayland’s Elements] owes whatever value it has to its 
manner of presenting for easy comprehension some of the leading English doctrines,”129 
Wayland’s views popularized the policies and principles of English taxation, rather than 
inspiring a uniquely American system of political economy.  
Conversely, Henry C. Carey emerged as the leading antebellum advocate of the 
protectionism that Wayland found so distasteful. He argued that protecting industry 
would benefit the American laborer.  The “British system,” he claimed, brought only 
“universal war” supported by “farmers and planters,” resulting, he continued, in 
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“pauperism.”  Whereas the “American system,” produced both an “elevating” and 
“equalizing condition of man throughout the world.”130  
His father, Matthew Carey, an Irish émigré, instilled in his son a deep loathing 
for the British, particularly their rigid class system.  Matthew also gave his son a 
partnership in his successful Philadelphia publishing house, Leo and Carey.  Henry used 
this position to launch a career as a political economist, publishing a number of books 
and pamphlets.  Carey first advocated a free trade policy, and incorporated a free trade 
doctrine into his three-volume tome, Principles of Political Economy, which became a 
standard college textbook.  However, Carey experienced an epiphany after the Panic of 
1837, from which he emerged a vocal proponent of protective tariffs.  His relentless 
preaching for protectionism, facilitated by his wealth and access to the publishing 
establishment, did not resonate nationally until the Panic of 1857, when his writings 
suddenly seemed prophetic.131 Carey used the printing press he owned to launch a 
sustained campaign for implementing protective tariffs. Because Carey wrote and 
published extensively as an advocate of protectionism, scholars have posited he had a 
strong influence on the economic views of the early Republican Party.132   
Carey held court in his stately home, and those who favored protection certainly 
enjoyed the meals he provided during his regular Sunday gatherings with friends and 
admirers. Pennsylvania protectionists agreed wholeheartedly with his preaching for 
protection of iron and maintained a vigorous correspondence with him. Carey wrote 
letters obsessively, and with no humility.  At one point, he sent a picture of himself to 
Kate Chase, Salmon P. Chase’s daughter, and the belle of Washington society. Yet his 
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influence may not have matched his hubris.  Regarding Carey, Justin S. Morrill, one 
person whom Carey supposedly influenced, remarked,  
Mr. Carey, it should be confessed had superb confidence in his 
own opinions, and a scanty respect for such as differed from him. … [He 
lacked] the compactness of statement and the felicity of language of 
Adam Smith, Mr. Carey is likely to have a permanent reputation. He 
wrote me long and frequent letters – difficult to read but not difficult to 
understand, and always of more or less importance.133   
 
Morrill kept Carey apprised of the passage of the Tariff of 1861, but Morrill did 
not seek his opinion, and made excuses for not visiting Carey when he had the 
opportunity.134 Carey remained influential amongst his fellow protectionist travelers. He 
remained a forceful and prolific commentator throughout the war, and for this reason, he 
had some influence on the party.  However, his role in directing Republican policy needs 
a closer examination. 
Carey’s idea that “manufacturing, agriculture, labor, and all other economic 
interests interacted harmoniously and positively,”135 also seemed to influence the 
Republican economic thinking.  Yet this idea did not spring from an ideology unique to 
“new” Republican Party. Thomas Jefferson struck a similar note in his First Annual 
Message as president: “Agriculture, manufactures, commerce and navigation, the four 
pillars of our prosperity, are the most thriving where left most free to individual 
enterprise.  Protection from casual embarrassments however may sometimes be 
seasonably interposed.”136  Republican ideology, Eric Foner noted, “incorporated many 
of the basic values of the northern public,” and this certainly remained true with their 
economic ideas.137 
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Republican lawmakers did not follow Carey’s prescriptions regarding internal 
taxation.  Carey opposed taxes on consumption, particularly of goods used by the 
general population, “salt, sugar, coffee, and tobacco.”  These taxes raised the price for 
laborers, and inevitably led to higher costs for employers.138  However these 
commodities became the first targets of taxation both in July 1861 and 1862.   When 
Carey learned of the provisions in the first major tax bill written by Congress, he wrote 
an angry letter to Thaddeus Stevens, Chair of the House Ways and Means committee, 
voicing his opposition:  “Nothing can make it [the tax scheme] work …” he thundered in 
his letter.139  Carey’s disillusionment with the Republican Party continued after the war.  
He continued to complain about the Republican tax policy as late as 1871.140  Indeed his 
impression that the Republicans mishandled the economy during and immediately after 
the war prompted his bolt from the ranks in the 1872 election.  Dunbar also dismissed 
Carey’s influence on the development of American political economy, stating, “that he 
overturned any previously accepted principle of leading importance, still more that he 
had established any new and valuable principle originated by himself, is a claim which, 
in our judgment, cannot be made good.”141 
Seligman and Dunbar, two respected scholars of American tax history, tout the 
influence of the Physiocrats on the development of American political economy. “The 
physiocrats . . . exercised a perceptible influence on contemporary American thought,” 
stated E.R.A Seligman.142  Charles Dunbar opined that the American understanding of 
what constitutes a direct tax was derived from the Physiocrats.143   One can trace the 
philosophical lineage between the Physiocrats belief that the labor of husbandmen and 
farmers creates wealth and the labor theory of value.  But, when implementing a system 
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for public revenue the rejection of the Physiocrats ideas provides an example of the 
disjunction between ideological persuasions and practical application in American 
political economy.  
The Physiocrats, a group of French political economists including Francois 
Quesnay, Dupont de Nemours, and Marquis de Mirabeau, whose writings gained notice 
in the 1760’s, believed that all wealth came from the products from land, or the produit 
net.144  Agricultural surpluses provided the source of all true wealth. Therefore, taxing 
this wealth directly through a “single tax” on agriculture would lessen the need for 
indirect taxes, both excise and custom duties.145  Free trade, particularly duties on 
agricultural products, would ensue.  Laissez faire, laissez passer, became a central tenet 
of their doctrine. “The most important and inviolable rule of economic government is 
not to cause injury, through taxation, to the security and progress of cultivation,” wrote 
Meek, to summarize the Physiocrats on taxation.146    
As a corollary to this, the Physiocrats did not believe manufacturing or 
commerce produced wealth.  As Smith noted “The capital error of this system lie[s] in 
its representing the class of artificers, manufacturers and merchants as altogether barren 
and unproductive.”147  The Physiocrats advocated minimal government support for 
commercial enterprises, or a laissez-faire approach the government involvement in the 
economy.  These ideas accorded well with the growing dissatisfaction Americans felt 
under British rule, and the distrust of government intervention and manipulation in the 
economy.  Thomas Jefferson, who served as an American representative to France, and 
Albert Gallatin, a native of Switzerland, and fluent in French, both knew well the ideas 
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of the Physiocrats, and agreed with their advocacy for direct taxes and against protective 
tariffs.  One can trace the link between these policies to the Physiocrats.   
However, both Jefferson and Gallatin advocated government support of building 
“roads and canals” in aid to commerce.148  Gallatin, as Treasury secretary, crafted the 
direct tax measure employed during the War of 1812.  Gallatin realized though, that a 
direct tax did not provide the most effective means for the national government to collect 
taxes.  Local and state government could best administer a direct tax, relying on local 
officials, a British, not a French practice.  The span of the United States made a national 
direct tax unfeasible, except as a wartime expedient to supplement ordinary revenue.149  
“Most Americans of Jefferson’s era were practical as well as flexible in their approach to 
the problems posed by economic and social development,” observed Drew McCoy.  
European systems of direct taxation would not have work at the national level in the 
United States because of the sparsely populated landscape, and the vast tracts of 
uncultivated land.  
Finally, John Locke originated the idea that land, and the productive capacity of 
land, provided the best source of tax revenue.  The incidence for taxes falls eventually on 
landowners, Locke proposed, as merchants shift the expense of a tax or customs duty to 
them.  Taxing them directly, rather than indirectly, would provide a more efficient 
system of taxation. “Taxes, however contrived … do in a country where their great fund 
is in land, for the most part terminate upon land,” he suggested. “It is in vain,” Locke 
continued, “to lay the publick charge of government on anything else [for] there at last it 
will terminate.”150   Seligman noted that Locke first articulated the idea that tax should 
fall directly on landowners, thus employing the terminology of the direct tax for the first 
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time in the English language.151  Even the French tax ideology of the Physiocrats had 
English origins. 
 
Conclusion 
The Republican lawmakers who crafted the internal revenue legislation during 
the Civil War relied on well-established precedents, rather than a new ideology. The 
resulting legislation, according to Revenue Commissioner David A. Wells, “raised the 
largest possible revenue in the least possible time without much regard to acknowledged 
politico-economic laws.”152  Specifically, they levied taxes to guarantee payments on the 
interest rates for war loans rather than “pay for the war.”  Steady tax revenues assured 
lenders they would receive regular interest payments, which allowed officials to 
negotiate lower interest rates.  Both William Pitt and Salmon P. Chase chose this 
approach for financing their wars initially.  When both men realized that the wars would 
take longer to win, therefore entailing more costs than anticipated, both changed their 
strategy and advocated more aggressive taxation to cover the interest rates on loans and 
establish a sinking fund to expedite retiring the war debt.  As Richard Cooper noted, 
 
When heavy wartime borrowing and the associated higher interest 
rates threatened to swamp the sinking fund and demolish his dream of 
redeeming the debt, Pitt resorted to such radical expedients as a graduated 
income tax.  But he did so largely to preserve the sinking fund, not in 
order to fight a larger war.  Pitt viewed the war as limited in its 
objectives, and therefore saw no compelling reason to adopt the new 
principles of revolutionary finance.153 
 
 The concept of redistributing wealth through taxation, placing a higher 
rate of taxation on the wealthy in order to transfer benefits to the less fortunate, 
did not apply in the mid-nineteenth century United States at the national level.  
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Local and state governments performed these services, and collected the taxes 
needed for the purpose.  At the national level, all citizens would contribute 
“cheerfully” to the war costs, but in proportion to their ability.  Sparing the 
“necessaries of life” while taxing luxuries helped to minimize the tax on the 
poor, while shifting the burden to the rich.  This represented, for the time, an 
attempt at progressive taxation. Introducing the income tax during the war 
emerged as a political expedient to mollify representative from western states 
more than an attempt towards economic redistribution. They needed the funds 
they knew an income tax would produce. Relying on indirect taxes as the most 
cost-effective, and easiest mode of taxation also followed precedent. 
Finally, the internal revenue measures enacted during the Civil War did 
not represent a fulfillment of a Republican economic ideology.  These measures 
came instead from mixed parentage.  The English system of taxation provided a 
base from which lawmakers worked.  The overwhelming need for war revenue 
within a short period of time, created an urgency regarding taxes.  In session for 
only thirteen months between July 4, 1861 and March 3, 1863, the Thirty-seventh 
Congress did not have much time to fashion a new revenue system from scratch. 
Meeting these demands required haste rather than deliberation.  Writing 
comprehensive tax measures proved an enormous chore since four decades had 
passed since the last effort at internal taxation. 
Many of the patterns the English established, Americans followed.  
Introducing permanent excise taxes during the Civil War provides one example.  
Invoking the income tax to balance, and supplement, direct taxes also manifested 
in the United States.  Americans also replicated the start-and-stop nature of the 
British income tax.  The English income tax levied during the Napoleonic Wars 
lasted from 1798-1815; when in 1842, Parliament “arrived at the limits of 
taxation on articles of consumption,” they reintroduced the income tax, and it 
became permanent.154  In the United States, Congress enacted the first income 
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tax in 1861, then it “died a natural death” in 1872, when the measure expired.  
The next American income tax passed in 1894, ending the next year when the 
Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional.  Enacted again in 1913, after the 
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the tax became 
permanent.  Twenty seven years elapsed before the British resurrected their 
income tax to relieve another budget crisis exacerbated by war, while Americans 
took forty-one years to reintroduce theirs.  
 Did the Republicans deliberately copy British policies?  In some instances, such 
as the income tax, they did.  They used British laws as a convenient source of 
information when writing many of the excise taxes and stamp duties.  The concepts of 
exempting the “necessaries of life” and establishing a “sinking fund” certainly replicated 
British practices.  However, in creating an internal revenue system, American lawmakers 
acted more like a distant cousin raised in a different environment, who has the same 
quirks and characteristics with another family member.  They share a family 
resemblance, and many traits, but still live different lives. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE POVERTY OF THE TREASURY 
 
The fiscal transformation that occurred during the four years of Civil War rivals 
the long-term impact of the social and political changes that occurred. The United States 
adopted a uniform currency, established a national banking system, embraced an 
aggressive protectionist revenue policy, and created an internal revenue system.  Before 
the Civil War, the national government never collected more than $74 million in 
revenue; after the Civil War, the Treasury never tallied less than $257 million in 
receipts.1  In 1861, the Treasury department employed roughly 4,000 workers 
nationwide; by 1866, the number ballooned to over 10,390.2  
In earlier chapters, I argued that the Union began the war in a state of economic 
disarray.  Rather than a unified vision for addressing the war finances, Republicans 
differed sharply over economic policy.  The fiscal structure of the nation proved a great 
impediment, and restricted the options at hand for addressing the Civil War fiscal crisis. 
Because they needed to produce tax revenue quickly they turned to precedent rather than 
creating policy anew. The ideal of sparing the “necessaries of life” from taxation became 
one of the foundations on which they based their new revenue scheme.  Moving forward 
from this base, this chapter contends that many of the basic presumptions made by 
earlier by scholars regarding the Civil War internal revenue measures need to be placed 
in this historical context.   
The revenue measures enacted during the Civil War broke the old structure of 
fiscal federalism, and created in its stead a lasting program of national internal taxation. 
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Instead of relying primarily on customs officers sequestered in ports collecting tariffs, 
after the war tax officials became a more common sight throughout the country, 
assessing and collecting taxes.  This altered the relationship of both state and national 
governments, as well as the national government and the citizens.  
The need for receipts emerged as the primary causal factor in designing this new 
system.  Initially, “men and means were voted in numbers and amount then thought 
prodigal and extravagant,” Jacob Schuckers chronicled.3  However, as the war 
progressed, and expenses continued to outpaced revenue, taxes increased, and became 
more “inquisitorial.”4  Like most aspects of the Civil War economic legislation, the 
exigencies of war dictated the policy, rather than leaders implementing a preconceived 
agenda.  Justin S. Morrill, for example, disapproved of the Legal Tenders Act of 1862, 
speaking forcefully in opposition to their introduction.  He voted against the first issue of 
Greenbacks in February 1862.  However, in 1863, when the need for more “purchasing 
power” to meet the overwhelming war expenses compelled a reissue of the Greenbacks, 
Morrill voted in favor of the measure.5  He admitted that he had not “abated a jot of my 
repugnance” for the Greenbacks, yet felt compelled to vote yea. “It is not my will that 
consents,” he lamented, “but the poverty of the Treasury that compels me.”6  The 
“poverty of the Treasury” compelled the Republican legislators to adopt many measures 
they would have avoided.  This “poverty of the Treasury” more than any other factor, 
directed Republican fiscal policy. 
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Second, describing the taxes as “regressive” does not place the legislation in 
proper historical context. The Civil War revenue measures did not tax agricultural 
produce, a remarkable conciliation when one remembers that America remained a 
decisively agrarian country until the late nineteenth century. They tried to spare the poor 
from bearing a large portion of the tax burden by avoiding taxes on the “necessaries of 
life.”  Instead, they designed the legislation to fall on manufacturers, than make these 
taxes as diffuse as possible to spread the burden of taxation between the profits of these 
businesses and a broad segment of the American population. Also, Republicans 
introduced the first national income tax and tax on inheritances, decisively progressive 
taxes.  The tax on manufacturers generated more income than any other duty.  48.3 
percent of all the revenue collected from internal taxes between 1863 and 1870 came 
from the three progressive taxes: the manufacturing excise, the income tax, and the tax 
on legacies and successions.7 
Finally the ideals of achieving social justice through taxation, taxing one segment 
of the community for the support of another segment, remained a local phenomenon in 
nineteenth century.  State and local governments lay direct taxes based on the value of 
property owned by individuals, as well as progressive taxes (such as income, inheritance, 
and taxes on luxuries, like carriages or gold watches) to look after the needs of the 
residents in their states. The national government instead focused on the challenges 
facing the nation, particularly during the Civil War, as they moved to thwart a domestic 
insurrection. Thus, just taxation on the national level during this era attempted, 
primarily, to “equalize taxation,” and “secure uniformity and certainty in the assessments 
in the various districts of the country.”8  But because taxing the “indolence and vanity of 
the rich” provided “an easy manner” of relieving the less fortune from the burden of 
heavy taxation, this became a secondary goal in the revenue scheme.  The effort did not 
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attempt to redistribute wealth from one group to another, but to tap into the pool of 
wealth that would provide ready funds for the war effort.  This represents a fundamental 
difference in tax policy between the Civil War era and the post-Great Depression era.9  
As noted in Chapter IV, these ideals arose in England in the late sixteenth 
century, and became the basis of the early nineteenth century concept just fiscal policy in 
the United States. Adam Smith’s “First Maxim of Taxation” read, “The subjects of every 
state ought to contribute towards the support of the government as nearly as possible, in 
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the 
state.”10  This idea lay at the heart of the war revenue measures. The modern acceptance 
of “discriminately” taxing one segment of the population for the benefit of another went 
against the concept of everyone contributing and fulfilling his obligation to society.  
When levying the income tax, for example, the debate never centered on making the 
wealthy “pay more,” but rather insuring that they pay their just share, so a “millionaire 
who has his entire property in stock,” cannot escape from the taxes paid “by a farmer 
who lives by his side” and counts his assets in acres.11  
Finally, this chapter draws upon two assumptions.  All revenue measures 
originate in the House of Representatives, and members of the House “derive [their] 
powers from the people of America,” and “ought to be acquainted with the interests and 
circumstances” of their constituents. Senators derived their powers from the States, and 
represented the broader interests of the state as “political and coequal societies.”12  For 
these reason, both representatives and senators worked as advocates of their constituents, 
either the residents of their districts, or the broader interests of the states themselves 
when formulating tax policy.  Representatives and senators from states that raised corn 
opposed the heavy duties on distilled liquors.  Senators from New York worked to lower 
the rates of the income tax laws, as residents from that state paid more on these taxes 
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than did residents of any other state.  These efforts crossed party lines, as Republican, 
Democrats, and border state Unionists tried to keep the taxman at bay. This loyalty to 
local economic concerns comes forth in the votes and debates on internal revenue policy.  
Tariff legislation also reflected this reality.  From Thomas Fitzsimmons in the first 
Congress forward, Pennsylvania representatives framed tariff legislation to protect the 
iron industry, a tradition followed by William D. Kelley during the Civil War.  
Consistently in these debates, representative tried to protect the interests of their 
constituents. Distinguishing between the regional interests, whose concerns these public 
officials have a duty to represent, and the “special” interests that corrupt becomes an 
important ingredient in analyzing the tax measures.  The appropriate advocacy for a 
local economic concern becomes conflated with the improper corruption by outside 
influences. The same individual who takes a high moral stance one day, may become a 
shill for special interests a week later.   
Second, the pragmatic approach to legislation that played a decisive role in 
establishing the fiscal federalism of the antebellum era, also guided the Civil War 
internal revenue legislation. This becomes evident from the beginning, with the 
introduction of HR 71, the direct tax bill.  Lawmakers relied on taxes they knew they 
could enact and thought they could collect.  Too often this practical basis for taxation is 
ignored.  
 
“The magnitude of the contest” 
The administration’s management of the economy during the Civil War has 
drawn sharp, and uniform, criticism from a broad field of historians and economic 
historians.  While highlighting different aspects of the Republicans’ efforts, the literature 
on the Civil War economy has remained consistently disparaging. Introducing a national 
fiat currency created unnecessary inflation.13 The Republicans initial response to war 
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introduced “obsolete and impractical procedures” to address the crisis.14 Treasury 
Secretary Chase should have used banks as government depositories, rather than 
clinging to the Independent Treasury system.15  However, once he finally shed this 
anachronistic structure, he replaced it with a National Banking system that stifled the 
innovative and market responsive aspects that worked in the old order.16  The 
Republicans then proceeded to foist upon the country high tariffs, thus giving rise to the 
new industrial order that emerged in the late nineteenth century.17  Despite these high 
tariffs, Chase and congressional leaders unnecessarily increased the cost of the war by 
financing it “mainly by loans.”18 Neither Chase nor his associates “realized that bold 
[tax] measures were needed”19 The delay in taxing the citizens proved “a major 
blunder.”20 When the Republican legislators finally introduced internal revenue 
legislation, they “failed to provide adequate taxation.”21  Instead, they recommended 
“regressive taxes”22 that demonstrated “the party state’s” support for the creation of a 
“new class of finance capitalists during the war.”23  Indeed “Mr. Chase’s failure,” and by 
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extension the failure of the Republican revenue program, “was inevitable”24 Because 
Republicans clung to their “naïve” economic policies, “they unwittingly laid the 
groundwork for the turmoil of the late nineteenth century.”25   
These critiques, while remaining somewhat contradictory (inadequate taxation at 
the same time that the United States collected protectionist tariffs, for example), point in 
the same direction:  the Republicans bungled the financing of the war, and these 
mistakes created, either unwittingly or (more cynically) by design, the economic 
disparities that surfaced in the late nineteenth century.  In considering these criticisms, 
one must first remember that, as noted in Chapter III, Republicans did not share a unified 
vision with regard to the economy.  The Republican economic policies during the war 
did not evolve through a singular party design.  They differed on fundamental policies 
regarding war finance, particularly with regard to taxation. Secretary Chase and his 
colleagues, compelled by the demands of the war, reached further into consumers’ 
pockets than originally intended. Chase and his contemporaries had to cope with a war 
of unprecedented, and unanticipated, magnitude in which the revenue needs of the 
government far surpassed the capacity of the traditional fiscal measures.  
These criticisms regarding the revenue measures remain, as David H. Donald 
noted, “unhistorical.”26 Scholars have based their studies of the war fiscal policy on the 
ultimate result of the legislation rather than its origin.  By 1895, a highly regressive tax 
structure based on alcohol and tobacco excise taxes supported the government; 76 
percent of all internal revenue and 28 percent of total government receipts (internal taxes 
plus tariffs) came from taxes and license fees on these articles, “recognized quite 
universally as deleterious both to the morals as well as the social well-being of the 
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community.”27  The Civil War income tax expired in 1872.  The Supreme Court declared 
the 1894 income tax measure “unconstitutional” in 1895.  The tariff policies remained 
aggressively protectionist. More significantly, the social changes of the post-bellum era 
introduced America to the persistent problem of entrenched disparities in wealth that 
accompanied the hurley-burley development of lightly regulated capitalism.  Fortunes 
accumulated while poor immigrants congregated in squalid tenements.  Workers fought 
for basic rights and reasonable pay.  Farmers, who had prospered after the Civil War, fell 
into economic despair by the 1890’s.  The Gilded Age of political corruption, in-
fighting, and legislative stalemate, kept lawmakers from addressing the needs of the 
nation, while they catered to the increasingly dominant lobbyists.  
Scholars have linked the war tax policies to these results.  However, one must 
remember that the economy after the Civil War differed from that of the prewar period.  
In a speech given on February 27, 1865, John Sherman summarized this sentiment:  
None of us appreciated the magnitude of the contest – the 
enormous armies demanded and the vast sums required … when the war 
came, we were without a currency and without a system of revenue. With 
the terrible lessons of 1815 and 1837 staring us in the face, no one 
advised adopting as a standard value the issue of 1500 [state] banks.28 
 
Although critics of the Civil War policies know this intuitively, the recognition 
of these problems does not surface in their appraisal of the policies enacted.  Produced in 
a cyclical fashion, the literature on the Civil War fiscal legislation reflects the strongly a 
presentist influence.  The late nineteenth century debates over the justness and 
constitutionality of the income tax inspired a spate of studies by economists on the Civil 
War policies.  Edwin R. Seligman, Charles Dunbar, A. C. Miller and Charles Bullock all 
wrote influential treatises on taxation during the late 1890’s and early twentieth century.  
These studies aimed to provide intellectual force to the argument in favor of re-
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introducing the income tax.29  Seligman, in particular, openly admitted his advocacy for 
the income tax. “I think it may safely be said,” he wrote in 1900, “that in all the 
communities of the civilized world there is no system of taxation that begins to compare 
with ours in injustice and inequality.”30 Thorough and comprehensive, historians 
(including me) rely heavily on these sources, justly using the expertise of these well-
respected scholars.  However, written before World War II, these studies present the 
problems created by Civil War finance as unique experiences in American history.  At 
the turn of the century, before the enormous outlays and commanding of resources that 
occurred during World Wars I and II, these conclusions had merit, but since need a 
broader context for interpretation.  
The Great Depression and World War II inspired another round of studies about 
taxation in the United States.  This literature demonstrated a greater concern for using 
taxation to provide certain social protections.  The duty of providing social “welfare” 
legislation fell to the state, not national, government. State government developed more 
dynamic, and progressive systems finances to address these needs. Providing relief for 
the poor, reaching their citizens “individually,” remained a local, not national 
responsibility.  Advocacy for introducing more progressive taxation has greatly 
influenced this later work that helped justify expanding the use of the income tax during 
World War II.31  This has resulted in unfounded criticism of Civil War legislators for not 
using “endowed powers” to achieve a “fuller and richer life” for the “common people” 
through tax policy.  This basis of interpretation misidentifies the nature and role of 
government during this time, and unduly characterizes the Civil War tax legislation as 
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overtly harmful to the “common people.”32  The Civil War legislation aided the 
endowment of these powers to the national government.  
The complaint that the administration did not begin taxing sooner also needs 
better context. All revenue measures must pass through the House of Representatives; 
the executive branch could neither collect nor appropriate money without congressional 
approval.  Chase managed to secure $7 million from the loan measures passed in the last 
session of the Thirty-sixth Congress, but he could not enact tax legislation without a 
sitting Congress. Chase wrote to congressional leaders in June 1861 asking them to 
come to Washington early to work on finance bills before the opening of the special 
session.33  Congress met for a month long special session, recessed, then convened again 
in December. Within seven months, Congress had approved borrowing over $300 
million, and enacted $200 million in internal revenue taxes, an enormous leap in the 
nation’s fiscal boundaries.  Rather than a slow response to war demands, if viewed from 
the actual time in session, this represents a remarkably fast turnaround for new, complex 
legislation.  
Since people believed the war would end quickly, inaugurating a comprehensive 
tax bill before 1862 would not have made sense.  “The northerners have all along 
thought themselves infinitely superior to the South and have boasted that they would 
soon crush the rebellion.”34  The Herald Tribune proclaimed on July 19, 1861 that, “It 
seems to be the universal and joyful conviction that this is the beginning of the end.”35  
Making plans for a long war “would [lead] to expenses which could later prove to be 
unnecessary.”36  Unnecessary expenditures did not conform to the antebellum era ideals 
of keeping an “unsleeping watchfulness” on government extravagance. 
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The Special Session of Congress did not meet until three months after the attack 
on Fort Sumter.  “There was no serious apprehension of a prolonged and calamitous 
war,” amongst the leaders in Washington.37 Indeed, as Mark Grimsley observed, only 
after June 1862, when Confederate General Robert E. Lee drove the Union’s George B. 
McClellan away from Richmond, did most northerners believe the war would not end 
quickly.  McClellan’s defeat outside Richmond “brought a sea change in the attitude of 
many northern civilians,” Grimsley noted, “who now saw a seemingly imminent triumph 
disappear into a stalemate whose duration no one could predict.”38  At the start of the 
war, President Lincoln requested from Congress only the “legal means for making this 
contest a short and decisive one.”39 When it became clear the war would require more 
blood and money than originally anticipated, Congress accepted the challenge with 
alacrity. 
Secretary Chase’s initial report to the Special Session of Congress estimated the 
government would spend $318.5 during the next fiscal year.  He requested $240 million 
in loans, and $80 million in tax revenue. Chase wanted to use loans to pay the war 
expenses, and rely on taxes to meet the “ordinary” costs of government, as well as the 
interest payments on the loans, a practice that the English had employed throughout the 
eighteenth century.  This sum represented the single largest appropriation ever sought 
from Congress.  
Chase recommended an interest rate of 7.3 percent for three-year Treasury notes.  
Although historically high for US securities, this interest rate nevertheless fell below the 
demands made by lenders at the end of the Buchanan administration. Chase also 
requested authority to issue 30-year bonds, carrying a 7 percent interest rate. Senator 
William Pitt Fessenden (R, ME), now Chair of the Senate Finance committee, wrote to 
his son on July 1, 1861, “We shall have to authorize a loan for $250 million and I am 
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afraid it will be hard to get.  We shall probably give Mr. Chase authority to get it in any 
way he can.“40 Part of “getting it” meant enacting taxes that would pay steady interest.  
“Public credit can only be supported by public faith, and public faith can only be 
maintained … by prompt and punctual fulfillment of every public obligation,” Chase 
stated in his report to Congress.   He advised raising $80 million in tax revenue. 
Chase left it to “the superior wisdom of Congress” to determine what type of 
internal taxes to levy. In the past, executive branch had often taken the lead in pushing 
desired revenue schemes.  Treasury secretaries Alexander Hamilton, Albert Gallatin, and 
Robert J. Walker, all wrote, or significantly influenced, the development of tax or tariff 
policy from their perch in the Treasury. Though Congress always took its role in 
enacting legislation, the secretaries often exerted an authority not vested in the 
Constitution. Although Chase aspired to assume the same activist role in the nation’s 
fiscal policy, he bowed to the Constitution.  Repeatedly, throughout his tenure, Chase 
practiced a firm construction of the Constitution, where it states that Congress, not the 
Executive Branch, will dictate revenue policy. This reveals another irony of Civil War 
governance; chided for invoking too much power and suspending civil liberties, in this 
other important area of government to citizen relations, Chase deferred to “wisdom” of 
Congress.41  Further, President Lincoln, overwhelmed by his role as the “Commander 
and Chief” of the military, left financial policies to Chase.  Exhibiting the pragmatism 
that governed many executives, Lincoln also left financial decisions to Chase “because 
as a follower of [Henry] Clay, and as a Whig, [Lincoln] believed in expedients.”42   
Chase did suggest levying taxes on stills and distilled liquors, tobacco, carriages, 
jewelry and inheritances, however he did not go further in guiding the tax legislation.  A 
believer in a narrow interpretation of the Constitution, Chase knew that revenue 
measures would ultimately come from Congress, and did not wish to encroach on their 
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authority.  Also, as an opportunist who wished to protect his own political future, Chase 
ducked on this potentially volatile issue and left it to Congress to take the heat.  
Chase’s report also betrayed his Democratic heritage and economic principles. 
Although acknowledging that it may entail extra expenses to collect, Chase spoke 
favorably of the direct tax, a measure championed by many Democrats, and scorned by 
Whigs during the 1850’s.  Advocacy for the direct tax during the late antebellum became 
an ironic segment of the broader sectional confrontation.  Southerners wished to 
resurrect the direct tax as a means of lowering tariff rates. Northerners flinched, because 
the costs of collecting the direct tax far outpaced those of the customs system already in 
place.  Many Republicans did not wish to supplant direct taxes with tariff revenue.  
Chase believed the best tax system relied on, “the manifest equity of the distribution of 
burdens in proportion to means, rather than in proportion to consumption.”  He also 
acknowledged that in some states, the local system of taxation would make for a “certain 
and convenient method of collection.” Chase showed his distaste for the Morrill tariff, 
suggesting it hindered the “prosperity of the nation,” and urged its repeal or at least 
adjusting duties so “the articles now exempt” would carry a “light” tax.  This would 
allow for lower duties on wool and other protected articles. Chase wanted coffee, tea, 
and sugar taxed, and estimated that would raise an additional $20 million, “while the 
burden of this revenue will be mitigated by participation on the part of the foreign 
producers.”43 
Finally, Chase also set forth a theme he would repeat constantly during the war.  
“The Secretary respectfully asks … whether the current disbursements of government 
may not be themselves diminished?”  He continually urged economy in government, 
another Democratic principle that often put him at odds with his Whig cohorts, who 
found his constant nagging about “economy” an irritant.44  Although this emphasis on 
restrained spending bothered his colleagues, Chase’s vigilance against “extravagance” 
impressed others.  “The secretary’s reputation for efficiency and integrity,” David H. 
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Donald noted, played a decisive role in “the gradual restoration of federal credit in 1861” 
and played an instrumental role in securing the loans the government contracted between 
Lincoln’s inauguration and the opening of the Special Session.45   
The greatest consideration in financing the war remained the need to bring fresh 
funds into the Treasury.  The government’s acute need for additional revenue directed 
the Civil War fiscal policy.  The Republicans reactively inaugurated a system of national 
internal taxation to meet the unexpected and unprecedented expenses incurred in fighting 
the war.  This concern, more than any other, influenced the war fiscal policy.  
 
Civil War Revenue Measures 
Congress enacted three comprehensive revenue measures during the course of 
the war: House Resolutions (HR) 71 (1861), HR 312 (1862), and HR 405 (1864). The 
first measure, HR 71, represented a bridge between antebellum fiscal policy and the 
demands of a modern government.  Based on legislation written for the War of 1812, HR 
71 relied on direct taxes, collected in all the states, including those in rebellion.   
The congressmen assembling in Washington for the Special Session that began on July 
4, 1861, faced the challenge of reuniting a nation consumed by civil war.  Bereft of 
funds, and its credit impaired, all knew that the crisis necessitated some form of internal 
taxation. For seventy years, the United States had relied on duties collected from imports 
as the primary source of revenue.  Obtaining loans from foreign countries had cushioned 
the financial “embarrassments” that occurred when tariffs did not meet all the expenses.  
Yet, these two traditional sources of revenue now seemed threatened. 
Trade slackened before the war began, and would continue to falter, they feared. 
Without cotton to export, ships would bring fewer goods to the Union ports.  The 
Confederate Congress, on February 9, 1861 enacted a revenue measure that relied on the 
Tariff of 1857, which fixed lower rates on average than the Morrill tariff. Suddenly, 
goods unloaded at Confederate ports paid a substantially lower duty than those delivered 
to New York.  Ships returning to Europe could fill their holds with bales of cotton, an 
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advantage northern merchants feared they had lost. Thus the Union government’s 
traditional sources of income, customs duties and, when necessary, foreign loans, now 
seemed imperiled. After the secession of states with key customs houses, the legislators 
recognized that the precarious state of the government’s finances required and incisive 
action.  The assembling congressmen confronted a problem no Congress had faced since 
1816:  how best to levy internal taxes.46 
The emergency session opened on July 4,1861 and Congress received Chase’s 
report the next day. Though members reacted favorably, James G. Blaine wrote, they did 
not accept all of Chase’s recommendations, and agreed quickly that the crisis required a 
more reliable stream of revenue.  However, “the legislators were not inclined to go 
farther than the head of the Treasury suggested,” Blaine recorded.47  The House 
concentrated first on the tariff legislation, and passed a measure on July 25, 1861 that 
retained the Morrill tariff, and increased most of the rates established in that bill.  
Removing coffee, tea, and sugar from the free list, as the Treasury secretary 
recommended, they fixed specific rates to these articles to generate guaranteed revenue.  
Clement L. Vallandigham (D. OH) charged that these duties on coffee, tea, and sugar 
unfairly taxed the “necessaries of life” and “subjects of universal consumption.  He 
demanded they be placed on the free list instead of bearing a tax. Thaddeus Stevens (R. 
PA), Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee snapped back that the necessity to 
“sustain” the government for the “prosecution of the war,” made these duties inevitable. 
Raising duties on these staple “luxuries” had been a favorite revenue device during the 
antebellum era to correct budget shortfalls. 
The time constraints on the Special Session became the most decisive factor in 
crafting the HR 71.  Because the session would last only a month, the House Ways and 
Means Committee felt compelled to borrow from the past, and adopt a law that had 
already been written. The measure copied “section by section” the 1813 and 1815 direct 
tax measure penned by former Treasury secretary Albert Gallatin. When critics 
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characterized the bill as “undigested,” Thaddeus Stevens, retorted that “this undigested, 
ill-considered bill is an exact copy of [Gallatin’s].”48 Hoping they only needed to 
readjust the apportionment, the Committee simply reworked the earlier direct tax in 
haste.  They introduced HR 71 on July 23, 1861, two days after the Union army’s 
humiliating defeat at the Battle of Bull Run.  
The original measure called for $30 million in direct taxes from all the states, 
with $20 million divided amongst the “loyal” states and $10 million from the states “in 
rebellion.” A group of congressmen moved for the postponement of HR 71 until the next 
session to give members more time to craft new tax legislation. Justin S. Morrill (R. 
VT), Chair of the Subcommittee on Taxation, who became instrumental in developing 
the national internal revenue program, rose to address this challenge. “We want to pass 
something now promptly,” he extorted, “something that will enable the Secretary of the 
Treasury to negotiate a loan … [otherwise] he will not be able to negotiate a single 
dollar.”49 
 Although this bill represented the fifth time Congress proposed a direct tax, the 
changes in the composition of the country generated more friction for the measure then it 
had in earlier congresses. Three main objections to HR 71 emerged during the course of 
the five days of intermittent debate.  The direct tax provisions assessed only real 
property, and did not tax any wealth in the form of capital.   This reflected the origins of 
the direct tax in the late eighteenth century when wealth equated with land and property 
(houses and slaves) ownership. The transition from an agrarian to a more mercantile and 
industrial economy, well underway by 1861, moved more and more Americans toward a 
new source of income. Representatives from western states, and states with rural 
populations, reacted with hostility to direct taxes. Their states comprised small 
populations with extensive land holdings, thus the tax would place a high quota on the 
citizens they represent. Congress apportioned the 1813 direct tax by population and the 
assessed value of “all lands, lots of ground and their improvements, dwelling-houses, 
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and slaves.”50 Created in a time when scattered farms comprised the base of the 
economy, the formula for direct taxes no longer matched the demographics of the 
country. Sixteen southern and western states had joined the United States since 1815, 
and most of these states had small populations of farmers who owned large tracts of 
land.  Thus, the direct tax would fall heavily on these individuals. Western 
representatives realized immediately that this bill would disproportionately tax their land 
rich but cash poor constituents. The increased urbanization of the East, and 
accompanying concentration of capital that occurred after the first Industrial Revolution 
in the 1840’s and 1850’s, created a class of wealthy, urban residents who did not count 
their holdings in acres.  These differences in national demographics meant the tax would 
fall “discriminately” on the western states.  
 Second, this measure changed Gallatin’s system of using state officials to assess 
and collect the taxes, to one that used federal government officials.  A group of 
congressmen, led by New York representative Roscoe Conkling, raised the fear that “an 
army of [federal] officers whose business it is to collect these taxes” would swarm 
across the country. They suggested employing state tax collectors who could double as 
the federal revenue officers, a scheme that would avoid having to construct a new 
bureaucracy.  Conkling wanted to rely on the precedent of 1813, when Congress 
requested that state tax officials act as their emissaries, collecting their quota, and then 
submitting it to the Treasury for a discount on their portion of the tax.51  Third, 
abolitionist Congressmen objected to collecting the direct tax on slaves.  Each direct tax 
measure before 1861 included slaves in the assessments, however they did not wish to 
sanction slavery by formally recognizing slaves as property “like a horse.”52  Again this 
signaled the more aggressive position that many northerners had taken against slavery 
since the Early Republic.  
 Schuyler Colfax (R. IN) led a group of western representatives in fighting for tax 
on capital as well as land. “The most odious tax of all we can levy is going to be the tax 
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upon the land,” objected Colfax on July 24.  He continued, “[I cannot vote for a bill] that 
would allow a millionaire, who had put his entire property into stock, to be exempt from 
taxation, while a farmer who lives by his side must pay a tax.”  Colfax insisted on 
dropping the direct tax and instead taxing stocks, bonds, and mortgages.  “Put this 
burden upon the men who are best able to bear it.”53 
 Hiram Bingham (R. OH) answered Colfax’s concerns.  Bingham, a former 
county district attorney and member of the Judiciary committee, had served in Congress 
since 1855.  He had established his reputation as an authority on the Constitution and the 
law.  Bingham countered Colfax’s proposal by observing that the Constitution did not 
allow for a direct tax on incomes or capital; their only options included levying a direct 
tax apportioned by population, or indirect taxes that had to be uniform throughout the 
United States and collected as duties, imports, or excises.  “This is not the time,” he 
lectured, “for friends of the country and the Constitution to undertake to establish a new 
construction … There is no power conferred upon the Constitution to impose direct taxes 
upon personal property.” John A. McClerland (D. IL) renewed Colfax’s objection that 
the tax would weigh “very heavy, if not ruinous” upon the “great agricultural states.”  
Owen Lovejoy (R. IL) joined the fray, and demanded that the tax extend to “luxury” 
articles as well as property. Frederick A. Pike (R. ME) called for scrapping the tax on 
land, and instead “raising the sum by an income tax.”54 
Based on these strong objections, the House voted to return the bill to the Ways 
and Means Committee, to see if they could include some form of tax on capital.55  
Stevens reported back the next day that they could not find any method for sanctioning 
this. Senator Thomas M. Edwards (R. ME) advocated moving beyond the Constitution, 
and determining a way to tax all property, not just land.  “Why stickle about terms?” he 
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asked.56 While acknowledging that the Constitution did not allow assessing incomes 
under the direct tax provisions of the Constitution, Bingham suggested using the indirect 
taxing authority, and treating income taxes as excises or duties.57  Anxious to move the 
bill forward, the members accepted this compromise. 
The Ways and Means Committee sent the measure back to Congress with the 
direct tax apportionment dropped to $20 million, and a three percent tax on all incomes 
above $600.  They accepted Bingham’s contrivance of terms, and henceforth referred to 
this tax as the “income duty” during subsequent congressional debates.58  This christened 
the tax as indirect, rather than direct, according to the taxing powers in the Constitution.  
This reference, Seligman noted, derived from British precedent, where a “duty was a 
generic term applied to every source of revenue” and taxes and duties remained 
“interchangeable.”59  The measure passed the House on July 29, 1861. Justin S. Morrill, 
acknowledging that taxing incomes would “be the most just and equitable” means of 
taxation, worried that “we have no time in this session to mature an income tax.”  
Morrill continued, emphasizing the importance of passing legislation during the session 
to provide means to prosecute the war.  “I have no doubt [an income tax] will be adopted 
… But now, for this emergency, it is necessary that we have something.”60 
 Senators did not “stickle with terms” and voiced support for incorporating an 
income tax from the beginning of their debates on the measure. “Let us tax property in 
the last resort,” suggested Senator James F. Simmons (R. RI), member of the Senate 
Finance Committee.  “We can meet all the exigencies … with a moderate duty on 
importations and a moderate tax on incomes,” he predicted.61  Simmons introduced an 
amendment for the income tax on July 29.  As he announced the amendment, he 
encouraged the Senate to abandon “old notions” and replace a land tax for national 
income tax. 
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 Simmons served in the Civil War Senate briefly.  Elected as a Whig representing 
Rhode Island from 1841-1847, he lost his re-election bid and resumed his career in yarn 
manufacturing. Re-elected to the Senate in 1856 as a Republican, Simmons joined the 
Finance Committee and emerged as an influential participant in their deliberations. 
Jerold Waltham has shown that Simmons wrote the income tax provisions that became 
incorporated into HR 71. Scandal however smote this legacy; forced to resign in 1862 
rather than face censure for a bribery charge, Simmons’s work on the income tax has 
receded from attention.   Because Simmons anticipated delays in debating then writing a 
new income tax bill, he began his research early.  On July 12, 1861, Simmons sent a 
request to the State Department for “references on the subject of the British income tax.”  
Portions of the income tax law followed those of the British statutes, word for word, 
although Waltham noted that the British tax “was not copied verbatim; rather it served as 
a fountainhead for ideas.”62   
The final version of HR 71 levied an income tax of three percent on all incomes 
above $800 derived from “any kind of property, or from any profession, trade, 
employment or vocation carried on in the United States,” an amount well above a wage 
earner’s salary. The uniform rate followed the Constitution’s constraints on indirect, not 
direct, taxes. “The indirect or income tax which is to be raised by this bill will be, in my 
judgment, at least twice as much as they shall raise by direct taxation,” Justin S. Morrill 
predicted. Income from securities was taxed at one and a half percent, but the interest 
from government bonds remained untaxed.  Citizens did not have to pay the income 
“duty” until July 30, 1862.63 
Second to the distribution and incidence of the tax burden came the objection as 
to how the government would collect the tax.  With eleven states in “rebellion,” many 
fretted that state revenue officers would not have sufficient loyalty to the United States 
to render the moneys collected. The 1813 and 1815 direct tax legislation had allowed 
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states to collect their quota for the national government, a system that proved more 
efficient then the Federalist method of sending federal revenue officers to districts 
throughout the country. But the first draft of this bill did not permit states to pay their 
quota in advance for a discount.  The recent experience with the southern customs 
officers had left some members with the belief that only national officers could collect 
the revenue. This change from the 1813 statute had less to do with building patronage 
opportunities, and extending the reach of the government, than with trying to pass a 
measure that would secure revenue, and mollify creditors worried about the security of 
their interest payments. 
Roscoe Conkling (R. NY) led the dissent on this portion of the bill.  Conkling 
insisted the “state machinery” would prove more effective in collecting the needed 
revenue. While Conkling’s suggestion seemed to concern itself with a reliable and cost 
effective means of collecting revenue, one can also look at this as part of the federalist 
struggle between state and national control over local governance.  Conkling, an 
ambitious sophomore representative, had won election as the mayor of Utica, New York 
in 1858, and accepted the Republican nomination to the House months later.  “Boss 
Conkling,” as his biographer David M. Jordan refers to him, integrated well into the 
New York political system.  During the Gilded Age, “he succeeded to the place which 
[Thurlow] Weed held,” as master of the fetid New York spoils system. “[Conkling] 
dominated politics” through his control of the New York Custom House.64 As the 
nation’s busiest port, New York’s customs officials supervised the flow of a large share 
of the revenue from imports.   “The New York Customs House afforded unequal 
opportunities for graft and extortion and lay at the center of the spoils system.”  As one 
federal employee in the New York customs house stated, “we clerks . . . consider 
ourselves as in the service of the collector and not in the service of the United States.”65 
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Conkling emerged in the decades after the Civil War as one of the most notorious 
lords of Gilded Age corruption and political patronage.  In 1880, he led the Stalwarts, a 
faction in the Republican Party that wanted to perpetuate the spoils system against the 
growing agitation for civil service reform.   Conkling resigned from the Senate in 1881 
over a dispute regarding federal appointments to the New York City customs house; 
clearly, control of the collection system in New York long remained a matter of great 
concern to him.  By keeping control of the “state machinery,” and control of 
appointments, he strengthened his power base.  Opening similar positions to federal 
power would undermine his authority in New York State.  Once again, we find the 
merging of public and personal interests in the development of national fiscal policy.66  
This mattered in the nineteenth century; state legislatures, not the voting public, elected 
senators.  Securing a power base in New York meant the possibility of moving beyond 
the House of Representatives to the Senate. 
 Besides the question of how to collect the tax in the Confederate states, the 
rejection of Conkling’s protest relied on a more immediate concern.  The direct taxes 
levied in 1813 and 1815 had not fulfilled expectations. Intended to generate $12 million, 
the tax produced only $10.5 million total.  Not all states collected their share, and no 
mechanism for enforcement existed.  Thaddeus Stevens reminded the members that 
Civil War would exacerbate this problem. Stevens believed that granting only the federal 
government the authority to hire revenue officers would secure the necessary revenue.67 
 The third and most impassioned objection to the bill came from abolitionists who 
did not want Congress classifying slaves as property.  Article I, section II of the 
Constitution cites representation and direct taxes as the twin policies directly affected by 
the “three-fifths” clause.  Counting slaves as taxable property acknowledged the 
southern wealth invested in slaves.  However, this policy provided federal recognition of 
the status of slaves as property, a concession that anti-slavery, “Radical” members of 
Congress would not allow.  The recent Dred Scott decision (1857), that granted Fifth 
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Amendment protection to slave owners to bring their property into the territories, gave 
this question added importance.  Under Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s interpretation of 
the Constitution, classifying slaves as property may open the free states to the property 
of slaveholders. Owen Lovejoy, one of President Lincoln’s trusted friends on Capitol 
Hill, “found the word “slaves” in the bill “with a good deal of surprise.”  He noted that 
“if we tax [slaves] as property, among dwelling-houses and horses, we are bound to 
protect them as property.” Stevens replied that, “If this provision is excluded from the 
bill, you exclude from taxation more than half the means of raising revenue in the rebel 
states.”68  Determined to collect the southern states’ share of the direct tax, Stevens 
would allow this concession for the broader goal of financing the effort to quell the 
rebellion and destroy the southern slave society.   
As so often occurred with financial measures, compromise and efficacy prevailed 
over principle. Though acknowledged as a direct tax, the legislators accepted the income 
tax by redefining it as a “duty.”  The final version of the bill apportioned $20 million to 
all (including the seceded) states. The states would have the chance to collect their 
portion of the tax and submit the revenue in one payment to the federal government.  If 
the states did not succeed in collecting their share, then the federal revenue officers 
would intervene and collect the outstanding amount.  Striking the word “slaves” from 
the bill, Congress instead allowed each state to determine what constituted taxable 
property.  Justin S. Morrill acknowledged that of the $20 million estimated revenue; they 
expected to realize only $12 million from the Union states. The assessments for the tax 
would not begin until April 1862, another sign that many believed the war would end 
soon and that the bill served to assuage bondholders as much to collect revenue. 
President Lincoln signed the law on August 5, 1861. 
 HR 71 failed as a revenue measure. The states met their tax quota through their 
requisitions of troops and supplies, not with money. “The government received nothing 
from the direct tax during the war which it would not have received otherwise,” Charles 
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Dunbar speculated.69  During the American Revolution, states failed to provide their 
requisitions because the central government had no means for compelling them to meet 
their obligations.  In this case, the federal government used its limited resources to fight 
the war, and had neither the means, nor the will, to force the states to provide more than 
they did.  The states in turn “paid” their tax in goods, rather than the much needed cash.  
Alive and still influential, the fiscal federalism honed during the early nineteenth century 
blocked the national government from exerting its will over the economy, even at a time 
of great need. Faced with the need to pass something into law, Congress accepted the 
expedient of a flawed tax bill.  While understanding that they moved beyond the narrow 
constraints outlined in the Constitution, they chose not to “stickle,” but instead 
compromise with representatives from the “new” western and southern states.  They 
used both the direct tax and income tax because they had already written statutes on 
hand they could use as templates, and would not have to create the legislation anew.  
The need to pass something in the short, emergency session forced them to accept these 
measures.   
Finally, the dominance of one “special interest” rose to the fore in these debates.  
While scholars tend to focus on the rising power of industrial and commercial concerns 
during the Civil War era, HR 71 and later tax laws show that the agrarian representatives 
exerted more power in designing these measures then their colleagues who spoke for 
other segments of the economy.  No one got all he wanted, but the influence of “farm 
interests” in the House held sway, demonstrating the predominance of agriculture both in 
representation and in the economy during that period.   
Congress never collected any revenue under the first income tax.  During the 
next session, they developed a more comprehensive and well-defined levy. However, 
through this initial failure, the legislators came to understand that the needs and 
resources of the nation had changed since the War of 1812.  The direct tax would neither 
be accepted nor practically enforced. The shortfall between expenses and receipts 
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required them to ditch the antiquated and impractical direct tax, and try something else.  
The central question as to whether the income tax constituted a direct or indirect tax did 
vex Congress briefly, but the exigencies of war, and the need to finish business during 
this short session, shortened any prolonged philosophical debate on this constitutional 
question.  Once they accepted an income tax, this question did not trouble them again.  
They needed the money too much. 
The Special Session, a remarkable though short assembly, adjourned the day 
after President Lincoln signed HR 71 into law.  Aside from initiating internal taxation, 
Congress authorized Secretary Chase to borrow $250 million, and imposed a tariff on 
coffee, tea, and sugar, the favored and most reliable revenue tariff of an earlier era. They 
took their first steps toward funding the Civil War. 
 
The Touchstone of Our Patriotism 
When Congress reconvened on December 2, 1861, exasperation had replaced the 
expectation that hovered in the chambers the previous July.   The war continued, and the 
optimism flagged.  Over the recess, the Union’s fortunes had turned grim.  Union forces 
seemed disorganized, and the leadership bereft of talent.  The Yanks lost the Battle of 
Ball’s Bluff that October.  Despite the low number of casualties, the Confederate troops 
embarrassed the Federal army, whose disorderly retreat turned into a rout.  This 
humiliating loss spurred Congress to establish the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the 
War, a move that foreshadowed the ensuing power struggle between the executive and 
legislative branches. General George McClelland, in whom the Union had placed its 
hopes for a quick and decisive victory, preened and marched, but did not attack. 
Confederate soldiers camped in Virginia, within marching distance of Washington. 
Tensions mounted with Great Britain after Captain John Wilkes stopped the Trent, a 
British ship passing through international waters, to forcibly remove two Confederate 
emissaries. 
Secretary Chase greeted the congressmen with more bad news.  The economic 
state of the country had declined again.  He stated in his first Annual Report that the 
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deficit totaled $213 million and only $2.2 million remained in the Treasury.  The 
government could not meet outstanding requisitions, including the Army payroll, despite 
having borrowing over $150 million that fall. Chase repeated his call for a “reduction in 
expenditure” as a means of alleviating the fiscal crisis.  He also asked for $50 million as 
an “adequate provision of taxation for ordinary expenditures,” while he planned to 
continue financing the “extraordinary” expenses of war through loans.70 Chase also 
recommended “relieving the nation from competition with local circulation” by taxing 
bank notes, and introducing a standard national currency.71  
This report angered the “finance capitalists” upon whom Chase relied for the 
loans he needed for the war costs.  Throughout that fall, Chase negotiated with an 
“Association” of bankers from Philadelphia, New York, and Boston for $150 million of 
the $240 million in loans he wanted for the war expenses.  They agreed to provide Chase 
with three installments of $50 million, all of which Chase had received and spent during 
the fall. In return, these bankers pressed Chase for a more aggressive program of internal 
taxation. “The success of the proposed loans will depend upon the enactment by 
Congress” of a program of taxation “adapted to the existing emergency,” read a 
resolution of the New York Chamber of Commerce.72 They wanted assurance that their 
interest payments would arrive regularly and their principal remained intact.  They also 
advocated taxes as a means of curbing inflation, a perennial fear of lenders during times 
of economic uncertainty.  
Chase did not have a good relationship with these men.  They distrusted him. 
Chase’s adherence to the Subtreasury Act meant that he refused to use the private banks 
for government deposits.  Chase’s demands that the banker’s provide their loans in gold, 
rather than accepting their banks’ notes, irked them.  On top of this, Chase refused to 
stop using small denomination Treasury notes that competed with their own profitable 
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bank notes, and they feared would depress the value of the bonds they received in 
exchange for their specie. This Association knew, better than most, that the Union could 
not rely on foreign loans to finance the war. “The credit of the government had become 
impaired to such a degree,” remembered Moses Taylor, president of City Bank in New 
York, “that a large loan cold not be obtained in any ordinary fashion.”73  They alone had 
sufficient resources to help the country through this peril.  Yet the Secretary of the 
Treasury continued to parry their demands for more aggressive taxation, the acceptance 
of bank checks and notes instead of gold for the loan payments, and withdrawal of the 
US treasury notes.   
Further, Chase expressed some odd opinions. He refused to sell the Treasury 
notes and bonds at the “market price,” which at that time meant well below par, and this 
cut into the bankers’ profits.  Second, Chase kept saying curious things about “the 
people” of the United States sharing the benefits of the Union debt, rather than relying 
on the established system of allowing a small circle of elite financiers to market and 
profit from, the public debt. Finally, an upstart named Jay Cooke, who successfully 
pulled the state of Pennsylvania out of a fiscal crisis in 1858 by selling the state’s bonds 
directly to the public, rather than through established financial channels, seemed to have 
the secretary’s ear.  All this troubled the cabal of bankers, who liked to run the financial 
show.74   
The first $50 million installment of the loan arrived in the New York Subtreasury 
from late August through late September 1861.  After agreeing to Chase’s terms for this 
first payment, John Stevens, a member of the “Association,” told Chase in a post-dinner 
speech that, “you have now received that vast sum of $50 million.  We all earnestly hope 
this sum will be sufficient to end the war; should it not … you cannot depend on further 
aid.”75  However, the rapid pace of war expenditures, and the generous interest rates they 
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received convinced the bankers they could afford to lend the Treasury an even more 
“vast” sum of money. 
On October 1, they negotiated the second installment.  In exchange for another 
$50 million in specie, they received government bonds, paying a fair, if not generous 
interest rate above 7 percent at par.  All went well, so the third installment began 
arriving on November 15.  On December 7, the banks’ specie reserves “were actually 
stronger than in August when the first loan to the government was made,” noted Robert 
Sharkey.76  However, the banks’ ability to provide specie to the government depended 
on public confidence.  Banks sold many of the bonds obtained from the government to 
replenish their capital, but if no one purchased these bonds, or demanded more than the 
bankers had paid, this scheme would collapse, which it did in December 1861. 
 Chase’s Annual Report raised deep skepticism amongst investors who felt the 
Secretary had not pushed for enough tax revenue. The Trent Affair, first greeted as 
symbol of Union strength, soon became a source of deep concern.  The British believed 
(correctly) that the United States had violated international law by boarding their ship 
and removing diplomats.  The Lincoln Administration’s tepid response to their early 
protests pushed the British to consider declaring war against the Union government.  
British factories depended on southern cotton; from the beginning of the war, the British 
had refused to take sides, but many feared their economic dependence on King Cotton 
would induce them to support the Confederate cause. These events triggered a loss of 
confidence, in both the general population, and the investment community. Between 
December 7 – 28, New York banks lost $13 million of their specie reserve to depositors 
who wished to hoard their gold.  On December 28, banks in New York suspended their 
specie payments, and other banks soon followed.77 
The government needed money, so the secretary initiated a series of financial 
measures that dismantled the seventy years of fiscal federalism erected during the course 
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of the antebellum era.  in February 1862, Congress passed the Legal Tenders Act, 
creating a national currency.  The Treasury began issuing the “five-twenties,” bonds held 
for no less than 5 years, but no more than 20 at 6 percent interest.  When the initial sales 
fell short of expectation, Chase decided to experiment and sell bonds directly to the 
public.  He commissioned a number of agents for the task, but only one succeeded.  In 
October 1862, he hired Jay Cooke as the “special agent” to sell bonds to the general 
public, not solely through the traditional banking community. Cooke’s program of 
advertising through newspapers and circulars throughout the country revolutionized the 
financing of the war, and created a link of profit and patriotism between the government 
and citizens that had never existed before. Chase also laid the groundwork for the 
National Banking System. Established in 1863, the national banks would become a 
vehicle for distributing the new currency, and an outlet the purchase and sale of 
government bonds.  All these changes occurred within the course of a year.  
Concurrently, Congress moved to create a new revenue system.  The financial 
calamity Congress faced in January 1862 prompted them to adopt a more ambitious 
stance regarding taxation than the Treasury secretary recommended. They agreed to 
keep the direct tax in place, however Congress voted to delay the appointment of 
national assessors and collectors.  They continued to hope the states would provide the 
bulk of the funds through their own “machinery,” but the House also determined to 
launch a new tax program.  On January 15, they passed a resolution requesting the Ways 
and Means Committee to formulate a $150 million tax plan, tripling the amount 
requested by Chase.  Clement L Vallandigham called for a delay in pushing through the 
resolution so the committee members would have time to develop a more comprehensive 
proposal.  “Taxation, heavy taxation, but upon sound principle, and in the right way, can 
alone save us.”  What Vallandigham meant by the “right way” remained unclear, 
because the members rejected his call for postponement.78  The public debt had reached 
$300 million, with $100 million in payments due by the end of January. This action  
signaled to the financial community that Congress would secure their investment. Since 
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the war began, Congress had been in session for only two and a half months when they 
approved this resolution.  Already they had increased tariff duties twice, approved over 
$250 million in loans, and $80 million in taxes, with another $150 million to follow.  
That March, Justin S. Morrill, acting as spokesman for the Ways and Means 
Committee, opened the debate on House Resolution 312 (HR 312), the first 
comprehensive internal revenue measure in American history. Raised in a small town in 
Vermont, Morrill worked as a shop clerk during his teens, and later owned a number of 
shops, as well as a business that supplied goods to shopkeepers.  He sold his business in 
1848, dabbled in farming, and then decided to run as a Whig for office in 1854, winning 
a seat to the House of Representatives.  Because he never went to college, Morrill 
became interested in helping others obtain that privilege.  Education had remained the 
responsibility of state governments throughout the antebellum era, however Morrill 
believed that the federal government should help provide the opportunity for those who 
could not afford to attend college.  He wanted farmers and laborers to have exposure to 
the latest developments in these areas. Thus, he became best known to the public for his 
stewardship of the Morrill Land Grant Act, which led to the establishment of 70 public 
colleges and universities for teaching “agriculture and the mechanical arts.”79  
Although best known to the public for the Land Grant Act, Morrill distinguished 
himself amongst his colleagues as a master of public finances.  He served on both the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee during his 44 
years in Congress.  He wrote the Tariff of 1861, also known as the Morrill Tariff, that 
moved the United States away from taxing imports on an ad valorem basis, relying 
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instead on specific duties, a policy that has been employed since.80  Morrill also 
advocated protecting raw materials, from field, stable, and mines, instead of 
manufactured goods.  Thus he supported high import duties on iron, lumber, and farm 
products, particularly wool, which Vermont farmers raised.  Although a “protectionist,” 
Morrill’s form of protection had little to do with the industrial interests of the country, 
and focused more on keeping agricultural prices competitive. As Richard Hofstadter 
pointed out in 1938, the conflict in pre-Civil War tariff debates focused less on the 
sectional tensions between slave and free labor, instead pitted manufacturers, who 
wanted cheap raw materials to transform into goods, against farmers, who wanted to 
keep the price on their agricultural products competitive with imports.81 In this debate, 
Morrill sided with the farmers. 
Subsequently, the revenue program that Morrill helped design relied on taxing 
industry, and not raw materials. A general, three percent duty on manufacturers would 
provide the “largest item of revenue,” Morrill foresaw as he outlined the bill.  “A burden 
that would paralyze the agriculturalists of the country will be taken on the backs of the 
steam giants with alacrity and confidence,” he predicted.82  Inherent in this program 
remained the goal to “propose duties upon a large number of objects, rather than confine 
them to a narrow field.”83  Instead of laying taxes on a few articles, the Ways and Means 
Committee determined to make the taxes “diffuse.”84  Rather than a unique Republican 
ideology with regard to taxation, this program echoed the programs used by Sir Robert 
Walpole and William Pitt during the eighteenth century in England. 
When one considers the scope of this tax measure, it’s surprising that the debates 
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on the bill did not focus more on the expansion of government power inherent in the 
legislation.  Border state representatives raised this concern first by reviving the 
antebellum fears that expanded government power would inevitably lead to 
emancipation.  “Shall reserved rights be surrendered to a consolidated government,” 
asked William H. Wadsworth (U. KY).  “”I am here to resist this new and 
overshadowing danger, this tendency of the federal government to swallow up the 
powers reserved to the states and the people respectively.”85  Hiram Bingham countered 
that, “because certain madmen have taken up arms against the Republic,” that the 
Congress wishes to expand government power.  “The word centralization has no 
meaning in reference to American institutions … so long as we recognize the supremacy 
of the written Constitution.”86   
While the tax on manufacturers would produce the most revenue, “few taxable 
articles or forms of wealth were permitted to escape.”87  Relying on long recognized 
principles that “sin” taxes, on articles with inelastic demand, remained a bountiful source 
of revenue, the bill fixed a twenty cents per gallon against distilled spirits; beer, ale, malt 
liquors, and fermented liquors would pay one dollar a barrel. Graduated rates applied to 
different grades of tobacco and tobacco products (cigars, cigarettes, and chewing 
tobacco). Taxing luxuries also provided a bulwark.  The legislators drew up “Schedule 
A” upon which appeared the articles that had long been considered luxuries of the 
wealthy: carriages, yachts, billiard tables, watches, pianos, and gold or silver plate. 
People had to purchase licenses to auctioneers, butchers, jugglers, lawyers, peddlers, and 
soap makers.  All contracts, insurance policies, bank checks, wills, and loans now 
required a stamp for authorization. To insure that “men with large incomes pay more in 
proportion to what they have than those with limited means who live by the work of 
their own hands,” the bill included taxes on gross receipts of corporations, inheritance 
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and succession taxes, and a new income tax.88  “The committee have thought it best to 
propose duties upon a large number of objects rather than confine them to a narrow 
field,” Morrill explained.89 Albert S. White (R. IN) proclaimed, “this tax is to be the 
touchstone of our patriotism.  It is the price that we are to pay for being true and loyal to 
our country.”90  Thaddeus Stevens, Chair of the Ways and Means Committee articulated 
the broad principles in this tax plan:  
The [Ways and Means] committee have found it necessary to visit 
many articles which they would have gladly spared.  They have, however 
laid no burdens on those with small means … They have attempted to 
raise the largest sums from articles of luxury, and from the large profits of 
wealthy men … while the rich and thrifty will be obliged to contribute 
largely from the abundance of their means, we have the consolation to 
know that no burdens have been imposed on the industrious laborer and 
mechanic; that the food of the poor is untaxed; and that no one will be 
affected by the provisions of this bill whose living depends solely on his 
manual labor.91 
 
In sparing the “food of the poor,” agricultural products, especially farm produce, 
implements, “breadstuff and flour,” remained untouched by this bill.  So too, did the raw 
material used for production (iron and wool, in particular). Sparing these articles fit with 
Morrill’s ideal of “protecting” raw materials used for industry, and sparing farmers from 
the burden of taxation.  This also served the communities that both Morrill and his good 
friend “Thad” represented, a fact not lost on other congressmen during the debates.  The 
“economic interests” of these lawmakers did play a role, but not in the way the Beards 
suggested.  “Industrial capitalists” bore the largest portion of the taxes, while sparing the 
northern “agricultural interests. 
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Those who “Suck the Vitals of Society” 
By far, the “agricultural interests” of the country and rural residents fared much 
better under this tax program, than the “steam giants.”  The direct tax became 
increasingly ineffective, as Congress passed a series of resolutions to halt the collection 
of this tax.  They determined to rely instead on indirect taxes.  This shift left the land of 
farmers, as well as their produce, untouched by the taxman.  Agriculture still represented 
the largest segment of the economy, and farmers, by far, the largest portion of the 
population.  They had many representatives in the House.  A practical element guided 
this development as well.  Trying to tax agricultural products would require an extensive 
“machinery” of collection, with assessors patrolling the farmstead scattered all across the 
vast territory of the nation. Instead of taxing farmers specifically, the bill aimed to 
collect from the subsidiary economic activity of farmers, such as slaughterhouses, 
peddlers, and the clothing worn by farmers, through the tax on manufacturers. Further, 
collecting taxes at established businesses that had ease of access would require less 
effort than trying to assess and collect from farmers spread across the country.  Farmers 
paid an income “duty”, like others, if they recorded profits over $600, which few did.  
Senator William Pitt Fessenden expressed his frustration with this system: 
 
We are obliged to pay tax on our salaries and our income of any 
other description, and we pay it on the gross income, and are not 
permitted to take out the expenses of living. But a farmer as he goes along 
supports his family out of the produce of his farm from day to day and 
regards as his income only the surplus, that which he sells and puts in the 
shape of money … under this bill the farmer must inevitably be the best 
off, and he will escape easier than others, though as a general rule, he is 
abler to pay and more independent than any other class of men in the 
community.92 
 
Not all agricultural products remained untouched: corn (used for making distilled 
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liquors), tobacco, and cotton felt the taxman’s sting.93  Different products, including 
these, had their defenders as well.  In looking at the “economic interests” represented in 
this measure, one finds a mix. Responsible representation of the needs and interests of 
constituent often became conflated with base lobbying to protect narrower concerns and 
personal interests.  Although the Beards correctly identified the corruptibility of human 
weaknesses, they over emphasized the role of “industrial” interests in these debates.  The 
industrialists won some minor victories in framing the tax legislation, but they did not 
achieve the escape from taxes that they had desired.  The government collected more 
internal revenue from the tax on manufacturers than any other levy. 
“A swarm of lobbyists arrived to press their concerns on the congressmen, 
lamented John Law (D, IN) in March, 1862. He chided the Ways and Means Committee 
for not working on the tax bill more diligently during the recess, thus clearing from 
Congress, “the army who are now here besieging [us] from having …every conceivable 
description of article exempted from duty.”94  Delegations from the New York City 
Chamber of Commerce and the Boards of Trade from Boston and Philadelphia arrived to 
press their concerns “As many as fifty or sixty interested parties were milling about the 
door of the room occupied by the [Ways and Means Committee],” asking for tax relief 
for their various clients.95  
 Intensive lobbying of this nature had occurred at the state level throughout the 
antebellum era.96  At the national level, lobbyist descended on Congress during tariff 
debates, John Pincus noted that, “the pressure group successes” in tariff measures 
affected local concerns, more than national, even as these local industries tried to tie 
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their fortunes to the nation’s well being.97  State, governments, not the national 
government, provided funds for the mix of private and public development.  HR 312 
represented a tremendous shift in the concentration of public funds. Now the national 
government, not just the states, would have discretionary power over private goods and 
services.  The scale of this power shifted as well.  Before the Civil War, public officials 
never had more than tens of millions at their disposal.  Hence, Congress had at its 
disposal hundreds of millions.  While allocated to set public expenses, the change made 
a significant shift from the private economy to the public.  No one understood this better 
than the various industries and services whose prices and fees the national government 
would tap for revenue.  
During the debates on this bill, representatives did not focus as much on the 
constitutionality of the different provisions, but rather on trying to keep their constituents 
from carrying the tax burden. Charles A. Wickliffe (U. KY), who represented tobacco 
farmers who would soon pay heavy taxes, urged Congress to hit bankers, brokers and 
other money men, “who suck the vitals of society,” instead of the “planting interests.”98  
Often petty local concerns overwhelmed the national effort. On March 20, a prolonged 
debate occurred between James R. Morris, Harrison G. Blake, and John Hutchins, all 
Republicans from Ohio, over the merits of taxing different types of cheese.  Throughout 
the tax debates, lofty moral, ideological, and political issues mixed with base personal 
influence peddling.  Senator Charles Sumner, recovered from the caning he received 
from Preston Brooks on the floor of the Senate in 1856, emerged as one of the more 
forceful and eloquent spokesmen for emancipation, then freedman’s rights.  During the 
tax debates, he advocated placing a high “excise” tax on slaves, with the idea of forcing 
manumissions. Yet, he strongly opposed a moderate three cents per pound tax on cotton, 
which would have hit the same slaveholders he sought to punish in other ways, but also 
squeeze the textile manufacturers in his state.  Later, he can be found pleading to remove 
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the tax on paper, another product of Massachusetts’ mills.99  Historians (including me) 
love to quote Schuyler Colfax as he defends farmers and attacks capitalists as he called 
for the first income tax in HR 71. Yet Colfax also fought with equal vigor to have the tax 
removed from newspapers and the advertisements that finance them.  As a part owner in 
the South Bend Free Press, this tax cut directly into his profits.100  
Rested after the long recess, Roscoe Conkling returned to the Second Session, 
ready to defend his patronage castle once again.  Conkling persisted in his desire to have 
state officers collect the federal taxes, pressing the point the day after the debate opened 
on this bill.  New York alone would need 3600 revenue officers, Conkling insisted.  
Thomas D. Eliot (R. MA), John S. Phelps (R. CA), Samuel Shellabarger (R. OH), and 
George H. Pendleton (R. OH) all concurred that state officers, rather than the national 
government should collect these taxes.  “It is not the taxgather [citizens] hate so much as 
the taxes,” Thaddeus Stevens replied.  “How can we [collect the taxes] if we allow those 
who have caused this trouble to make the assessment.”   
Efforts to retain local control of assessments and collections failed, primarily 
because a Civil War raged, and legislators feared that they would never see revenue from 
the seceded states if they relied on local officials to collect tax from their fellow 
confederates.101  “It is indispensable that the government have within its own control the 
means of meeting its all its vast engagements, Morrill concurred.102  They could trust 
only federal tax officials, appointed by the president, to secure the payments from 
southerners. The economic interests of their constituents, as well as the personal interests 
of the lawmakers, played a role in developing this bill.  However, this represented less of 
a “breakdown in the old moral standards” than a shift in the theater of money politics, 
from the state houses to Congress. Efforts to spare their constituents from paying high 
taxes mingled with less legitimate concerns.  Leeches swarm to blood, and lobbyists 
flock to money.  Despite these competing forces, the bill passed the House and moved to 
                                                 
99 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., May 23, 1862, 2317; also 2400-2408. 
100 Curry, Blueprint for Modern America, 168. 
101 Debates on this matter, Ibid, March 13, 1862, 1217-1226; March 14, 1238-1242. 
102 Ibid, March 12, 1862, 1194. 
 211
the Senate. 
The Senate received of the bill on April 10, 1862, but did not start debating it 
until May 6.  The Finance Committee tinkered with the legislation causing the 
committee’s chair, William Pitt Fessenden, to “crack the whip” and move the measure 
onto the Senate floor.103  Regarding the “infernal tax bill,” Fessenden remarked in an 
April 25 letter that, “There is no time to make a new one, and all we can do is to patch 
this.  It will be odious.”104  The Senate began consideration of the bill on May 6. 
We have looked at the relationships in a federalist system between the states and 
the national government, and within the government between the executive and 
legislative branches.  This tax bill affords the opportunity to examine the balance of 
power between the House of Representatives and the Senate.  Clearly the authority to 
levy taxes lies with the House of Representatives, where “bills for raising revenue” 
originate.  However, the Senate may “propose or concur” on revenue measures.  Elected 
in general elections, House members, in theory, represented the interests of the people 
who elected them to office.  Senators, chosen by their state legislatures, often spoke for 
the broader interests of their state, not merely the concerns of one district.105  An 
individual Senator could exert more influence within his chamber than any individual 
congressmen (except in cases like Thaddeus Stevens, the “fearless leader in the 
House.”).106  The deliberations on HR 312 demonstrate this dichotomous relationship.   
First, the Senate tarried with the bill once it reached the floor.  The New York 
Times guessed that “speculators and monopolists” delayed the bill in an attempt to make 
their deals with different Senators.107  The New York Herald opined the abolitionist 
Senators want to delay the bill to punish the administration for their laxity on the slavery 
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question and ineffective management of the war.108  No clear answer comes forth, but 
the delay created frustration for other senators, whose tempers flared during the debates 
on this bill.   
The “economic interests” of the various states present themselves clearly during 
the Senate deliberations.  Senators from tobacco growing states disapproved of the tax 
on leaf tobacco.  John Sherman, representing corn farmers, spoke against the liquor 
excises made from his constituents’ corn.109  New Englanders opposed the 
manufacturing duties, and advocated replacing them with a broader income tax or a 
general sales tax.  However, all understood that they needed to introduce some form of 
taxation;  they just hoped to keep the taxman out of their states or districts.  The Senators 
did try to shift the burden of taxation from their state onto others 
The Senate sent the bill back to the House on June 9, with 315 amendments.  
Thaddeus Stevens tried to get the Senate’s amendments dropped by having the House 
declare that they did not concur with the changes.  This attempt failed.  A conference 
committee met, with both House and Senate members, and worked through the 
amendments. The Senate withdrew 16, and saw 253 of their amendments pass from the 
committee. 
 
The Income Duty 
 The Senate had the greatest impact on the income tax portion of the bill.  Debates 
on the income tax focused less on the merits or legitimacy of an income tax, and more 
on the particulars of collecting the tax. No more “stickling” about whether the income 
tax represented a constitutional form of taxation.  Once the Congress had decided to levy 
it as an indirect tax, this concern did not arise again until after the war.  Lawmakers saw 
people “employed on a fixed income” as the main targets for this tax.  Justin S. Morrill 
described the tax as the “least defensible” and most “inquisitorial” portion of the bill, but 
                                                 
108 Quoted in Curry, Blueprint for Modern America, 172 
109 Henderson and Wilson from Missouri, Powell, Kentucky.  Senators from Virginia, 
Maryland, Missouri, and Connecticut supported this effort. Curry, Blueprint for Modern 
America, 173. 
 213
the need for more revenue trumped these worries.  He understood that this represented a 
bountiful form of taxation.  “Ought not men with large incomes pay more in proportion 
to what they have then those with limited means?” he asked.110   Whether that tax would 
count “gross” or “net” income emerged as the first point of concern.  Thaddeus Stevens 
explained that they meant “net” income, but if they included that word in the bill. It 
would open the door to a multitude of frauds. 
Fessenden advocated making the income “duty” graduated.  A three percent tax 
applied to incomes up to $10,000; anyone with an income over $10,000 paid a five 
percent tax, starting June 30, 1863. The Senate also recommended lowering the 
exemption to $600.  Provisions agreed to by both chambers included taxing American 
citizens residing abroad five percent tax on all income derived from property held in the 
United States.111  In a nod to the federalist system, those paying the income duty could 
deduct state and local taxes. Corporations paid taxes on their gross receipts, and railroads 
withheld for the tax collector three percent of the interest payments they made to those 
who held their bonds.  Government employees in “civil, military, or naval services” had 
the income tax withheld from their paycheck, another extraordinary change in the 
relationship of the government to individual citizens. “Tapping revenue at the source,” a 
practiced from the British mode of collecting income taxes, did not apply to those 
employed in the private sector, leading Smith to conclude that, “after the depreciation of 
the greenbacks” government employees “found the tax more burdensome than most 
other people.”112  To assess the tax, the payer provided a report of his income, and then 
swore an oath on the accuracy of the statement.  Self-assessment became the basis for 
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determining the amount of the tax. This mode of self-reporting allowed for more fraud, 
but it also made the tax less “inquisitorial” and more acceptable to the public.113 
President Lincoln signed the tax bill into law on July 1, 1862.  George Boutwell, 
former governor of Massachusetts, became the first Revenue Commissioner on July 17, 
1862.  His ran a small operation initially, working with three clerks the first year to 
count the taxes.  Although Boutwell considered HR 312 was “incomplete in parts” and 
an “imperfect plan,” however the best one could expect “under the circumstances” 114 
The returns disappointed.  Morrill had estimated the tax bill would generate $101 the 
first year; Chase, after hiring some “practical men” to review the measure, guessed $85 
million. However, the taxes generated only $37.6 million.  The shortfall, Dewey noted, 
“was largely due to the unsettled conditions of business as well as to the necessity of 
establishing at short notice an entirely new branch of treasury administration for the 
collection of duties.”115   
No infrastructure existed to handle the taxes.  The revenue districts followed the 
same outline as congressional districts.  For this reason, Congressmen and Senators 
played a role in recommending individuals for these posts.  Since the Democratic Party 
retained power through most of the antebellum era, “the long exclusion from power” of 
the Republicans “keenly whetted the Republican appetite for place and office.” Daily, 
Secretary Chase faced “throngs” of applicants daily who hoped to fill these new 
positions. Controlling this patronage further exacerbated the divisions within the 
administration, not only between members of the executive branch, but between the 
different Cabinet secretaries and members of Congress. Secretaries Chase and Seward 
fought over patronage positions in New York, a situation that eventually led to Chase’s 
resignation in June 1864.  Members of Congress competed with the administration over 
the positions within their district and state.  Schuckers related a meeting that took place 
between Secretary Seward, Senators Preston King and Ira Harris, and President Lincoln, 
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in which Seward “embarrassed” the Senators by presenting the president with a list of 
candidates for different patronage opportunities in New York that differed with their 
recommendations.116 
The mounting debt became the concern of all lawmakers. Secretary Chase, 
admitting that the “vast expenditure” necessitated by the war caused “fear in his mind,” 
admitted in a February 1864 letter, that “I am anxious to have them provide for at least 
one-half of our whole expenses that way.” 117 However, he and Congress still remained 
at odds over how best to accomplish this.  Chase wanted “the largest possible proportion 
of expenditure [to] be provided by direct contributions from the property and incomes of 
the people.”118   However, it became clear to the lawmakers that excise taxes, which 
played a significant, although secondary role in HR 312, would provide the “key to the 
fiscal cupboard.”  They knew from the experience of the British that a high tax on 
distilled spirits could produce more revenue than under the current statutes.  Joseph J. 
Lewis, Commissioner of Internal Revenue lamented that the British liquor taxes raised 
20 percent of their revenue, while those in the United States less than ten percent.119 
“England taxes spirits enormously, but has her drunkards still,”120 Morrill noted during 
the earlier debates on the revenue bills.  
Thus Congress targeted the taxes on alcohol with particular zeal. They retained 
the idea of keeping taxes diffuse, but determined to target selected articles, particularly 
those that corrupt the “morals of the community.”121  They passed another revenue law, 
HR 405, in March 1864 that raised the tax on distilled spirits from twenty to sixty cents a 
gallon.  But as the debt grew, they determined to enact a more comprehensive bill. The 
result, HR 405, enacted in June, 1864, built upon the foundation of HR 312, but 
increased duties on most articles. The tax on distilled spirits rose again to $1.50 per 
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gallon. Licenses to sell all types of liquor increased.  Tobacco also took a hit.  They 
doubled the tax on smoking tobacco, and increased the rate on leaf (unmanufactured) 
tobacco.  The cigar duty soared from $3.50 to $40.00 per 1,000.  
The 1864 debate on the liquor tax focused on whether or not to tax liquor “on 
hand” that distillers had produced and warehoused in anticipation of a tax increase.  
Fernando Wood (D. NY) insinuated that “unseemly influences” had lobbied Congress in 
order to shield the liquor on hand from the tax.122  The New York Herald Tribune made a 
more explicitly charged that one “mercantile house” in New York had paid “certain 
parties operating in Washington” $72,000 to keep the tax off whiskey on hand.  “Judge 
then what must have been paid in all.”  In 1868, when the “Whiskey scandal was 
revealed, The New York Times lamented that “this was the beginning of the fearful 
corruption and demoralization” that engulfed public officials after the war.123  
The most productive tax thus far, the general duty on manufactured products, 
also increased from three to five percent.  Again they raised the income tax, to five 
percent on incomes between $600-$5000; seven and one-half percent for incomes 
ranging from $5,000-$10,000; and ten percent for those over $10,000 per year.  The top 
rate doubled the income tax duty from the earlier bill. In addition to this increase, 
Congress enacted a special income tax in October 1864 that went directly to paying 
bounties for soldiers who re-enlisted, or volunteered.  This one time tax charged a rate of 
five percent on all incomes over $600.  This became the first direct transfer of income 
from one class in society to another.124 William Pitt Fessenden, appointed Treasury 
secretary after Chase’s resignation, advocated in his only report as Secretary of the 
Treasury, a further increase in income taxes by removing all exemptions.  “In a young 
and growing country the vast majority of incomes are small while all participate alike in 
the blessings of good government.”125 
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 Although the general manufacturing tax remained the most productive through 
the course of the war, the shift towards excise taxes on selected goods began.  
Considered luxuries, or at the least, non-necessities, they represented a fair tax, one that 
the taxpayer could avoid by not choosing to drink or smoke.  When John Sherman 
complained that his corn raising constituents paid the “heaviest tax in this bill (HR 312)” 
through the levy on distilled liquors, Fessenden snapped right back, “That is a tax only 
on those who drink liquor.”126   This remained a fundamental idea in American taxation 
since the Constitutional Convention: that taxes laid on consumption, particularly on 
items deemed “luxuries,” fell only on those who chose to purchase the good. When the 
base for taxation had to expand, Congress concentrated the “diffuse” taxes on 
manufacturers that spread the burden of taxation through the broad range of goods 
produced on these goods.  This attempted to bear upon the profits of the steam giants, 
and spread the incidence through most sectors of the economy.  Rather than regressive 
taxes, laid upon the “politically mute consumer who shouldered the tax burden,”127 the 
Republicans laid taxes that on manufacturers and wealth first, in the form of the 
manufacturing duty, income, legacy, and corporate taxes. Second, they targeted excises 
taxes on, historically, the most productive sources of revenue that also proved to the 
destructive to the health and morals of society.  
 
The General Sales Tax  
 I have argued throughout this chapter that the war congresses enacted revenue 
legislation out of necessity, rather than choice.  To assess fully where volition ends and 
obligation begins, one must look not only at what measures the Congress passed into 
law, but those they did not.  The proposal to introduce a general sales tax provides such a 
test.  In writing both HR 312 and HR 405, legislators considered incorporating a sales 
tax to shift the burden of both the income tax and the tax on manufactured goods more 
directly to consumers.  The sales tax would have placed a national ad valorem duty on 
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sales, with rates of one percent (recommended in 1862) to one and a half percent (1864). 
Advocated most strenuously by representatives from manufacturing states, and those 
with the highest contribution to the income tax, the sales tax would have lightened the 
duty on the manufacturers and instead placed it consumers as they purchased the 
finished goods. 
 Without doubt, manufacturers would have escaped from fronting the brunt of the 
Civil War internal taxes if the proposed amendments passed.  While benefiting larger, 
vertically integrated enterprises, that handle distribution and sales without middlemen or 
jobbers, the tax would hurt smaller distributors, and those located in rural areas, 
particularly in the West, who generally purchased goods from intermediaries.  These 
middlemen remained the “most important men in the economy,” according to Livesay 
and Porter.  They not only sold goods, but provided capital and credit to both their 
suppliers and customers and helped spur regional development, and “served as the 
primary economic integrators” for the developing western and rural communities.128  In 
rural areas, they provided the “simplest and most pleasant banking operations” for local 
farmers.129 The merchant’s centrality to the economy waned slightly in the pre-war 
years, as railroads facilitated the distribution of goods from producers to market without 
intermediaries.  The introduction of the greenbacks, which moved businesses off the 
“credit treadmill” and onto a cash only basis, played a significant role in the decline of 
mercantile influence, and the rise of corporate power, during the late nineteenth 
century.130 
Instituting a national sales tax would have expedited this process.   This tax, as 
Congressman James E. English noted, represented “a great national measure intended to 
affect all the interests of the country.”131  It would swiftly help create a more national 
                                                 
128 Glenn Porter and Harold C. Livesay, Merchants and Manufacturers: Studies in the 
Changing Structure of Nineteenth-Century Marketing (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 
1989), 8. 
129 Lewis E. Atherton, “The Services of the Frontier Merchant,” Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, 24 (September, 1937), 160 
130 Porter and Livesay, Merchants and Manufacturers, 126. 
131 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd sess., March 27, 1862, 1404. 
 219
economy by tying the government into transactions, large and small, throughout the 
nation.  Government official would scrutinize all sales, thus extending its reach into the 
economic process, a “goal” of the Republicans, according to Arthur M. Lee.132  The 
incidence of a national sales tax, Otto van Mering noted, “is widely distributed,” but then 
“rights itself over time.”  Prices increase, especially on goods with high, inelastic 
demand.133 
The Boards of Trade in both Boston and Philadelphia called upon Congress to 
pass this legislation.134 On March 27, 1862, William P. Sheffield (R. RI) offered an 
amendment to HR 312, seeking a one percent tax on the sales of “goods, wares, 
merchandise, property, and estates.” Although his initial amendment excluded “sales to 
jobbers or middlemen” he later stated that he wanted “all sales” to fall under this tax.  
Sheffield said that he offered the amendment to place both the receipts of “the poor 
woman who sells a pig” which could pay a tax if the profit rose over the income tax 
exemption, and the “man who receives $1 million in profits” on the tax roll.135  
However, he soon dropped this populist pretext.  “I [want] my constituents to be relieved 
from an undue proportion of [war taxes],” he proclaimed. “As (HR 312) now stands, it 
makes the workshops of New England pay one fourth of the tax.  That sir, is unjust.”  
Rather than a concern about the poor woman and her pig, he offered the sales tax as a 
relief for the manufacturing duty.136   
A brief, but telling debate ensued.  New England representatives, James E. 
English, Samuel Hooper, and Alexander H. Rice, spoke in favor of the tax.  “Instead of 
singling out manufacturing interests of the country,” Rice complained, “it would be 
equally just and equally wise,” to spread the tax more fairly, especially on “articles 
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furnished by nature.”  Hooper suggested that the tax on manufacturers would act as “a 
duty on consumers,” so the sales tax would not represent a significant change from the 
current bill.  Valentine B. Horton objected because the sales tax represented a measure 
that required “a new principle” and “new machinery.” William Kellogg (R. IL) added, 
“There ought to be some justice and some far distribution,” of the tax burden,  “so that it 
shall reach the capital of the country as well as individuals.” He protested replacing the 
sales tax with one that the “consumer” would bear through the “actual necessaries of 
life.”  Sheffield then withdrew his amendment, stating, “My object has been 
accomplished.”137  Although HR 312 did not incorporate a general sales tax, Congress 
did adopt taxes on selected sales including, auctions, real estate, and securities (stocks 
and bonds) sales. 
The idea of a national sales tax did not surface again until 1865. When the 
Finance Report of 1864 projected a $35 million shortfall between receipts and 
expenditures, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Joseph L. Lewis, advocated 
implementing a general sales tax. Lewis stated in his report that, 
I can find [no other tax] which promises such a large yield of 
revenue, with so little disturbance to trade, and so slight a pressure on the 
tax payer … I am clearly of the opinion that the tax on sales … is greatly 
preferable to a supplementary duty on incomes [or] a direct tax.138 
  
The Ways and Means Committee instead suggested raising the tax on 
manufacturers again, to reach an average duty of five percent.  George Boutwell (R. 
MA) countered by reviving the idea for a general sales tax. William P. Sheffield (U. RI) 
first introduced the sales tax as a means for taxing rich and poor alike.  Boutwell, on the 
other hand, made no effort to hide his intentions with the tax. On the evening of 
February 17, 1865, he proposed adding a one and a half percent sales tax in place of an 
increase in the manufacturers duty.  The debate on the amendment began the next day. 
“When you analyze this system of taxation, whether on incomes, manufacturers, or 
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sales, the producers and consumers of the country pay the tax.”  Since the consumers 
represent “a larger class,” Boutwell continued, "the tax should fall on them."139  Whereas 
manufacturing interests advocated the sales tax in 1862, representatives wishing to 
relieve their constituents from the income tax became part of the debate in 1865.  
As with the debate in 1862, this became a contest between eastern and western 
interests, as well as urban against rural representatives. Sixty-seven percent of the 
western representatives opposed this tax.  California representatives William Higby and 
Thomas B. Shannon favored it, in hopes of relieving the tax on domestically produced 
wine.  “A tax on sales,” James A. Garfield (R. OH) protested, “is a tax on all necessaries 
of life.”  Garfield also showed concern for enlarging the government’s reach into the 
economy through this tax.  “[The sales tax] would put property in a place where 
government can lay hands upon it in bulk.”140 Although recognized in the 1862 
deliberations that this measure would increase the role of the federal government in the 
economy, representatives showed far more concern about this issue in 1865. William A. 
Allison (R. IA) also worried about augmenting federal power through this tax. “It would 
be a radical change in our system of raising revenue and would require the presence of 
the tax gatherer and collector in every district and hamlet in the country,” to secure the 
revenue from a sales tax.141   
Rather than a sectional split, the interests in this legislation fell more towards 
rural against urban representatives. Fernando Wood (D. NY) former mayor of New York 
city, whom Joel H. Silbey described as one of the Democrats who feared “the impact the 
war was having on the country,” and “the centralization of power” incumbent in the war 
legislation, nevertheless did not see this augmentation of national taxing power as a part 
of this feared revolution.142  Wood supported this measure. “If you tax sales it does not 
necessarily follow that the tax imposed runs into the consumption of the articles and the 
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consumer finally pays it,” he offered.143  Rufus P. Spalding (R. OH) said he supported 
the sales tax because “the shoddy contractors” and “men who buy houses … would feel 
the tax.”144  John A. Griswold (R. NY), hoping to relieve his state from the 
disproportionate national share of the income tax, supported the sales tax, while 
complaining that “no mode of taxation is more unjust and unequal” than the income 
tax.145 
Robert D. “Pig Iron” Kelley, the outspoken defender of Pennsylvania iron also 
favored replacing the taxes on iron and iron products with a sales tax. Protectionists 
general eliminating or reducing other taxes to increase the dependence on tariff revenue. 
All the Massachusetts representatives, except Samuel Hooper  (R. MA), who had a 
change of heart on this issue, voted for the tax, hoping to relieve the textile concerns in 
their state. Hooper noted that it hurt those in rural area who “have to pay the tax many 
times over on flour and groceries.”146  William Allison (R. IA) noted that another special 
interest would benefit from the sales tax.  “I am not surprised that gentlemen 
representing constituencies in New England” and other great cities in eastern states are 
in favor of this tax upon sales … the tax will consolidate trade in those large cities and 
break down the smaller traders throughout the country.”147 The amendment failed on 
February 18, 1865. 
Justin S. Morrill emerged as the primary opponent to incorporating a national 
sales tax into the revenue bills, both in 1862 and 1865. As a former merchant and 
storeowner in a small Vermont town, Morrill, more than any other participant in the 
sales tax debate, understood the mechanisms needed to collect the tax, and the effect it 
would have on small businesses.  He did not wish to see the augmentation of federal 
power inherent in this tax.  “Inspectors and collectors,” Morrill warned, “would have to 
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run down every transaction in the country.”148  Small-scale retailers, who would have to 
pay the tax to acquire items, than charge it again upon the sale, would face price 
competition, and eventually elimination, from larger distributors with national reach. 
Manufacturers and importers would undercut these merchants, and replace their 
businesses.  Merchants did not keep detailed books that would allow the efficient 
collection of this tax.  Finally, many “sales” still occurred without money, as a form of 
barter.149  How would a revenue officer determine the appropriate tax in these situations, 
Morrill wondered.  
Applying some of the lessons of brief debate for an unsuccessful tax, we find that 
congressmen represented the interests of their constituents.  Republicans from 
manufacturing districts favored the legislation.  Both Republicans and Democrats from 
rural areas opposed the legislation. Although Democrats voted overwhelmingly against 
this measure, urban Democrats favored it.  New Yorkers in particular, supported the 
measure as a substitute for the income and other progressive taxes that hit their 
constituents disproportionately. Thus constituent interests, some of whom were also 
strong economic interests in the district, played a key role in this vote.  The sales tax 
would have facilitated the Republicans supposed goal of “bolster[ing] a new national 
system,”150 both by concentrating the power within the economy, and extending the 
governments reach into the daily transactions.  While acknowledged and understood that 
this would eventuate with the introduction of the sales tax, the proposal did not pass.  
The broader contention that “industrial capitalism was now in control of the state” 
cannot be supported by this episode.151  The sales tax clearly would have shifted the 
burden of taxation from the “steam giants” and “capitalists” and spread it on the 
citizenry.  This did not happen.  Also the generalization that the Union tax system 
constructed the “most coercive civilian agency in the national government” needs 
                                                 
148 Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd session, February 17, 1865, 878. 
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 224
moderation.  Implementing the sales tax would have necessitated a larger, more coercive 
force of collectors, a fact recognized then rejected during the debates.152  Morrill had the 
final word on this issue:    
The vast amount of sales of the country are purely and simply on 
the necessaries of life; you are therefore proposing to tax the poor man 
with a large family … the very men that we have exempted from license 
[fees], the very men that we have exempted from the income tax, will not 
escape this tax.153 
 
 The effort to shield the “poor man with a large family” defeated the 
corporate interests on this measure. 
 
Conclusion 
The economic legislation drafted during the war represents a series of 
capitulations, rather than a drive to create a new hegemony Justin S. Morrill voted 
against the first issue of Greenbacks in February, 1862, but acquiesced eleven months 
later, acknowledging that, “I am constrained to give my vote for this measure now 
because I know . . . the Treasury demands instant relief . . . it is not my will that consents 
but the poverty of the Treasury that compels me to follow the only path left open.”.154  
As James G. Blaine noted in his memoirs: 
 We are so familiar with the vast sums which the war against the 
Rebellion caused the National Government to disburse, that it is difficult 
to appreciate the spirit with which the legislators of 1861 approached the 
impending burdens.  They knew that their task was great.  They were in 
imminent peril, not only from open hostility, but also from doubt and 
fear.  The resources of the Republic had not been measured  . . . The 
needs of each crisis were supplied as each arose.  Congress did not try to 
look far into the future.  It exerted itself to give daily bread to the armies 
of the Union, to provide munitions of war, to build and equip the navy.155  
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 In the early months of the American Civil War, when the need to establish a 
system of internal taxation became apparent, lawmakers looked to the English precedent.  
First, taxes were not levied to “pay for the war,” rather they were enacted to guarantee 
payments on the interest rates for war loans. Only after lawmakers realized that the war 
would continue longer and costs more than anyone predicted did the construct this new 
system.  Steady tax revenues assured lenders that the interest on the bonds they 
purchased would be paid regularly, allowing officials to negotiate lower interest rates. 
“[In England] tax revenue was used to reinforce the system of public credit.  Tax 
revenue ensured that government had a secure and regular flow of income which it could 
use to maintain its credit and meet its interest payments,” explained H. V. Bowen.156  
Salmon P. Chase chose this approach for financing the American Civil War.  “Public 
credit can only be supported by public faith, and public faith can only be maintained by 
an economical, energetic, and prudent administration and by prompt and punctual 
fulfillment of every public obligation,” he stated in his first report to Congress.157  The 
per capita expense of the Civil War actually continued to increase after the surrender at 
Appomattox, as the debt accumulated and lawmakers used tax revenue to continue 
interest payments and retire the principal. 
 
                                                 
156 H. V. Bowen, War and British Society, 1688-1815 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
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157 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, July 4, 1861, 6. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE “MOST BURDENED OF THEM ALL” 
  
 The fate of the war, and the Republican administration that guided the Union’s 
strategy, remained uncertain through the summer of 1863.  The Confederate Army had 
managed to defend itself well and repelled or outmaneuvered Union advances. President 
Lincoln appointed one general after another to lead the military effort and each 
floundered.  The war cost more than anyone’s most extravagant estimates. The Treasury 
struggled to keep pace with the mounting expenses. “McClellan is a dear luxury,” Chase 
complained in his diaries during the winter of 1862. “Fifty days, fifty miles, fifty 
millions of dollars – easy arithmetic, but not satisfactory.”1   
Congress had passed the first Legal Tenders bill in February 1862, creating, for 
the first time, a national fiat currency.  Introducing the “greenbacks” had further widened 
the economic fissures within the Republican Party.  Close colleagues and good friends, 
such as Thaddeus Stevens and Justin S. Morrill, differed forcefully on this legislation.  
Stevens supported printing the greenbacks, while Morrill remained convinced they 
augured financial chaos for the country.2   
These differences continued through the post-war period. Although a divisive 
issue throughout Reconstruction, during the war the greenbacks gave the Treasury what 
it needed most, “purchasing power.”3  Congress declared that the greenbacks represented 
“lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private.” The 
Treasury still needed gold, so importers paid their tariffs in coin, not paper. As the 
London Economist noted, the Treasury still needed a steady source of specie to pay 
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interest to investors.  Customs revenue provided “the only source, by the way, on which 
it [the US] relied for gold to pay the interest of the gold-interest-bearing loan.”4 
Investors watched these policies with care and caution. This infusion of freshly printed 
cash permitted Chase to pay some of his bills, which he could not do otherwise.  Thus by 
July 1, 1862, “Not a single requisition from any department upon the Treasury remained 
unanswered.  Every audited and settled claim and every quartermaster’s check for 
supplies … had been met, he reported with relief.”5 
The balance Chase achieved in the Treasury quickly ran red again. The expenses 
of the war had reached over $1 million per day, and receipts from customs and the five-
twenty bond sales amounted to only $380,000 daily.6 By the end of July 1862, only 
weeks after meeting his obligations, the government owed Union soldiers and defense 
contractors over $36 million in back pay.7 At Chase’s urging the government printed a 
second batch of greenbacks bringing the total circulation to $300 million before the end 
of the summer. Prices began to rise, although wages did not, and the sale of bonds, a 
barometer of faith in the nation’s future, flagged. “It was on the passage of arms that the 
confidence of the people in their government actually depended,” Robert Sharkey noted.  
“The greenbacks were issued on the credit of the nation, and it was victory or defeat that 
determined the standing of that credit.”8  Not until the summer of 1863, after the victory 
at Gettysburg, did the Union army inspire much faith.   
This volatility in the state of the nation’s finances explains, in part, the haphazard 
manner in which Congress addressed the challenge of raising revenue.  HR 312 became 
the single largest, and most novel, revenue measure passed by Congress. The 
government had never laid such a broad duty upon industry, taxing every step of the 
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manufacturing process. Originally, legislators had hoped this bill would suffice, but the 
continued demands of the war necessitated an even more comprehensive tax net thrown 
upon the nation.  Although Chase and Morrill held high expectations for HR 312, the 
returns disappointed.  The first year in effect, the measure generated only $41 million in 
revenue, less than half what the lawmakers had hoped.  Not until fiscal year 1864 did the 
revenue laws begin meeting the needs and expectations of the Republican leaders.9   
The lawmakers feared that the fiscal demands of the war would overburden, and 
eventually collapse, the effort to reunite the nation. The relief Chase felt that July after 
paying his bills quickly dissipated.  “Expenses are enormous, increasing instead of 
diminishing,” wrote an anguished Secretary Chase in September 1862.  “It is a bad state 
of things; but neither the President, his counselors, nor his commanding generals seem to 
care.  They rush on from expense to expense and from defeat to defeat, heedless of the 
abyss of bankruptcy and ruin which yawns before us.”10  Soon after Chase penned these 
concerns in his diary, the London Economist predicted in October 1862 that, “the 
independence of the southern states was as certain as any future event could be.”11 
Studies of the Civil War finances have overlooked two key elements that drove 
the Republican decisions.  First, the vulnerability of the nation continued as a persistent 
concern.  Would the Union actually win the Civil War?  Although patriotism ran high, 
and the war rhetoric continued to call for defeat of the South, the expanding debt, and 
devices implemented during the war to keep pace of the expenses worried legislators. 
“Everyday’s delay in the passage of this bill (HR 405), Morrill fretted on June 16, 1864, 
“costs the government at least half a million dollars.”12  As the war continued, it became 
clear that the Union could not afford the expense. 
Second, because the Republicans held such a commanding political position in 
the government throughout the Civil War, and early years of Reconstruction, the 
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political uncertainty of the party remains an unnoted factor in their decisions.  In the 
congressional elections of 1862, the Republican Party suffered losses nationally. 
Democrats gained 35 congressional seats, and many gubernatorial victories. Republicans 
lost support in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Connecticut, and Maine .13  Harper’s Weekly attributed the “recent Democratic 
victories” to “general dissatisfaction with the results of the war.”14  Although the 
Republicans controlled the Executive and Legislative branches, they remained a party 
that continually looked over its shoulder, checking the political winds.   
The blood drawn from the nation left the citizenry wary and impatient.  John 
Sherman recorded another source of public discontent.  During the summer of 1862, 
President Abraham Lincoln had prepared the initial draft of the Emancipation 
Proclamation, “without consultation with, or knowledge of the cabinet.”  His advisers 
urged him to wait until after the election to affect the policy, which he did.  However the 
public greeted the news of the pending action “with coldness and silence,” according to 
Sherman. “The effect of this proclamation upon the pending elections in Ohio was very 
injurious,” he related.15 
In retrospect, the defeat of the Confederacy in 1865 seems inevitable, but the 
men directing the effort worried not only about the fate of the nation, but for their 
political fortunes as well. James Bryce, another astute European observer who marveled 
at the American political system noted that, “the essential feature of the [party] system,” 
in the Untied States, “is that it is from bottom to top strictly representative.  This is 
because it has power, and power can flow only from the people.”16  Throughout the 
course of the war, the people remained restless.   
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The Republican Party’s governance during the Civil War remained a true 
anomaly. Elected in 1860 as a minority party that won only 39 percent of the national 
vote, they nevertheless entered office with complete control. The departure of the 
representatives and senators from the seceded states gave this fragile coalition party 
unprecedented authority over the national government. Only in the Judiciary, where 
career Democrat Roger B. Taney still presided as Chief Justice, did the opposition retain 
influence in a branch of government.  Muted by the public outcry against the 1857 Dred 
Scott decision, this one voice of official opposition did not resonate.  President Lincoln’s 
effort to forge a coalition government extended beyond his party, when he selected 
Democrat Andrew Johnson as his running mate in 1864.  Not only did this signal his 
desire for a rapid end to partisan and political strife after the war, but gave, he hoped, a 
stronger political base to his party for the election.  Choosing a War Democrat for Vice 
President would help convince other northern Democrats to vote Republican (or Union, 
a label the party created during the campaign.)17 
Despite the Republican Party’s continued weakness in the polls, the war 
compelled them to act against the public weal. Emancipation did not have broad public 
support, yet President Lincoln released the Emancipation Proclamation in January 1863.  
Issuing the greenbacks provided another example of governing against public opinion.  
After the war, when greenbacks became inculcated into the economy, the new currency 
achieved great popularity, and became the “money of the people.”18  However, during 
the war, greenbacks exacerbated some of the financial difficulties of ordinary Americans 
because they produced rapid inflation, and the flight of specie.  
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The tax measures passed during the war also worried the lawmakers’ and raised 
fears about the public compliance. The United States government had not levied taxes 
since the War of 1812, and the political leaders feared inciting public outrage by 
imposing a heavy tax burden. They remained uneasy about enacting taxes throughout the 
course of the war. After the first disastrous defeat at Bull Run, in August 1861, Chase 
opined in a letter to John C. Fremont that, “there is great danger that, after a month or 
two the people in view of the magnitude of the burdens it [the war] is likely to entail, 
will refuse their support.”19  As late as April, 1864 Gideon Welles recorded in his diary 
that,  “Congress is laboring on the tax bill.  The members fear to do their duty because 
taxation is so unpopular. An old infirmity. Chase has not pressed for it heretofore for the 
same reason.”20 
We know now that the public willingly accepted this new burden, but the 
lawmakers had no way of knowing if how far they could reach into the pockets of the 
loyal citizens.  Taxes roused public discontent in the past, and the amounts levied during 
the Civil War far exceeded any amount requested by a Congress.  Senator William Pitt 
Fessenden warned in 1862 that the “general opinion of the people in all sections of the 
country,” would find the tax bill “odious” and “offensive.” Citizens will not like “this 
going into people’s houses to know whether they had pianos, or going in their yards to 
find whether they had a carriage.”21  
Popular unrest did occur during the Civil War. Riots broke out in Wisconsin, 
Detroit, Chicago, and Rutland, Vermont between the summers of 1862-1863, precisely 
when the first revenue measure took effect.  The most violent demonstration of public 
frustration occurred in New York in July 1863, when a four day Draft Riot broke out, 
leaving 105 people dead.  The periodic outbursts of violence “can be viewed as a direct 
consequence of specific wartime tensions.”  Thus, officials never knew when they might 
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go too far in taxing citizens, and set up the next riot.22  Anger against the Conscription 
Laws, passed in 1862 and 1863, which imposed the draft for the first time in United 
States, provoked these outbursts of popular anger.  But Republicans also feared that 
exorbitant taxes could further exacerbate the public fury.  Chase noted in his 1863 
Annual Report, written the fall after the New York draft riots, “I can see clearly that we 
go no further without heavy taxation” and “heavy taxes will excite discontent.”23 
Few “tax riots” have occurred in American history.  The “major categories of 
collective violence” that convulsed civic society before the Civil War, include “anti-
immigrant, religious, anti-abolitionist, and anti-black” or other race riots.24  The 
Whiskey and Fries Rebellion remain notable, in part because they represent anomalies. 
The “theme” that “resistance to new or rising taxes … has punctuated American history 
from the very beginning,” continues as a great American myth, Anthony Joseph 
argued.25 Because tax collection, and the expenditure of public revenue, remained a 
function of state and local governments, “the criterion of representative consent seemed 
largely satisfied.”  Indeed, Joseph found that Americans most often described themselves 
as “cheerful taxpayers” throughout the Early Republic and Antebellum eras.26 
Yet, the Civil War revenue measures broke this “cheerful” system of fiscal 
federalism.  The need to meet the expanding costs of the war forced the Republicans to 
develop tax programs that, according to Revenue Commissioner David A. Wells, 
resembled an “Irishman on his visit to the Donnybrook fair; ‘Whenever you see a head, 
hit it.’ Whenever you find an article, a product, a trade, a profession or a source of 
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income, tax it!”27  The national government joined the state and local governments as an 
agent for collecting the multitudinous taxes.  They feared they would face an adverse 
public reaction if they pushed too hard for revenue.   “You must remember,” Senator 
William Pitt Fessenden (R, ME) wrote to his friend James S. Pike (R. NH) in 1864, “that 
it takes time to find out how much a people can bear, and in what way best to impose the 
burden.”28 
 “Asserting nationalism became [the] most distinguishing feature” of the 
“economic policy developed by Republican leaders,” Arthur Lee suggested.29  Yet, the 
Republican lawmakers approached this leap into national taxation cautiously, and with 
little enthusiasm.  “The unwillingness to create friction and opposition,” James G. Blaine 
noted, “entered into the considerations which determined the [revenue] 
recommendations of the Secretary.”30  Historians too often overlook this reluctance to 
impose national taxes because of the many calls that arose across the country for a 
systematic revenue system that would alleviate the long-term expenses of the conflict. 
The public understood that they would have to pay the war costs, either during 
the conflict through taxes, or as a heavier toll later through long-term interest payments. 
The New York Tribune predicted in December 1861 that loyal citizens will “cheerfully 
submit” to a system of taxation to prosecute the war.31  “The tax gatherer will be 
received by every loyal man,” the Chicago Tribune predicted in March 1862.32 
Thaddeus Stevens (R. PA), as Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, received many 
letters from citizens supporting taxation.  “My life and the little property I have is at the 
disposal of the government for the suppression of the rebellion,” wrote Unak Bruner of 
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Nebraska in February 8, 1862.33 
Although conscription riots rocked the Union, no tax revolt occurred during the 
course of the war, despite the heavy taxes levied upon Americans. Revenue 
Commissioner Joseph J. Lewis noted in his first report to Congress that, “The present tax 
laws, on the whole, have been not merely endured, but welcomed by the people in a 
manner … elsewhere unparalleled.”34  Imposing indirect taxes, instead of relying on the 
direct taxes, also helps explain the public’s readiness to accept the new revenue program.  
“Indirect taxes are an indistinguishable part of the price of commodities and [the 
taxpayer] is not always sure that he is paying any tax,” commented Richard T. Ely.35  
The reliance on indirect taxes made the new tax regime more palpable to the public.  The 
public accepted indirect taxes more readily than direct taxes, which helps explain the 
reliance on excises and tariffs after the Civil War.  
Even with these expressions of popular support for a vital revenue program, the 
Republicans remained hesitant to disrupt the structure of fiscal federalism to enact a 
national program of taxation.  Contrary to the idea that they eagerly embraced 
opportunities to “nationalize” the economy, the Republicans looked upon this as less of 
an opportunity than a challenge and a burden.  Aside from the concerns about public 
opinion, other complications emerged in forced development of a unified fiscal system.  
The first related to the currencies of the nation.  Despite the introduction of the 
greenbacks, notes of various types continued to trade as currency. Silver coins 
disappeared from circulation, creating great difficulties in managing small day-to-day 
transactions.  Forced to produce some type of medium for these exchanges, the Treasury 
authorized the use of postage stamps as a currency on July 17, 1862.  This expedient 
proved less helpful than anticipated, since the stamps had a “propensity for sticking 
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together and getting crumpled.”36 People took to cutting small denomination bank notes 
into quarters or tenths, to replace quarters and dimes.  
Shinplasters, private notes issued by “hotels and transportation companies, but 
also barber shops and drug stores,” circulated widely, although the state governments 
declared them illegal.37  Banks still printed their own notes, responding to the need for 
fractional currency. The Treasury began circulating copper coins and fractional bills by 
late 1863, but the currency situation continued to create “disorder and much 
inconvenience to public business,” throughout the course of the war.  Thus, when first 
introduced, the greenbacks neither stabilized the economy nor nationalized the 
currency.38  
The National Banking Act of 1863 allowed the banks that received a national 
charter to print notes. State banks continued to produce their own notes, since the 
demand for them continued.  Western states did not have a supply of either greenbacks 
or national banks, so they continued to handle their money affairs as they had always, 
with a jumble of local currencies.  The internal revenue laws taxed the state bank notes, 
but not until 1865, when Congress imposed the “death tax” of 10 percent these renegade 
notes, did they begin to disappear.39  Approximately $179.2 million in state bank notes 
circulated in 1864, but only $20 million by 1866.40  As the supply dwindled, the 
remaining notes became “dirty, greasy, and repulsive to use.”41  However, state banks 
remained an important part of the local economies, particularly in the western states. 
State banks still outnumbered national banks as late as 1892.42 
Paying for the prosecution of the war, rather than nationalizing the financial 
structure of the country, remained the primary objective of the Republican 
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administration. The “confused state of monetary circulation” impeded the bond drives 
initiated by Jay Cooke.43  Cooke and his agents sold $361 million of the five-twenties in 
communities across the country.  As one of the first national financial campaigns of any 
kind, he came across the same difficulties with the various currencies in use. “The most 
serious problem, when sales were large, was that of securing the proper means for 
making payments to the government.” Required to make payments “in lawful money,” 
Cooke often had trouble finding enough acceptable currency to transfer to the 
Subtreasury in New York or Treasury in Washington. In the fall of 1863, the sales of 
bonds outpaced the Treasury’s ability to print greenbacks, and Cooke’s agents often had 
to hold these various local currencies until shipments of fresh greenbacks arrived. In 
smaller towns where suspect currencies circulated, Cooke’s agent had to absorb the cost 
of exchanging these moneys into greenbacks or Treasury notes.44  
The Treasury depended on the domestic sales of bonds. Chase and members of 
Congress knew they could not rely on foreign capital to invest in U. S. securities, and 
thus needed the support and cooperation of American citizens.  “It is vain to look 
abroad" for funds, Chase noted in an October 13, 1861 letter to General William T. 
Sherman.”45  Wedded to borrowing at home, the government needed to provide some 
consistent means for customers to pay for their bond purchases. 
The difficulty in establishing a national revenue system while thousands of 
different legal currencies circulation also troubled the internal revenue process. 
Collecting taxes for the national government under the disparate monetary system 
proved a challenge.  Local assessors and collectors were required to accept “all lawful 
money” for taxes.  They assumed responsibility for verifying the validity of the notes 
they received. The Treasury established depositories in each state for the collected funds 
and kept separate accounts for “all moneys” received from the internal duties or taxes 
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from each state.  Officials would then convert the funds into greenbacks, or national 
bank notes.46 
Setting standard pay for tax officials working in different parts of the country 
also proved a challenge. How do you equalize pay across the country, where the value of 
money, and the cost of living changed dramatically?  Lott Morrill (R. ME) complained 
in the early days of the debates over HR 312, that granting the same pay to collectors in 
the “rural, poor districts” of the country with those in the more urban areas over 
compensated those working in the former.47  Timothy Phelps (R. CA) countered that the 
costs of collecting revenue in his state would remain high.  Assessors and collectors did 
not receive reimbursement for travel, or any daily expenses (such as stationery), which 
would make the costs in his state quite high for each revenue officer.48  To ease this 
debate, revenue officers instead received a fixed per diem ($3 per day for assessors) for 
each day engaged in duty, plus an extra $1 for each 100 names they placed on the tax 
list.  Collectors worked entirely on commission, 4 percent up to $100,000 tallied, then 2 
percent for the amounts over that plateau.49  Rationalizing terms across the country also 
challenged officials.  A debate erupted on May 23, 1862 over the difference between a 
horse dealer and a horse trader, since the proposed tax rate differed.  Although they 
performed the same tasks, dealer generally dealt in urban areas while the term trader was 
used more often in rural areas.50    
Meeting the war costs, through loans and revenue, helped push the Treasury to 
initiate the programs that posed the greatest threat to the localized economic structure of 
the antebellum era.  To gather enough money to fund the Civil War, the Treasury needed 
some consistent medium of exchange, collected anywhere in the country and 
recognizable in Washington.  Introducing the greenbacks gave the Treasury the ability to 
pay its bills, and Americans a consistent method for paying their taxes.  The greenbacks 
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emerged as part of the effort to save the nation rather than nationalize it. The mixed 
currencies of the country greatly impaired the effort to draw in the revenue needed for 
the war.    
 
“The most lightly taxed Nation on the Earth” 
 Once established, the Republicans followed the same principle for the subsequent 
tax measures passed after HR 312. They created a “diffuse” tax program that attempted 
to place “no burden on those with small means.”51  The general duty on manufacturers 
provided the most revenue during the war, but lawmakers never agreed on who actually 
paid this tax.  Justin S. Morrill insisted throughout the conflict that this duty did not fall 
on “consumers,” but instead draws from “the profits made by manufacturers.”52  
However, Fernando Wood (D. NY) disagreed.  “Some gentlemen appear under the 
impression that the manufacturers are to bear the burden [of this tax.] That is not so.  It is 
the consumer, and not the manufacturer.”53  
Incidence, or where the burden of taxation falls, has always provided a 
compelling field of inquiry for economists.  Historians assume that a “beer tax” hits 
“beer drinkers.”  However, Professor McCloskey has argued that, “The question of 
incidence cannot be answered by inspecting the tax law or its revenue.”54  The legislators 
crafting the Civil War revenue laws struggled with the same question. “There are and 
always whom it is levied and from whom it is collect, or whether it is somebody to 
whom he sells his goods and manufactures,” lamented Senator King in 1862. “We shall 
never know.”55  
Determining who would pay a tax on cotton became a central question in the 
debates over levying this duty.  New England “Radical” Republicans, such as Charles 
Sumner, Benjamin Butler, and James Simmons, all associated with policies to punish the 
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South for instigating the conflict, nevertheless consistently thundered against the tax on 
cotton in order to spare the textile mills in New England from paying this cost. The 
Ways and Means committee originally proposed a tax of three cents per pound on 
cotton, but accepted in HR 312 a tax of only a half-cent per pound.56   
The tax on cotton rose after the war, one of the few to do so, to three cents per 
pound, paid by the producer.  In determining the post war cotton tax, representatives 
expressed their concern over the incidence of such a vital product.  Justin S. Morrill 
fought for a lower cotton tax in 1862, expressing his hope that the tax code would not be 
used for “grinding the South.”57 However by the end of the war, Morrill favored a higher 
cotton tax, with limited exemptions, to ensure that, “every piccaninny in the South” 
would not try to skirt the tax through these exemptions.58  John Lynch (R. ME) argued 
that if the cotton producer paid the tax, then the bill should allow for high exemption to 
spare the “small producers, black and white” from the burden.  He suggested instead, 
that Congress override the constitutional directive against levying duties against exports, 
and “letting England pay” this tax.59  Reminded that the Constitution banned a tax on 
exports, Lynch retreated.  A brief discussion ensued about whether Congress could 
ignore this provision, since an export duty on cotton would provide tremendous revenue, 
with little pain to the taxpayers.  This discussion proved more theoretical than 
substantive.  Here Congress adhered to the Constitution with regard to taxation, whereas 
they stretched the meaning of an indirect tax in order to implement the income tax. 
Abner Harding (R. IL), who served in the war with the Eighty-third Illinois 
Infantry, wanted the tax removed completely to spare “the toiling millions” of this 
country, who would pay the tax through their clothes purchases.  Samuel S. Marshall (D. 
IL) agreed, claiming the tax on cotton would “shift the burdens of government from the 
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rich to the poor.”60  This agitation against the cotton tax became less a divide between 
parties.  Senator Cowan also noted that taxing cotton would place also tax the consumer 
goods made with cotton. “It is true that the poor people of the North are as willing to pay 
their tax on their shirt as on their tea and coffee; they are willing to pay their taxes, and 
perhaps more so than the rich people; but I say it is unjust to impose on them now all the 
heavy burdens of the nation it is unjust to make they the great source of revenue.”61   
The repeal of the general duty on manufactured goods made the tax on cotton more 
acceptable to the representatives of the textile interests.  Eventually Congress adopted a 
tax of two and a half cents on cotton, but, the next year, Congress stopped taxing cotton 
altogether.62   
 “Until a few years ago, we were the most lightly taxed nation on the earth,” 
remarked Congressman Henry J. Raymond (R. NY) in 1865. “Now we are amongst the 
most heavily burdened of them all.”63 Despite this burden, Congress marveled that the 
public bore the taxes without any severe complaint.  “The present tax laws, on the 
whole, have been not merely endured, but welcomed by the people in a manner, it is 
believed, elsewhere unparalleled,” noted the 1863 Annual Report from the Internal 
Revenue Commissioner.64 But not all saw the taxes as a “welcomed” addition to the 
civic life. Samuel S. Cox (D. OH) wondered in 1862 why Congress “commenced this tax 
business at the wrong end.”  First they levied a tax on “tea, coffee, sugar, and other 
necessities of life,” then later they turned to the luxuries, like “circuses,” which had to 
pay a tax on their ticket sales beginning with HR 312.  The definition of what constitutes 
a necessity played a significant role determining which items to “hit” with taxes. “We 
must recollect that we have taxed the poorer classes of our people almost out of the 
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power of social enjoyment [through the liquor/beer taxes,] stated Benjamin G. Brown 
(U. MO) in 1865.65   
Even the income tax, clearly the most “just” tax enacted during the war, fell hard 
on the “middle class.”  The Internal Revenue Recorder reported in 1867 that the income 
tax in 1866 (its most productive year) brought in $61 million, of which $26 million paid 
by those with less than $5,000 in income.  Over 300,000 people paid the $26 million, 
whereas only 50,000 individuals paid the remainder of the tax.  “It is unjust, 
unproductive, inequitable.  It falls with crushing effect on salaried men.”66 Adopting the 
method of collecting the income tax “at the source” had made salaried individuals more 
susceptible to the tax than the “honest” citizens who had to report their income. This 
policy hurt government employees in particular.  Private companies did not always 
cooperate in reporting their charges’ salaries.67  The tax on interest from stocks and 
bonds issued by banks, railroad companies, insurance companies, and other private 
corporations proved the most productive means of counting the “hidden” income of the 
wealthy.68  
Worries about tax incidence did not fall strictly on party lines; as Linden 
suggested, a geographic divide, depending on the tax and how it affected the 
constituency of the representative or senator most influenced the lawmaker’s concerns 
about where the tax fell. Nor did the same ideal of tax equity that we have now extend 
back to the Civil War era.  “In our age,” Webber and Wildavsky observed, “conceptions 
of equity comprise the central core of fiscal theory.  Equity of incidence manifested as 
one measure of the goodness of a tax.”  However, in an earlier time, “fiscal equity 
meant, without exception, all men should pay taxes.”69  
The Civil War represented the first “modern” war in American history, but the 
fiscal policy used to fund that war retained elements of the archaic.  The tax on 
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manufacturers and the income tax augured future tax policies that would attempt to shift 
the incidence towards a more progressive policy.  However, immediately after the war, 
Congress retained the ideal of taxing “luxuries” or “superfluities” as a fair form of 
taxation. This concept, borrowed from the past, wedded the United States to a more 
regressive tax program in the late nineteenth century. 
 
“Obvious as the Sun’s Pathway through the Heavens” 
The Thirty-ninth Congress opened on December 4, 1865.  When Congress had 
last assembled, the war still smoldered. Not until the Union victory at Gettysburg in July 
1863, and the subsequent surrender at Vicksburg, did the North’s military effort gain any 
traction.  By the close of the Thirty-eighth Congress, members spoke confidently of the 
future “success in the great contest,” but soldiers in the field still needed food, clothes, 
and arms.  The final revenue measure of the war became law on the last day of the 
session. This bill raised the rates on alcohol, increased the income tax to a new high of 
ten percent on all incomes above $5,000.  “It will be time enough when the rebellion 
shall be ended to speculate upon a system of taxation by which our public debt shall be 
extinguished and by which more rigid forms of equity shall be carried out,” Morrill 
promised the members.70  
Re-elected to office the previous November, President Abraham Lincoln 
launched another great battle, this time against political allies instead of rebellious 
Confederates. The last session of the war Congress featured the beginning of a great 
power struggle between the Executive and Legislative branches of government that 
would last until 1877.  Radicals in Congress began a campaign to stretch the earlier 
bounds of the federal government’s power in order to secure the emancipation of all 
slaves, then bestow full political and civil rights upon the freedmen.  They achieved 
limited success on January 31, 1865, by amending the Constitution for the thirteenth 
time, thereby ending the most hideous epoch of American history.  
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Despite this achievement, Congress and the President Lincoln could not agree on 
a measure to guarantee suffrage for the freedmen.  The president wished to limit the 
franchise to black soldiers, or possibly civilians if they could read, and of course, were 
men.  The Radicals pressed for conferring the franchise to all adult male blacks.  Both 
sides retreated, and agreed to resume their contest during the Thirty-ninth Congress.  
However, before adjourning, Congress did establish the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, 
and Abandoned Lands. The Freedmen’s Bureau would provide relief and temporary 
subsistence for the freed slaves, clothing, and other basic needs. However, Congress 
allocated no funds or staff for the task.  “Despite its unprecedented responsibilities and 
powers, the Bureau was clearly envisioned a temporary expedient … for only a year.”71 
Although temporary, the establishment of the Freedmen’s Bureau set a new course for 
the federal government.  Restricted from reaching citizens “individually” before the war, 
the government now touched Americans and freedmen, through both financial and social 
legislation.  Tragically though, the government retreated on social legislation, allowing 
states to resume control over their constituents, while continuing to invoke the power of 
internal taxation. 
By the time Congress met again, the political landscape had changed.  Felled by 
John Wilkes Booth, President Lincoln died on April 15, 1865.  Only the week before, 
General Ulysses S. Grant had accepted General Robert E. Lee’s surrender at the 
Appomattox courthouse. The benevolent terms General Grant allowed, letting the 
Confederate soldiers keep their horses, and the officers keep their sidearms, reflected the 
policy of the president.  Before his death, Lincoln clearly intimated that he hoped to 
reunite the nation, and restore the South to full participation in American civic society as 
soon as possible.  This vision now fell to Andrew Johnson, his Democratic, intemperate 
Vice President.  Yet before the Congress assembled, Johnson’s policies showed signs of 
failure.  By the opening of Congress, seven and a half months after Johnson became 
president, southern states began working towards the enactment of “Black codes,” 
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repressive laws that would evolve into a systemic repression of black Americans 
throughout the nation, for the next 100 years. 
Schuyler Colfax (R. IN), the new Speaker of the House, opened the session 
stating that Congress’s duties appeared as “obvious as the sun’s pathway in the 
heavens.”72 However, splits within the Republican Party emerged over just how far the 
government could move towards granting individual rights and economic independence 
for individuals.  Then, President Johnson and Congress began a fervent battle over the 
Reconstruction policies of the South.  Congress passed sweeping Civil Rights 
legislation, only to see it vetoed by the President.  The Freemen’s Bureau soon became 
emasculated.  Johnson, who initially proclaimed his desire to reshape the political and 
economic power structure of the former Confederacy, issued over 7,000 pardons during 
the Thirty-ninth to former Confederate elites, who soon regained their political 
stranglehold over southern politics. As Foner noted, the Republicans held a majority in 
Congress that could overwhelm any of Johnson’s vetoes. If they had shared a unified 
vision on the future course of Reconstruction, they would have reshaped the South, and 
enabled the new found, and fully funded, might of the national government to secure the 
social, political, and economic future of the freedmen.  However, the divisiveness within 
the party, ineptness of the president, malaise and war fatigue of northerners, and 
intransigence of the southern white population, led to the resumption of state-based 
power in the South, and a beginning of a second tragic period of history for black 
Americans.73 
 
Debt or Taxes 
Salmon P. Chase served as Treasury Secretary until June 1864.  His weariness 
from the trials of the job caught up with him.  The economy of government he sought 
when he took charge of the Treasury died on in the trenches of war and profiteering. His 
strain with Cabinet members continued.  Rather than contenting himself with the 
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challenges in the Treasury, Chase also felt compelled to give his advice to the War 
Department.  In early 1864, he made the terrible mistake of mounting a surreptitious 
campaign to wrest from Lincoln the Republican nomination for the presidency. Chase’s 
efforts failed, shattered any hope of reconciliation with the president’s loyalists, who 
retaliated by calling for an investigation of corruption in the Treasury department.  
Chase’s close ties with Jay Cooke, whose success in selling war bond made him a 
wealthy man, drew increasing criticism from Congress.  Finally Chase began to push for 
a more aggressive tax program, but by then, Congress had taken control of tax policy.  
When Chase offered his resignation to the president in June 1864 (a device Chase had 
used before to confirm Lincoln’s confidence in his stewardship); surprising Chase, 
Lincoln accepted it.  
Lincoln’s leadership during the war did not inspire confidence in Union citizens.  
In August 1864, Lincoln told his cabinet that, “it seems exceedingly probable that the 
Administration will not be re-elected.”74  However, General William T. Sherman's 
capture of Atlanta and successes in Georgia, inspired voters, who re-elected Lincoln.  
However, this affirmation did not give the president greater sway within his party. 
Radicals who pushed the president to take a more decisive stand on abolition and Civil 
Rights for the southern blacks.  Republican leaders differed greatly not only over these 
social and political questions, but also over fiscal policy. The fate of the greenbacks 
emerged as a divisive party issue.  The Republican Party split over the question of how 
soon America should return to a policy of “sound finance,” and withdraw the greenbacks 
from circulation.  McCulloch replaced William Pitt Fessenden, who followed Chase at 
the helm, when Chase resigned during the summer of 1864.  President Lincoln appointed 
Fessenden to signal “a measure of continuity” in fiscal policy and help “promote 
harmony” within the increasingly bitter factions of the party.  Fessenden did “cast his 
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lot” with most of Chase’s financial schemes, then happily returned to his seat in the 
Senate after one year.75  Hugh McCulloch became the Treasury’s new secretary. 
In his capacity as the president of the State Bank of Indiana, McCulloch traveled 
to Washington in 1863 to protest the Secretary Chase’s new National Bank system.  
Soon thereafter, Chase asked him to assume responsibility for implementing this new 
organization, a responsibility he accepted reluctantly.  His knowledge of the workings of 
state banks, plus his contacts with the leaders of the banks helped smooth the 
inauguration of Chase’s bank policy.  McCulloch became Comptroller of the Currency 
overseeing the admittance and circulation of the greenbacks.  Ironically, McCulloch 
assumed responsibility for two programs he initially distained, another example of how 
the exigencies of war finance held more sway than pre-conceived fiscal principles.  
Further, like Chase, McCulloch remained an avowed free trader.  Thus, two of the first 
three Treasury secretaries in a Republican administration advocated free trade, not 
protectionism.76 
McCulloch became Treasury secretary on March 9, 1865 and stayed in that office 
until the beginning of the Grant administration.  During his tenure, he forcefully 
advocated two policies.  First, he advocated a return to “sound money” by contracting as 
many of the greenbacks in circulation as quickly as possible and returning to the gold 
standard.  Second, he wanted to reduce the federal debt.  Both policies aimed to thwart 
the expansion of the wartime inflation.  When McCulloch took office in 1865, $100 in 
greenbacks purchased $51 in gold, the highest inflation rate in the country since the War 
of 1812.77 Although McCulloch launched an energetic contraction policy in 1866, the 
intense political reaction against this program led to a quick retreat two years later.  This 
action opened the fissures within the Republican party, and again demonstrated how 
deeply divided the party remained with regard to economic matters. The question 
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expanding or contracting the greenback supply, and whether greenback could be used to 
pay the principal of the federal debt, opened a divisive political issue that rocked 
northern politics for the next 30 years.78 
Although all agreed that the government could cut taxes, differences emerged on 
how aggressively the government should reduce the debt. In our post-Keynesian world, 
we often overlook what the congressional leaders saw as one of the most formidable 
challenges they faced.  By February, 1866, the nation had accumulated a debt of $2.7 
billion. Not only did it comprise the largest debt in the nation’s history, but the 
magnitude of the debt dwarfed any of the previous encumbrances taken on by the 
government.  Only five years before this time, members of Congress, many of whom 
still served, fretted over a $70 million debt. They worried over the financial toll this 
would take on the nation. Servicing the wartime debt, Robert Yearly observed, 
“unquestionably posed a staggering task to men raised on the lackluster fiscal diet of 
pinchpenny government unaccustomed to taxing massively, spending lavishly, or 
borrowing feverishly.”79  Thus in evaluating future tax policy, Congress also considered 
a central question: should the United States stay with high, war-level taxes, using the 
surplus to shrink the debt, or should Congress reduce taxes, allowing the money to 
“fructify in the pockets of the people?”80  
Secretary McCulloch never equivocated. Inflation “corrupts the public morals,” 
declared the secretary. “Men are getting rich while morality languishes and the 
productive industry of the country is being diminished.” He did not want drastic cuts in 
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internal revenue, instead urged that the tax policy “should be stable.”  He noted the 
frequent changes in the tax and tariff laws shows “the readiness of the people of the 
United States to adapt their business to the policy of the government, whatever it may 
be.” He wanted to use the accumulated revenue to pay down the debt.  McCulloch also 
believed the high tariffs impeded trade, and urged Congress to lower the tariff duties.81 
Regarding the debt, McCulloch declared his intentions in his first Annual Report as 
Treasury secretary: 
  The debt is large; but if kept at home, as it is desirable it should 
be, with a judicious system of taxation, it need not be oppressive.  It is, 
however, a debt. … Neither its advantages nor its burdens are or can be 
shared or borne equally by the people.  Its influences are anti-republican.  
It adds to the power of the executive by increasing federal patronage.  It 
must be distasteful to the people because it fills the country with 
informers and tax-gatherers.  It is dangerous to the public virtue, because 
it involves the collection and disbursement of vast sums of money, and 
renders rigid national economy almost impracticable. It is, in a word, a 
national burden, and the work of removing it, no matter how desirable it 
may be for individual investment, should not be long postponed. … 
Various plans have been suggested for the payment of the debt; but the 
secretary sees no way of accomplishing it but by an increase of the 
national income beyond the national expenditures.  In a matter of so great 
importance as this, experiments are out of place.  The plain, beaten path 
of experience is the only safe one to tread.82 
 
The American tradition of government carrying a low debt also played a role in 
this discussion.  “Those favoring a permanent debt or slow repayment [of the debt] 
remained in the minority.”  Robert Patterson noted that tax revision did not become an 
“important political objective” until the Panic of 1873 rocked the financial stability of 
the nation.83  Justin S. Morrill suggested on May 7, 1866 that Congress reduce taxes by 
$75 million.84  But “arguments for the reduction of the debt” persisted.  Since Albert 
                                                 
81 Hugh McCulloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century: Sketches and Comments 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888), 202 
82 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1865, December 5, 1865, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 
House Ex. Doc. 3, ser set 1254, 16. 
83 Patterson, Federal Debt Management, 118 (both quotes). 
84 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., May 7, 1866, 2436. 
 249
Gallatin’s tenure in the Treasury, “the American people have manifested a strong dislike 
to the perpetuation of a funded debt,” Henry C. Adams noted. As long as “conditions 
remained prosperous” and  “industry had become adjusted to high taxes” there seemed 
little reason to reduce taxes, and great historical precedent to reduce the debt.85  
The war compelled the movement from this “pinchpenny,” antebellum system of 
finances to the “modern” fiscal state of debt and taxation. How best to reduce the debt, 
relieve the country from the “shackles which the internal taxes have thrown around it,”86 
and help nurture the future prosperity of the country, tested the Republican leaders.  
While most advocated reducing taxes as quickly as possible, some moved to keep taxes 
high in order to provide revenue to extinguish the debt. “I believe that if there is 
anything the people desire more than [any other],” proclaimed John B. Alley (R. MA), 
“the wealthiest shoe manufacturer” in Lynn, on February 11, 1865, “is that our taxes 
should be increased to such a degree that the credit of the country should be preserved 
and protected.”87  To solve the conundrum of debt or taxes, the administration decided to 
enlist the help of an “expert.” 
 
David A. Wells 
Although a frequent occurrence now, turning to a group of laymen to help 
resolve thorny financial or political issues represented “a novelty in American 
experience” at the time of the Civil War. But the size of the debt, and complexity of the 
internal revenue system convinced the administration and congressional members they 
needed to seek advice.  On March 3, 1865 Congress authorized the Secretary McCulloch 
to appoint a commission to “inquire and report, at the earliest practical moment, upon 
the subject of raising such taxation as may be necessary in order to supply the wants of 
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government.”88  Congress asked the commission to propose the best means for 
increasing taxes, rather than devising a way to make them more effective.  Since the war 
ended before the commission began work, their purpose changed to a review and report 
of the revenue system.  Associated with the Progressive Era, using “experts” to facilitate 
“scientific management” of business and other large-scale processes became a regular 
feature of bureaucracies.  However, this commission represents a nascent hint of the 
coming of movement.89  McCulloch asked David A. Wells to serve as the chair. 
Born in 1828 from “good New England stock,” Wells’s family came to America 
during the early Puritan migrations. Thomas Welles, his forebearer, served as the 
governor of the Connecticut colony from 1655-1658.90  His father James married 
Rebecca Ames, the daughter of a prominent and wealthy paper manufacturer.  Despite 
this pedigree, and fortuitous union, James Wells suffered financial ruin when his dry 
goods store went bankrupt during the Depression of 1837.  He abandoned his family.  
Rebecca moved David and his two siblings into her father’s home in Springfield, MA, 
where David lived until his adulthood.91  Like Andrew Carnegie’s mother, Rebecca 
Ames Wells, “burned with shame at her husband’s failure.” Tapping her father’s 
resources, she made sure her sons received the best education possible, and pushed them 
to succeed.92   
Wells attended Williams College and graduated in 1847, then accepted a position 
as a reporter in Springfield for two years.  There he honed his skills as a writer, and 
earned his first small fortune. While working in the paper’s pressroom, Wells invented a 
machine that folded newspapers.  He obtained a patent for the device, which he quickly 
sold for a handsome profit.  He decided to resume his schooling, and enrolled at Harvard 
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to further his “scientific education.”  He graduated in 1851, and then accepted a teaching 
position at Groton Academy.  Anxious to secure good income for himself, Wells began 
his writing career.  He launched a successful series of annual almanacs, cataloguing 
“scientific discoveries,” and current literature on agricultural progress.  The series 
became a hit, and Wells subsequently published a new volume each year until 1866.  He 
earned enough to quit his teaching position, and soon devoted himself entirely to his 
career as a “scientific writer,” concentrating on texts for schools and colleges.  He 
married the heiress of a mercantile fortune in 1860, allowing him to concentrate on his 
writing career while enjoying an affluent lifestyle.  He became the editor of an 
agricultural journal, and soon a partner in the Putnam publishing house.  Wells 
developed a national reputation through his authorship of many magazine articles on 
agriculture.93  
Like many wealthy northerners, Wells invested heavily in Union bonds during 
the Civil War.  As the conflict dragged on, and the debt of the government rose, unease 
seeped into the bond market. Two loan measures passed in 1864 that allowed the 
Treasury secretary to borrow $600 million, and receive “any lawful money or treasury 
notes, certificates of indebtedness or certificates of deposit,” in payment for these bonds.  
This arrangement exacerbated this disquiet, because of the many different forms of 
“lawful money” floating about.  During the War of 1812, the government used similar 
legislation to sell bonds, and then lost tremendously when much of the “lawful money” 
collected turned out to have little value. Employing such a drastic payment devise, John 
Sherman noted, would only pass under the “extremity of the measures deemed necessary 
at this period of the war.” Secretary Chase worried publicly that the debt could rise as 
high as $3 billion, an insurmountable amount.94  Both greenbacks and bonds declined in 
value.  Concerned for the fortunes of the nation, as well as his own ledger, Wells decided 
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to write a patriotic brochure to rally support for the government securities. Our Burden 
and Our Strength resulted .95   
This pamphlet argued that the future population growth and prosperity of the 
nation would enable the government to continue steady interest payments, and retire the 
debt without forfeiture or any repudiation.  Although a great “burden” strained the 
nation, Wells predicted that the country’s many “strengths” would enable Americans to 
carry the debt without inhibiting future prosperity.  “With a virgin soil, enormous 
emigration, a system of land tenure which conduces to the highest prosperity of the 
greatest number, and a condition of society in which individual enterprise is encouraged 
and fostered,” the United States will bear and retire the debt without impeding future 
prosperity.96 Per capita wealth would continue to grow, as it had throughout the 
antebellum era, through the increase in population, opening of new agricultural lands, 
continued industrial expansion, revival of the cotton trade, and release of slaves from 
bondage into more productive labor. His command of the current agricultural and 
industrial conditions gave his argument great weight.  
Wells used “scientific” reasoning in studying the nation’s productivity to 
demonstrate that the United States would carry its debt far better than the British had 
managed theirs.  Wells provided statistical analysis that showed if rapid population 
growth continued the per capita interest payments would fall from $5.35 in 1865 to 
$2.00 by 1900, roughly half what the British paid on their debt.97  The British debt and 
funding system became the template from which Wells based his comments, just as 
Congress had followed British precedent in developing the tax system. 
 Wells’s “perky little book” reassured his friends.  George Putnam, his former 
partner in publishing, saw great potential, and set his presses to work.  Subsequently, 
over 200,000 copies circulated both domestically and abroad. Wells received accolades 
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for restoring faith in the bond market.98  President Lincoln requested a private interview 
with Wells to ask his advice about post-war finances.  During the meeting, Wells 
observed that the tax structure needed revision based on the “resources of the nation.”  
He then suggested that the president establish a commission to study the matter, and 
make formal recommendations.  “That’s a pretty good idea,” Lincoln replied. Three 
months later, in March 1865, Wells received the appointment as chair of the U. S. 
Revenue Commission.99  
Secretary McCulloch wanted the different members of the Revenue Commission 
to represent the primary economic forces and sections of the country.  Wells, a native 
New Englander, former paper manufacturer, and resident of New York at the time the 
commission formed, spoke for the commercial interests of the Northeast. Stephen 
Colwell, an iron manufacturer from Pennsylvania, joined the commission and became its 
most outspoken proponent of protective tariffs. McCulloch, in his autobiography, stated 
that “congressional representatives” had recommended Colwell to him.  However, with 
his usual humility, Henry C. Carey claimed credit for securing his friend Colwell’s 
appointment.  “Advanced in years and feeble in thought,” Colwell contributed little of 
the work of the Commission.  Samuel S. Hayes, Chicago’s comptroller, represented the 
agricultural interests.  McCulloch wished to have a “western man” who would add more 
diverse political views to the committee.  Hayes joined the commission as a Democrat 
and a “copperhead,” although “amiable” and helpful in “arriving at facts.”100  Harper’s 
Weekly exuded that, “we may be sure that there will be neither jobbery, nor ignorance, 
nor political prejudice,” in the deliberations of the commission.101 
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 Wells and his commission subsequently produced one comprehensive report on 
the internal revenue system, plus thirteen “Special Reports” focusing taxation on specific 
articles.  Remarkably, the commissioners produced these lengthy reports between March 
1865 and January 1866.  Credited with writing most of these reports, Wells unabashedly 
accepted the praise the Commission received.  “The diffuseness of the present revenue 
system is doubtless one of its greatest imperfections,” the report noted.102  Instead of a 
tax scheme that would “hit every head,” they urged Congress to abolish or pass a 
“speedy reduction of all taxes which tend to check development, and the retention of all 
those which, like the income tax, falls chiefly upon realized wealth.”103  Excise taxes on 
specific articles of “indulgence” would generate large revenue without harming the 
“industriousness” of the people. “Securing large revenue from distilled spirits … is 
absolutely necessary to insure the successful carrying out of any plan for simplifying the 
internal revenue system,” they reported.104  By placing a light duty on “articles of 
necessary and large consumption,” such as tea and coffee, Congress could collect great 
revenue without disrupting public consumption. They recommended retaining the tax on 
cotton. Preserving the income tax,  “although an obnoxious tax” would not hurt future 
economic growth because it “falls mainly on accumulation” and would prove the least 
“detrimental to the country than any other form of taxation.”105 
With this tax “edifice” in place, Congress could grant “entire exemption of the 
manufacturing industry” from all taxation; this would help to “equalize” the tariff and 
internal revenue. Wells worried about the “continued assaults” and “deprived elements 
of stability” that the high war tariffs created.  By canceling the tax on manufacturers 
Congress would not have to raise tariff rates. Wells urged caution in fixing any new 
rates, but indicated that Congress could lower them in the future.  The manufacturing 
duties accounted for most of the internal revenue during the war, but these well-selected 
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excise taxes, plus the stamp duties and license taxes, could provide enough revenue to 
avoid the “duplication” in the existing revenue system, and eventually lead to lower 
tariff rates.106  
The report aimed to remove the “diffuse” taxes and replace them with more 
“concrete” ones that “can be easily, cheaply, and surely collected, and distributed 
themselves with a satisfying equality. Wells elaborated on this theme:  
We must draw our revenue from few sources, and avoid the error 
of many and useless perforations.  [We must attain] freedom from 
multitudinous taxes, espionage, and vexations … freedom from needless 
official inquisitions and intrusions; freedom for industry, circulation, 
competition everywhere.  Deprive the people of freedom in industry and 
there will be disappointing revenues, discontent, embarrassment, and 
demoralization everywhere – cheerfulness and prosperity nowhere.107 
 
The commissioners recommended limiting taxes to a few select, but productive 
items, cutting the manufacturing tax, and advised caution in making any changes in the 
tariff schedule. Indeed the report suggested that in looking for a model to follow for a 
balance of taxation and debt reduction, “the British statesmen for at least the last quarter 
of a century,” have best shown “what ought to be the future revenue policy of the United 
States.”108  Although all three men signed the commission’s report, “a difference of 
opinion exist[ed]” among the Commissioners.109 Colwell and Hayes soon issued 
dissenting addendums.  Colwell agreed with Wells’s recommendation to remove the 
taxes on manufacturers, however he issued a strong appeal for protective tariffs.  The 
revenue policy of the nation needed to “uphold and cherish that industry” which 
provides “nearly all that meets the wants of civilized life,” Colwell argued. He advocated 
limiting the influx of foreign trade, in order to boost industry and free “domestic 
laborers” from the “destructive” competition in Europe. This recommendation 
“completely contradicted” Wells recommendations in the first report, to make few, if 
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any changes, in the tariff schedule.110  Samuel Hayes wanted to base the new revenue 
system on taxes on “wealth,” specifically the income and the inheritance taxes.  
Wells, through the commission, launched a criticism of the revenue agents, 
suggesting they were not “competent men.”  By adopting a system based on limited 
taxes, the Internal Revenue Bureau could reduce the number its employees.  These 
thoughts also signaled a future development in American government. Wells emerged as 
a “nineteenth-century American liberal.”111  He became a leader of the “Mugwumps,” a 
group of Republican politicians who left the party in protest during the 1880’s to support 
Grover Cleveland, and subsequent Democratic candidates.   These dissenters, 
predominantly prosperous men from the Northeast, believed it their duty to direct 
American “virtue, civilization, and progress.”112  Appalled by the corruption that had 
infiltrated both political parties, they advocated Civil Service reform and the re-
establishment of a “sound” currency by returning to the gold standard.  By the 1890’s, 
the Mugwumps became outspoken anti-imperialists.  Wells emerged as their chief critic 
of the high protectionist tariffs that gripped the American fiscal system by the late 
nineteenth century. His abhorred the growing influence of special interests in directing 
American fiscal policy, a distaste that began during his early years as the Special 
Commissioner.  By the time of his death, in 1898, the Democratic Party had incorporated 
Wells’s tariff position into their party platform. 
While Congress accepted the general ideas espoused by Wells and the 
commission report, they differed on a few key provisions.  Wells had recommended 
lowering the tax on whiskey from $2.00 per gallon to $1.00.  Congress explicitly 
rejected this idea. “Experience in England has shown that as the duty was raised on 
spirits … it never seriously affected the consumption.  In other words, men will drink, no 
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matter what it costs,” stated Thaddeus Stevens in the session before the release of the 
report.113  More explicitly, Justin S. Morrill suggested after reading the report that 
Congress retain the liquor tax at $2.00 per gallon as a way of testing “its real value for 
revenue purposes, and incidentally… as a mode of repression in consumption of 
intoxicating beverages.”114   
Wells argued in Our Burden and Our Strength that the United States would grow 
out of its debt, without any direct fiscal intervention. On the question of debt or taxes, 
Wells urged lowering taxes as rapidly as possible. “The rapid reduction of taxation, 
rather than a rapid reduction of the principal of the public debt” should become the “true 
policy of the government,” Wells stated.115 Future growth and prosperity would enable 
the United States to carry a debt, without stifling production.  Securing lower taxes, 
Wells believed, would provide the first step in that direction. 
 Members of Congress did not completely accept this optimistic outcome. Henry 
J. Raymond (R. NY), founder of the New York Times, insisted that taxes cover not only 
the interest, but start attacking the principal on the debt as well.  “When erecting the tax 
system we followed the example of the nation which has had more experience of internal 
taxation than any other, Great Britain.” Congress must follow Britain’s lead in reducing 
the debt as well.116  Yet cutting taxes had popular support. Voters experienced tax breaks 
directly, where debt reduction was less tangible. While lawmakers accepted the idea that 
some taxes needed to stay in place to cut the deficit, they wanted to provide as much tax 
relief as possible for their constituents.  As with enacting taxes, the lawmakers now vied 
to reduce the burden as much as possible for their voters.   
Between 1866 and 1870 internal revenue receipts fell from $309.2 to $184 
million.  After 1875, of the taxes that remained, just under 60 percent came from liquor, 
tobacco, and stamp duties. All accepted the premise that Wells suggested: making the 
system less “diffuse” and settling instead on a few objects that would produce the 
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greatest revenue. William Lawrence (R. OH) summarized the goals of the Thirty-ninth 
Congress in winnowing the revenue system: “The theory upon which [the revenue 
system] proceeds is that it is not our policy to tax sources of productive industry, except 
so far as they produce luxuries.”117  Liquor and tobacco fit these requirements. Years 
later, John Sherman explained how the tax system came to rely so heavily on so few 
object: 
As the necessity for excessive taxation diminished after the war 
was over, taxes on various articles were gradually repealed … by 1894, 
they consisted of practically four items: spirits, tobacco, fermented 
liquors, and oleomargarine. The oleomargarine tax was not intended as a 
material revenue tax.  The purpose was especially to prevent the 
fraudulent imitation of butter by using an extract of beef.  None of these 
is an article of necessity, but all are used purely to gratify an appetite, in 
many cased indulged to excess.  All civilized national have come to 
regard these articles of the best subjects of taxation.  To the extent that 
whiskey is used a beverage it is hurtful in its influence upon the 
individual and upon society at large. The tax on tobacco and cigars is a 
moderate one, but the consumption of them is far less dangerous than of 
spirits in their influence upon society.  No complaint is made of it.  Its 
consumption is so general that the tax is fairly distributed and falls mainly 
upon the richer classes, as the tax is increased in proportion to the value 
of the tobacco.118  
 
Liquor and tobacco, objects “injurious” to the person, as well as society, became 
the primary targets of the future revenue acts. Both Congress and Wells based the 
immediate tax system on revenue collected from indirect taxes on liquor, tobacco, 
cotton, and income, with the understanding that a reduction in tariffs would follow.  
Lawmakers soon abated the cotton tax, hoping that soon the South would be “decorated 
and enlivened by factories.”119  As Hugh McCulloch would later explain, “liberal 
legislation” would help the South regain its standing economically and help promote 
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“harmony” in the country.120  Congress did not wish to wring the expenses of the war out 
of the southern “rebels.” 
Congress embraced most of these suggestions, but with a “difference.”  Wells 
suggested implicitly at first, and more aggressively as time went on, that his proposed 
tax system would allow for a reduction in the tariffs enacted during the war.  On this, 
Congress balked. Adjusting the tariff proved difficult. The members could not reach 
agreement on the direction of tariff policy.  No new tariff legislation, either increasing or 
decreasing duties, could pass the Thirty-ninth Congress.  Congressmen could not 
reconcile the differences between those who wished to protect manufactured goods and 
those who wanted to guard against cheap raw materials coming into the country.   
Congress remained incapable of finding consensus on tariff strategy until the Forty-first 
Congress.  By then, the Treasury began accumulating surpluses well beyond the ordinary 
expenses and interest payments.  Aggressive debt reduction became policy, more 
through an impasse than through an aggressive embrace of protectionism. Between 1866 
and 1873, the government reduced the debt by $604 million.121 
The Tariff of 1870 produced the first comprehensive change in tariff rates.  This 
bill focused on reducing “revenue articles” such as tea, coffee, sugar, molasses, and 
spices and expanding the free list.  Congress lowered the duty on pig iron from $9.00 a 
ton to $7.00.  But the duties on some manufactured articles increased, particularly steel. 
Awash in the “comfortable feeling of prosperity,” and providing ample funds for the 
reduction of the onerous debt, modifying the tariff became less urgent to the elected 
officials. 
 One member did get what he hoped.  Justin S. Morrill achieved his goal of 
providing a shield for the woolen industry in Vermont. The Woolen Act of 1867 nearly 
doubled the import duty on the main commodity of his state. Morrill assembled a 
coalition of Ohio representatives (another wool state) and anti-protectionist Western 
representatives who saw this as a means of thwarting the manufacturers’ efforts to 
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increase the tariffs on manufactured goods.  Subsequently, representatives succeeded in 
raising revenues on specific raw materials, copper in 1869, or manufactured goods steel 
rails and marble in 1870.122  
Wells’s ideal of making the tax system less “diffuse,” and limiting taxes to a few 
“indulgences” worked half way.  Congress accepted his suggestion of keeping taxes 
focused on liquor and tobacco, and supplemented by taxes (such as stamp duties) that 
took little effort to collect and provided abundant revenue. He recommended keeping the 
income tax (they no longer bothered referring to it as a “duty”) that struck at 
accumulated wealth. Wells proposed this system as a means to meet the interest 
payments while not curtailing American “industriousness,” and with the understanding 
that Congress would slowly reduce the tariff rates.   
On this second half of the tax equation, lawmakers could not reach agreement.  
Although Congress bequeathed to Americans a “free breakfast” by reducing import 
duties on coffee and tea, and moving other goods to the free list in 1870, the bulk of the 
Civil War tariff rates remained in place.  No longer needed to offset the duties on 
manufacturers, the primary source of revenue during the war, these high tariffs shifted 
the burden of taxation completely to indirect taxes, the best hidden means of gaining 
public revenue.  Ironically, the post-war reliance on the regressive alcohol and tobacco 
taxes sprang from the ideal of establishing justice and fostering American 
productiveness. Many believed these items hurt the health and well being of the 
individual, as well as undermined moral basis of society. In an effort to spare the 
“necessaries of life” taxes fell on its small pleasures.   
Lawmakers readily whittled the internal revenue measures to give their voters a 
tax break, in a manner that they could see and feel readily.  Removing the taxes on 
everyday goods they purchased, food they ate, and clothes they wore, gave the public 
concrete break, and allowing lawmakers to claim credit for their actions. Professor 
O’Brien, in discussing the British reliance on these same taxes noted that, “[Lawmakers] 
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considered each tax in isolation, and simply assumed that the ‘poor’ needed to consume 
certain things and that if they chose to buy other highly taxed commodities they did so 
voluntarily and accepted the consequences.”123 
The tariff continued as a result of congressional gridlock, and the rationalization 
that high duties helped contribute to debt reduction.  “High duties permitted debt 
reduction [and] the existence of the debt was itself an excuse for maintaining the high 
tariff.”124  Hugh McCulloch, who considered protective tariffs as “insidious” and 
“unequal taxes,” nevertheless, when writing his memoirs, effused that the tariff policy 
after the war helped reduce the debt.  “By the high duties, and taxes on whiskey and 
tobacco, more than one-half of the debt has been paid.”125  Tied to debt reduction, as 
well as the post-war prosperity, congressmen did not feel the pressure they would later to 
enact tariff reform.  “The protective system, which had been at the firs a temporary 
expedient for aiding in the struggle for the Union, gradually became accepted as a 
permanent institution.”126 While Congress felt pressure to reduce the internal revenue 
laws, they received many memorials and letters requesting that the tariff policy remain 
the same. 
 A second irony emerged. The continued policy of taxation after the war created 
surpluses well beyond the needs of prudent debt management.  While Congress retreated 
from giving “individual” assistance to the freedmen, they used new fount of 
accumulating cash to inaugurate the first national social welfare program in the form of 
veteran’s benefits.  By 1888, the Republican platform declared, “Congress should be so 
enlarged and extended as to provide against the possibility that any man who honorably 
wore the Federal uniform shall become the inmate of an almshouse, or dependent upon 
private charity.” The revenue generated from this tax legislation gave Congress the 
impetus to touch citizens “individually,” and launch what Theda Skocpol called the “first 
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phase of modern social provision in the United States.”127  By 1890, the federal 
government spent 35 percent of its budget on direct benefits for pensioners and their 
widows.128 The Civil War revenue measures laid the base for this future policy. 
What became of the two “just” taxes enacted during the war? 
 
The Direct Tax 
 No revenue measure failed as miserably as the first.  The Direct Tax (HR 71) 
enacted during the emergency session in July 1861, did not fulfill its purpose.  “The 
government received nothing from the direct tax during the war which it would not have 
received otherwise.” The legislation followed the precedent established in the 1813 
direct tax by allowing allowed states to “assume, assess, collect, and pay” the portion 
allocated to their citizens and receive a 15 percent discount on the entire quota. All the 
states that remained in the Union, except Delaware, took advantage of this incentive.  
Thus, the feared invasion of the “army” of federal revenue collectors did not occur in 
most of the Union states.129  
What the states paid to the government emerged as one problem with the direct 
tax.  Instead of sending money, the states fulfilled their commitments through their 
military obligations, including the support for the regiments originating from the states.  
These “payments” toward the direct taxes resembled the requisition system under the 
Articles of Confederation.  States counted the supplies and provisions for the troops they 
sent to the war as part of their payment.  Dispatching these materials over the course of 
the war meant that their quotas trickled into the Treasury, just as they had under the War 
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of 1812 direct tax.  By 1865 states had paid only 32 percent of the total amount allocated 
to the loyal states and territories.130  
Congress remained chary of the direct tax.  Passed into law to assure bond 
investors that their principle remained secure, and their interest payments would arrive 
as promised, the direct tax represented an expedient that lawmakers soon abandoned.  
Unlike indirect taxes, which remain hidden in the cost of the article purchased, the 
taxpayer knows what he pays under a direct tax, and must produce his payment in one 
large sum, instead of incrementally through his purchases.  Congressmen feared “that 
their constituents would notice a direct tax more than an indirect tax,” Smith noted.131  
Joseph A. Wright (U. IN) articulated the concerns of rousing the public with the direct 
tax when he stated in 1862 that, “This is not the time to press upon the country this 
question of direct taxation, which, of all others, should be avoided if it can.”132 Congress 
accepted the direct tax originally because, unlike other revenue laws, the statute existed.  
Lawmakers only had to reapportion the tax based on the current population. In contrast, 
it took members of Congress six months to write and agree upon the provisions of HR 
312.  
Written in 1813, the direct tax law applied to a much smaller country with a more 
even distribution of land in the states. Because the addition of extensive land holdings in 
western and southern states, the burden of the direct tax would fall more unevenly on 
these sparsely populated areas.  When dispersed evenly, through apportionment, 
legislators considered the direct tax the most fair, because it taxed the value of real and 
personal property.  However, the change in the country’s demographics rendered the tax 
unfair than in an earlier era.  The eastern states, with their greater concentrations of 
wealth, would dodge the brunt of the tax, leaving owners of large tracts of land to carry 
the weight of the tax. For these reasons, the Civil War direct tax floundered. 
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Congress repeatedly voted to delay collection of the direct tax, even as the states 
responded slowly to meet their obligations. In enacting HR 312 in 1862, Congress 
suspended the collection of the direct tax until 1865.  In June 1864, they again deferred 
the tax, and in 1868, suspended the collection indefinitely since “neither the legislative 
nor executive departments of the government have done anything regarding the 
collection of said tax.”133  The laxness in enforcing this tax demonstrates, in part, the 
reluctance of the government to invoke its powers during the course of the war.  They 
did not wish to rouse adverse public opinion, so delayed in collecting the tax most 
tangible to the citizens.  
The direct tax levy applied to all states, even those “in rebellion.” As the 
Confederate states fell under federal control, the provisions of the direct tax applied. The 
landowner had sixty days to pay the tax after receiving notice from the assessor. Non-
compliance resulted first in a heavy fine, then forfeiture.  James G. Randall described 
this portion of the direct tax statute as “odious” and a form of “virtual confiscation.” He 
claimed the direct tax law seemed more severe in terms of land seizures than the 
Confiscation Acts. 134 Congress passed two confiscation laws during the war, both with 
the provision that land could return to the owner’s estate once he died. Attorney General 
Edward Bates did not strictly enforce these laws, and consequently seizures occurred on 
only a small portion of the former plantations.  President Andrew Johnson restored most 
of this land to the original owners as he pardoned former Confederate leaders during the 
summer and fall of 1865.135 
Like the Confiscation Acts, the direct tax did not inflict as much harm on the 
southern states as the legislation permitted.  Only half the receipts from the lands 
confiscated for non-compliance returned to the Treasury.  According to the 1862 
legislation on collecting the direct tax in the southern states, one quarter of any receipts 
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from seized lands remained in the state to support “suppression of the rebellion;” the 
other quarter went to a fund for the “promotion of colonization [of freedmen] from the 
state.”   Once northerners abandoned the idea of colonization, these fund were 
supposedly dedicated to education and support of the freed slaves.  The Treasury only 
collected $2.3 million from the direct tax in the southern states. Forfeitures totaled 
approximately $2.4 million.136  Robert E. Lee’s estate in Arlington became the most 
famous of these forfeitures.  
As soon as the war ended, the Treasury, now under the direction of Hugh 
McCullough, “indefinitely postponed” the collection of the direct tax, and “all internal 
taxes accrued before the establishment or revenue districts.”  This exempted southerners 
from the back taxes accumulated during the war.  Sales from forfeited land stopped. In 
an effort to “promote harmony between the government” and citizens in the former 
Confederate states, the Treasury developed a lenient tax collection policy in the South.137  
This provides a clear indication of the reconciliatory attitude that the government 
extended to the former Confederate states, a remarkable turn, considering the blood and 
treasure that the war consumed.  Indeed, throughout McCulloch’s tenure, he adopted the 
policy of leniency in collecting taxes in the former Confederate states.  Despite the 
rhetoric of the Radicals in Congress, the power of the victorious North did not descend 
on the former Confederate states in a vindictive manner. 
Legal complications with the direct tax continued until 1900.  Some states, 
Georgia for example, never paid their quota, or paid only a small portion of their share.  
As the Treasury accumulated large surpluses, all recognized the impracticality of trying 
to collect this tax in the delinquent states. Absolving these truants from their obligation 
angered some citizens in the states where the tax had been paid in full. Thus Congress 
decided to refund the full amount collected to all the states, and forgive the outstanding 
balances from the delinquent states.  Though this met with approval in Congress, in 1889 
President Grover Cleveland vetoed this legislation.  The Constitution does not have a 
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provision allowing the federal government to give states money, he reasoned.  The 1836 
surplus distribution represented a loan, not a gift.  These constitutional scruples did not 
trouble Cleveland’s successor.  President Benjamin Harrison signed the legislation into 
law soon after he became president.  By 1896, Congress redistributed $15.2 million back 
to the states as a refund for the direct tax contribution. This legislation also permitted the 
Treasury to reimburse anyone who could prove he had owned land seized and sold for 
non-payment of taxes.  The government settled the last of these claims in 1900.138   
 Now a curious relic of United States tax history, the direct tax demonstrates how 
the American economy matured; the provision could work in a uniformly rural, 
agricultural country but not in a large democracy with mixed economy and rural-urban 
population. The direct tax also provides an extended lesson in American fiscal 
pragmatism.  Added to the Constitution to provide a “bridge over a gulph” between slave 
and non-slave holding states, the direct tax provided one of the compromises necessary 
for ratification of the Constitution. Invoked only four times, the federal government used 
this power of the purse only in times of war, and in a manner that allowed states to 
maintain their sovereignty.  Rather than enforcing the tax with a heavy hand, the national 
authorities allowed states to collect the tax, and in turn accepted lower than apportioned 
receipts. Rather than an “odious” tax that afflicted the southern states after the war, the 
direct tax demonstrated the government’s desire to reunite the nation, and heal the war 
wounds. 
 
The Income Tax  
 With regard to the income tax, David A. Wells wrote that, “Although in many 
respects an obnoxious tax, falling as it does mainly on accumulation, it will probably be 
sustained with less detriment to the country than any other form of taxation – the excise 
on liquor and tobacco excepted.”139 Wells and the Revenue Commission recommended 
keeping the income tax as part of the future revenue system.  In 1864, Congress enacted 
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an income tax that placed a 5 percent duty on incomes over $600 but less than $5,000; 
7.5 percent on incomes between $5,000-$10,000; and 10 percent on incomes over 
$10,000.  Companies withheld five percent from their stock dividend and bond interest 
payments for the Treasury.  Government payroll clerks would withhold five percent 
from the salaries of all officials making more than $600 a year.  The tax would continue 
through 1870.140 
 As promoters of the income tax predicted, the measure proved fecund.  The 
income tax generated $20.2 million in 1864, $60.9 in 1865, and $73.4 million in 1866.  
The special income tax passed in October 1864, to pay bounties to recruit new soldiers, 
and retain those serving, proved especially effective. The statute required an extra 3 
percent tax on incomes up to $10,000 and 5 percent on those over $10,000.  This one-
time tax raised $29.8 million, and provided enough to enlist 200,000 men.141 As its 
opponents feared, the revenue generated from the income tax came primarily from a 
small geographic area.  In 1864, citizens in New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania 
alone contributed 61.3 percent of all income tax revenue; 75 percent of the total income 
tax revenue came from all the northeastern states.142   
When introduced, the 1864 income tax bill stirred debate because it graduated 
rates. Morrill in particular, feared that levying a higher tax on the wealthy would 
encourage fraud and evasion. “The income tax, intrinsically the most just of all taxes,” 
he stated, “will always be difficult in ascertaining the actual income of reluctant 
taxpayers, and these will be sufficient in number to form a respectable company of 
growlers.”  Morrill recommended instead taxing that all income above $3,000 at 10 
percent.  Fessenden, in his sole report as Treasury secretary, recommended removing all 
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exemptions, and making the income tax universal.  “All participate alike in the blessings 
of good government,” so all should contribute towards its “necessity,” he suggested.143 
When Congress considered how best to trim the tax burden, Morrill, now Chair of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, recommended “The abolition or speedy reduction 
of all taxes which tend to check development, and the retention of all those which like 
the income tax fall chiefly on realized wealth,”144 a view that echoed Wells’s 
recommendations. 
The income tax had proven so productive, the costs of collection minimal, and 
while falling on one group on individuals, maintained broad appeal with the general 
population.  The concern regarding the constitutionality of the tax disappeared.  
Although still referring to it as the “income duty,” legislators no longer worried whether 
it constituted a direct or indirect tax.  Supreme Court Justice Roger B. Taney denounced 
it as unconstitutional because it “diminished” the salary he received during his time in 
office, but this complaint fell on unsympathetic ears.145   
Instead of debating whether or not to retain the tax, Congress considered the 
ways to improve it.  They moved to flatten the tax, and raise the exemptions.  By 1867, 
they raised the exemption to $1000, and fixed 5 percent rate.  Profits from real estate 
transactions, and the value of sales from livestock were added to the definitions of 
income.  They also exempted the salaries from mechanics or laborers employed on 
public works. “In a republican form of government the true theory is to make no 
distinctions as the persons in the rates of taxation,” stated Morrill in favoring a uniform 
rate for the income tax.146  
 The income tax received less attention in the immediate post-war discussion than 
other measures, another irony given the focus it received in the late nineteenth century.  
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In his opening remarks on the readjustment of the tax legislation, Morrill suggested 
leaving it place.  The healthy returns from the tax, Morrill stated, provided evidence of 
the “strict integrity of character” of the wealthy citizens who paid the tax. “The law left 
it almost to the conscience of each man as to how much he should pay, and all seemed to 
vie with each other as to who should pay the most.”147  While recognizing the 
“inquisitorial” nature of the tax, Morrill also believed that the large revenue it drew 
“from a free people, imposed upon themselves,” favored retaining, rather than 
terminating the tax.  Few disagreed.  Whether or not to continue graduating the rates 
instead became the focus of the discussion.  While favoring the retention of the income 
tax, Wells argued that the “discrimination” in the tax, in the form of graduated rates, 
seemed “unjust.”  The income tax fell on the “results of successful industry and business 
enterprise,” thus should the rates be set to “equalize” the burden at five percent.148  
Set to expire in 1870, the real contest over the income tax began that year.  On 
June 1, 1870, the Ways and Means Committee released its latest proposal on winnowing 
the tax receipts, they advocated renewing the income tax, but abolishing the tax on 
inheritances, gas, and other selected articles.  The coalition opposed to continuing the 
income tax centered geographically on the three states that contributed most of the 
revenue, rather than politically on the divide between Republicans and Democrats.  
Because the citizens in New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts paid over 60 
percent of the income tax, the opposition to it came from congressional leaders from 
those states.  Beginning in 1870, Dennis McCarthy (R. NY), Benjamin Butler (R. MA), 
William D. Kelley (R. PA), and Roscoe Conkling (R. NY), spoke forcefully for the 
removing the income tax.149  Kelley, who emerged as a fervent protectionist after the 
war, consistently advocated removing most of the internal revenue measures, in order to 
reassert the dependence of the federal government on tariff revenue.  McCarthy 
declared, “It has no moral force.  This tax is unequal, perjury provoking and crime 
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encouraging because it is at war with the right of a person to keep private and regulate 
his business affairs and financial matters.  It makes the tax-gatherer a spy.”150 
John Sherman emerged as the most ardent defender of the income tax in 
Congress. In England, Sherman noted, the income tax provided the only means for 
reducing the taxes on consumption thus: 
The “only discrimination in our tax laws that will reach wealthy 
men as against the poorer classes … If I had my way, I would retain the 
income tax at five percent on all incomes above $1,000 … then throw off 
these taxes upon consumption that oppress the poor and take coppers out 
of the dollars of the people who earn them by their daily work … We tax 
the tea, the coffee, the sugar, the spices the poor man uses.  We tax every 
little thing that is imported from abroad together with the whiskey that 
makes him drunk and the beer that cheers him and the tobacco that 
consoles him.  Everything that he consumes we call a luxury and tax it; 
yet we are afraid to touch the income of Mr. Astor.  Is there any justice in 
that?151   
 
Robert Stanley suggested cynically that Sherman’s supported the income tax “certainly 
not to challenge the protective and regressive system” which he had helped to build by 
replacing it with income taxation.  Rather the object was to avoid placing the “entire tax 
load upon consumption.”152  The indirect taxes on liquor and imports affected Sherman’s 
constituents more than an income tax.  Trying the keep the burden of taxation off his 
constituents played a more significant role. 
Columbus Delano, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue advocated retaining 
the tax in his Annual Report. “My opinion is that, so long as a large internal revenue is 
required by the financial necessities of the government, a portion of that revenue should 
be collected from incomes … After all, it is but a tax upon the increased wealth of the 
nation; and when it is understood that government securities are exempted from taxation, 
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and that the interest on these securities produces a large amount of the income of 
taxpayers.”153  David A. Wells, who now held the position of Special Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, assigned to continue reporting on the revenue system, expressed his 
support for the tax, noting that only “about a million of the population are interested in 
having the tax removed,” while the remaining 38.5 millions are interest in having it 
maintained.154  Ironically, Wells would come forth in the 1890’s as a leading opponent 
of the income tax, equating it with socialism.155 
The Forty-first Congress kept the income tax, but raised the exemption to $2,000 
and limited its duration to two more years.  When considered again in 1872, the tax 
failed to win even support, but the votes were close in both the House and Senate.156  
Although all his subordinates favored retaining the income tax, President Ulysses S. 
Grant opposed continuing it beyond 1872.  Fearing that his prospects in the upcoming 
election, Grant determined that he needed the support of the great moneyed interests, 
according to Allan Nevins. In an example of these moneyed interests, John C. Hamilton, 
one of the “wealthier men of New York,” wrote Grant’s Secretary of State, Hamilton 
Fish prior to the 1872 election, explaining that “I wish the income tax could yet be 
repealed. Our Union League has denounced it unanimously.” Grant’s Treasury secretary 
George Boutwell “warmly denounce[d] the repeal of the income tax,” fearing “the 
substitution or continuance of the other taxes which affect a larger number of persons 
will be unpopular.” However, Boutwell’s diffident and difficult personality gave him 
little credence.157  
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Ironically, as southern delegates, who began participating in Congress again in 
1868, remained “ambivalent” about the income tax.  Seip noted that “members from 
more heavily agricultural districts tended to favor retaining the income tax,” but their 
support for the bill held little of the passionate that would surface 20 years later.158 
Southerners as a whole paid little in the income tax, although, I suspect, southern 
congressmen as a group paid.  Although no study has been conducted correlating the 
votes of congressmen with their income tax returns, this might explain the lack of 
interest shown by southern leaders. 
“The chief reason the income tax did not continue,” Seligman explained, “is not 
because of objections raised by its opponents as the simple fact that it was not necessary 
for revenue purposes.”159  The prosperity of the country continued apace.  Government 
surpluses had reached $101 million by 1870.  Opponents of the income tax waged a 
more serious and prolonged attack against it then the defenders for retaining it.  The 
income tax died a natural death, rather than get shot down.  The House allowed it to 
expire.  Only after the downturn in 1873 did levying an income tax became the central 
goal of tax reformers. 
 
Conclusion 
 After a visit to England in 1870, Hugh McCulloch, in language reminiscent of 
that used by delegates to the Constitutional Conventions and subsequent ratification 
conventions, described the tax structure developed after the war: 
The national taxes are indirect, and although heavy, they are not 
complained of and do not seem to be felt, because they are taxes upon 
consumption, and are paid by the consumers in the increased prices of the 
taxed articles which are consumed … Taxes upon imports are easily and 
cheaply collected, and always have been, and probably always will be, 
the most popular taxes; but they are, nevertheless, the most unequal and 
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consequently the most unjust of all, because the very rich people rarely 
pay more than those in moderate circumstances.160 
 
When faced with the decision to reduce the debt or the government revenues, Congress 
followed precedent: they compromised.  The Republicans leaders in both Congress and 
the Treasury managed to reduce both taxes and the debt, slowly, but steadily. This 
system became the pragmatic juncture between two different, and conflicting directions 
in policy. Fiscal leaders believed that winnowing the tax system to garner revenue 
almost exclusively from excise taxes on liquor and tobacco represented a success in 
taxation, and not a failure. These articles provided substantial and consistent revenue.  
Further, the public accepted this program. “From the storm of Civil War the North 
moved into the sunshine of an unrestrained economic boom.”161  While basking in this 
sunshine, the tax system did not seem too bad.  Americans accepted this post-war 
adjustment, if not as “cheerfully” as in the early Republic, but certainly before the Panic 
of 1873, without protest.  “The majority of American would appear disposed to endure 
any amount of sacrifice rather than bequeath a portion of their debt to future 
generations,” noted economist Francis A. Walker in 1869 in a popular magazine 
article.162   
Wells remained disappointed throughout his public career that Congress could 
not move on his recommendations regarding the tariff.  Fat and happy, with coffers 
bulging, the debt going down, and memorials flooding Congress in support of the tariff 
policy, the leaders did not see any reason to act on lowering import duties.  Only after 
the prosperity slowed, and the country plunged into depression did tariff revision 
become a hot political issue.   
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
After James Bryce toured the United States in 1887, he described the persistence 
of James Madison’s vision of federalism.  The central government, he wrote, directed 
the “national common purpose,” including “foreign relations, internal commerce, 
weights and measures, and the post office.” Bryce continued, “State governments” 
assumed responsibility for the “maintenance of [local] law and order, the creation of 
local institutions, the provision of education, and the relief of the poor.”1 The states 
continued in their responsibility for all the functions of government that touched citizens 
“individually.”  
Federalism persisted through the nineteenth century as law as well as tradition. 
Not until 1941, in the Supreme Court case of Edwards v. California, did the Court 
declare the “Elizabethan poor laws” asserting that “relief is solely the responsibility of 
local government” no longer applied in the United States.  In overturning California’s 
“Okie law” forbidding residents from aiding “paupers” from entering the state, the Court 
declared, “the duty to share the burden, if not wholly to assume it, has been recognized 
… by the federal government.”2  In lamenting the forsaken aspirations for racial and 
economic justice in the years after the Civil War, historians have rarely considered the 
continuity of federalism as a strong impediment to fulfilling the ideals espoused by the 
Radical Republicans.  
Immediately after the Civil War, surpluses accumulated in the Treasury that gave 
the government more financial flexibility than at any time in its history. Rather than 
using these funds to assist the freedmen, the Treasury, under Hugh McCulloch, initiated 
an aggressive debt reduction plan.  However, the government did launch a politically 
popular Civil War veteran’s pension system that, by 1890, expended $109 million a 
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year.  Instead of assisting indigent freedmen, these funds were “lavished on a selected 
subset of the working and middle-class people of both races, who by their own choices 
and efforts as young men had earned aid … [by] participat[ing] victoriously in the 
morally fundamental moment of national preservation.”3   
Americans had provided pensions to veterans since the American Revolution.  
These payments not only rewarded valor, but also served as a practical means of 
overcoming the problem of how to pay soldiers.  Granting land, bonds, or long-term 
payments over time compensated for delivering pay inconsistently during the conflict, a 
constant problem for the early military. Throughout the American Civil War, soldiers 
received their pay in a variety of dubious paper “heresies:” Treasury bills, bonds that did 
not sell on the market, and greenbacks. Thus the pensions awarded to soldiers, and 
eventually their widows, seemed appropriate, and hardly inconsistent with the past.  
However, the increase in federal receipts, and new fiscal power of the government 
facilitated the expansion of this traditional program into the proto-type of the twentieth 
century welfare system.  
Despite the growth in the federal budget, and largesse to veterans and their 
families, giving assistance to the indigent remained a local, not a national concern. We 
now interpret the use of the financial power attained during the war as woefully 
inadequate, however those applying that power thought they had done well. When James 
Blaine reviewed the “progress” of the United States from 1861 to 1881, he exulted that, 
“No period of history has been more marked by generous expenditure for worthy ends.  
The provision made for those who suffered in the Civil War has perhaps no parallel at 
home or abroad.”4  This reticence to use national funds for “individual” relief, coupled 
with persistent racial prejudice, the desire for national reconciliation, frustrations with 
the continued violence in the South, impatience with the freedmen’s “inability” to 
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become self-supporting free laborers, and the salve of economic prosperity, makes the 
failure to direct more social spending to the emancipated slaves seem inevitable. When 
the Panic of 1873 struck the nation, John Sherman noted with some disgust that, “the 
wildest schemes for relief to the people were proposed.”  Most of these “wild schemes” 
involved manipulating the currency supply, not providing assistance to those 
impoverished by the downturn.5  However, individual concerns became national 
concerns after the Civil War.  During the Forty-Third Congress, Margaret Thompson 
related, 441 of the 833 bills enacted gave private relief to petitioning individuals and 
organizations, including “reparations to businesses, churches and schools, and other 
properties sustaining military damage during the war.”6 
The increase in the national budgets did not result in a corresponding concern for 
spending public funds with care.  Authorities could not sustain the antebellum ideal of 
keeping an “unsleeping watchfulness” over national expenditures. Mark W. Summers 
explained that corruption seeped into the federal system because, “the government had 
more work to do, more responsibilities to oversee, and more money to spend.”7  Douglas 
Bowers noted that in the antebellum era, lobbying and political influence peddling 
occurred primarily at the state level since that’s where most public funds were 
expended.8   
However, the expense of the war permanently altered the role of the national 
government in the public and private economy. Per capita receipts rose from $1.78 in 
1860 to $8.00 in 1873, then steadying at $5.75 by 1886.9   George Boutwell related that 
when first appointed commissioner of internal revenue, he and three clerks tabulated the 
early returns.  However, by March 1863, the Bureau of Internal Revenue “exceeded in 
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magnitude the entire Treasury Department.  It was in fact the largest government 
department ever organized in historical times. By its machinery, it became so vast that 
$350 million were assessed and collected in a single year.”10 
The ideal of trying to keep public revenue close to the scrutiny of “the people” 
continued, however the size of the organization defied this commitment. “It is well to 
keep the power over public funds and public expenses as close to the people as 
possible,” Supreme Court Justice David J. Brewer recommended to law school students 
in 1897.  He lamented the “growing tendency in government” towards “extravagance” in 
the late nineteenth century. He expressed this worthy sentiment in a speech he delivered 
defending his participation in striking down the constitutionality of the income tax. In 
declaring the tax a “direct” rather than an indirect tax, the Court attempted to reassert the 
antebellum mores of fiscal federalism in an era where all such restraints had 
disappeared.11  
Before the war, citizens paid their taxes primarily as tariffs fixed to “luxuries” 
entering the country.  After the war, American citizens paid taxes on all types of articles 
and transactions.  Besides the excise taxes on liquor and tobacco that became the staples 
of the new internal revenue system, the government continued to collect duties on 
matches, patent medicines, licenses, and most bank transactions.  In order to cure a 
malady, warm or illuminate your house, legally open a shop or provide a service, or 
complete any type of financial transaction besides local barter, the citizen interacted with 
the national government. Tax collectors during the antebellum era stayed confined to 
distant ports, but during the post war era, over 3500 revenue officers dotted the country. 
Erected hastily as a wartime expedient, it became clear after the war that the structure 
would not be dismantled.  The government will continue to collect internal taxes, 
Sherman noted in 1895, “as a part of the organized machinery of the government … as 
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long as our public debt remains, and until the list of pensioners will be obliterated by the 
hand of time.”12 
No longer stationed only at distant ports, Treasury officials now roamed the land, 
assessing, collecting, and punishing when they detected fraud.  Federal tax officials in 
the “mountain South” chased down small-scale “moonshiners” to collect the whiskey 
excise, the single largest source of internal revenue. Wilbur Miller related that in 
enforcing this system, “the government presented itself as both powerful and 
conciliatory;” arresting offenders, then issuing only small fines rather than jail time.13  
The whiskey excise taxes resulted in the grandest scandal that beset the Treasury in the 
post-war era.  Although unveiled during the Grant administration, the corruption in 
collecting the whiskey excise began early.  Fernando Wood (D, NY) speculated on the 
House floor in 1864 that some members took too vigorous a stand against applying 
increased excise rates to manufactured whiskey, and insisted that any new tax should 
apply solely to future production.14   
Distillers paid tax officials to miscount the number of gallons they produced, thus 
lowering their tax payments.  The revenue officers reaped enormous profits.  The 
supervisor of revenue in upstate New York would habitually collect $500,000 annually 
in graft.  Orville E. Babcock, President Grant’s “confidential advisor” kept a close watch 
over the executive branch to alert his co-conspirators in the “Whiskey Ring” of any 
pending investigations.  The opportunity to profit from skimming the distilled liquor 
excise collections became pervasive.  New Orleans officials alone skimmed well over 
$1.5 million from the tax system.  Although corruption occurred in the antebellum 
customhouses, the degree increased in the post war era because the size of the system 
had grown, both in terms of employees and the amount of money circulating through the 
machine.15 
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Congress did not become officially involved in regulating business until the 
establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887.  However, lawmakers 
had experience in manipulating consumer preferences through taxation.  Protective 
tariffs purposefully raised prices on imported goods in order to make American products 
more competitive. Congress passed the ten percent tax on state bank notes in 1865 
specifically to make their use prohibitively expensive so they would fall out of 
circulation. Excise taxes on liquor and tobacco, the backbone of the new internal revenue 
system, taxed “superfluities” that all could avoid, if desired.  Government power could 
now be used to modify individual behavior.  Congressmen Lott Morrill (R, ME) spoke 
often of taxing liquor into “extinction.”  He hoped that by raising the tax high enough, 
those without moral fiber could no longer afford to indulge.16  The excise on margarine 
by 1895 became the fifth largest source of internal revenue by 1895.  Enacted solely for 
the purpose of discouraging the use of this product at the behest of dairy farmers, this tax 
did not produce needed revenue, but simply raised the price on this product to make 
butter the preferred commodity.  
The character of government changed during the postwar era, not only because of 
the swell of revenue within, but also the new opportunities in the private sector. Over 
1500 members served in the House between 1861 and 1881.  “Rapidity of change in 
elective officers” characterized the post war chamber. Each succeeding session in those 
ten Congresses contained a majority of new members. Only William D. Kelley kept his 
seat during this entire period. Many members, such as Justin S. Morrill, John Sherman, 
and Roscoe Conkling advanced to the Senate, but the House during this period remained 
singularly inexperienced.17 Thompson described the House during the “Gilded Age” as 
having “high turnover, no formal leadership, largely inexperienced membership, and 
little or no professional staff.”18 “The House of Representatives [in December 1873] is 
best understood as one suffering acutely from time-lag.  The House was a fundamentally 
antebellum institution endeavoring with limited success to cope with the enlarged federal 
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purview of postwar America.”19  Yet, this inexperience body now controlled far more 
“power of the purse” than the early congresses.  This, in part explains why Congress 
during the Gilded Age “subsidized but did not supervise.”20  Government now had the 
“power to choose favorites and alter the market,” yet most of the members of the body 
did not have the experience to do this wisely.21  “Teaching the American people that 
government could legitimately spend on a grand scale – in the billion dollar range for the 
first time,” proved decisive in redefining government power after the Civil War.22 Justin 
S. Morrill gave an explanation of these new powers during the tax debates in 1862: 
The government of the United States – the most parental and 
benign of all earthly governments – in its hour of need has the right to 
demand whatever may be the measure of its necessities to sustain the 
public credit … That the government is the property of the people is not 
more true than that the property of the people for public use belongs to 
the Government.  If the power of taxation gives the right to take three 
percent, it gives to the extent of ninety-nine percent, just as much; but it 
would be an abuse of power justifying a revolution if it exacted anything 
beyond it reasonable and urgent necessities.23 
 
 Yet, the war changed the character of what constituted “reasonable and urgent 
necessities.”  In trying to redefine these new parameters, the only restraint became that 
of the democratic forces, garnering their strength, and “justifying a revolution” against 
the newly perceived powers of government. 
                                                 
19 Thompson, The Spider Web, 73. 
20 Harold M. Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction on the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1973), 382. 
21 Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom, 79. 
22 Elazar, American Partnership, 105. 
23 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 1862, 1194.  This quote is often 
taken out of context by citing only Morrill’s statement that the government has the right 
to demand the property of the people. 
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